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Abstract
The	  Communicable	  Disease	  Control	  Directorate	   (CDCD)	  within	   the	  Department	  of	  
Health	  in	  Western	  Australia	  (WA)	  is	  responsible	  for	  protecting	  Western	  Australians	  
from	   communicable	   diseases	   by	  monitoring,	   responding	   to,	   and,	  where	   possible,	  
preventing	   infectious	  disease	   incidents	   in	  the	  community	  and	  hospital	  sector.	  The	  
CDCD	  works	  closely	  with	  the	  government	  laboratory,	  PathWest,	  which	  is	  the	  main	  
diagnostic	  laboratory	  in	  WA.	  During	  2015-­‐2016,	  I	  completed	  a	  dual	  field	  placement	  
with	  the	  CDCD	  and	  PathWest.	  My	  experiences	  in	  these	  two	  placements	  fulfilled	  the	  
requirements	  of	  a	  Master	  of	  Philosophy	  in	  Applied	  Epidemiology	  (MAE).	  
As	   part	   of	   my	   core	   MAE	   competencies	   I	   performed	   the	   first	   evaluation	   of	   the	  
infectious	  syphilis	  surveillance	  system	  in	  WA.	  On	  the	  whole,	  the	  system	  adequately	  
met	   its	  objectives,	  however,	   I	  was	  able	  to	  provide	  a	  number	  of	  recommendations	  
for	   improvement.	  Recommendations	   included	   the	  collection	  of	  additional	  data	   to	  
improve	   case	   management,	   the	   development	   of	   electronic	   notification	   forms	   to	  
improve	   the	   timeliness	   of	   reporting,	   and	   implementing	   automatic	   upload	   of	  
laboratory	   results	   to	   facilitate	   case	   follow-­‐up.	   The	   results	   of	   the	   evaluation	  were	  
summarised	  and	  will	  be	  distributed	  to	  stakeholders.	  	  
I	   participated	   in	   two	   outbreak	   investigations	   associated	   with	   Salmonella	  
Typhimurium	   PFGE1	   (STM01).	   I	   was	   involved	   with	   the	   investigation	   of	   a	  
community-­‐wide	   outbreak	   of	   STM01	   and	   conducted	   a	   case-­‐control	   study	   to	  
determine	  the	  risk	  factors	  for	  illness.	  I	  found	  that	  illness	  was	  associated	  with	  eating	  
chicken	   cooked	   outside	   of	   the	   home,	   raw	   eggs,	   and	   particular	   brands	   of	   eggs.	   I	  
reported	  the	  results	  back	  to	  the	  lead	  investigators	  to	  guide	  efforts	  in	  identifying	  the	  
source.	  During	   interviews	  for	  the	  case-­‐control	  study,	  a	  cluster	  of	  cases	   linked	  to	  a	  
particular	  café	  was	  identified.	  I	  investigated	  the	  cluster	  with	  hypothesis-­‐generating	  
questionnaires,	   developed	   a	   hypothesis	   for	   factors	   associated	   with	   illness,	   and	  
designed	  a	  cohort	  study	  to	  test	  that	  hypothesis.	  We	  were	  unable	  to	  proceed	  with	  
the	   analytical	   study,	   however,	   environmental	   investigations	   of	   the	   cafe	   added	  
support	  to	  our	  hypothesis,	  and	  allowed	  us	  to	  provide	  recommendations	  to	  prevent	  
future	  outbreaks.	  	  
	   IV	  
During	  my	  time	  at	  PathWest,	  I	  investigated	  the	  relationship	  between	  inflammatory	  
bowel	  disease	  (IBD),	  a	  chronic	  inflammatory	  condition	  of	  the	  gastrointestinal	  tract,	  
and	   infection	  with	  Clostridium	  difficile,	   a	   spore	   forming	  anaerobic	  bacterium	   that	  
can	   cause	   severe	   gastrointestinal	   disease.	   International	   studies	   showed	   that	  
persons	  with	  IBD	  have	  both	  greater	  incidence	  of	  Clostridium	  difficile	  infection	  (CDI),	  
and	  poorer	  outcomes	  following	  infection.	  To	  determine	  if	  the	  situation	  was	  similar	  
in	   Australia,	   I	   conducted	   a	   large	   retrospective	   cohort	   study	   using	   linked	   hospital	  
administrative	   data,	   statutory	   death	   notifications,	   and	   CDI	   surveillance	   data	   for	  
WA.	  I	  found	  a	  high	  incidence	  of	  CDI	  in	  hospitalised	  patients	  with	  IBD,	  that	  was	  six	  
fold	   higher	   than	   that	   previously	   reported	   for	   non-­‐IBD	   patients.	   In	   contrast	   with	  
overseas	  studies,	  IBD	  patients	  in	  WA	  with	  CDI	  did	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  at	  increased	  risk	  
of	   death,	   or	   experience	   longer	   hospital	   stays	   than	   IBD	   patients	  without	   CDI.	   The	  
results	   are	   the	   first	   to	   report	   the	   current	   situation	   and	   outcomes	   of	   CDI	   in	   IBD	  
patients	  in	  Australia.	  	  
In	  this	  thesis,	   I	  document	  the	  experiences	  and	  competencies	   I	  have	  gained	  during	  
the	  MAE	  program.	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1 Introduction 
During my Masters of Applied Epidemiology, I was jointly placed at the 
Communicable Disease Control Directorate (CDCD) within the Western Australian 
Department of Health, and at PathWest Laboratories. The joint placement 
provided me with a breadth of projects and experiences in public health that 
would not have been possible at one placement alone. My experiences and 
projects over the two years are briefly detailed below, and selected topics 
discussed in greater depth in the following chapters. 
2 Field Placements 
2.1 CDCD 
The CDCD within the Department of Health aims to monitor and minimise the 
occurrence and spread of communicable diseases in Western Australia (WA). It is 
comprised of five major programs: 1) Sexual Health and Blood-borne Virus 
Program; 2) Prevention and Control Program; 3) Healthcare Associated Infections 
Unit; 4) Epidemiology and Surveillance Program; and 5) Case management Branch 
(HIV). Although I worked most closely with the Epidemiology and Surveillance 
Program, and the Sexual Health and Blood-borne Virus Program during my 
placement, I was included in meetings and discussions with the other programs. 
This meant that I developed a working knowledge and appreciation of their work. 
For instance, I attended meetings to discuss the public health response to a 
cluster of meningococcal cases in one region, and another meeting to debrief on 
the response to a mumps outbreak, and the learnings and research that could 
come from it. Both these meetings were driven by the Prevention and Control 
Program.   
During my time at the CDCD I became involved in several outbreaks of Salmonella, 
particularly a large community wide outbreak. Epidemiologists from OzFoodNet 
(the central body for monitoring and responding to food borne outbreaks of 
disease in Australia) based within the Epidemiology and Surveillance program 
detected a large community wide outbreak of a clonal Salmonella type (Pulse-
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Field Gel Electrophoresis Type 1, (STM01)) that began in 2014. Lack of clustering 
by time or location meant that establishing risk factors for infection was difficult. 
At the request of OzFoodNet, I developed and conducted a large case-control 
study to identify the risk factors for infection and to characterise the 
epidemiology of the outbreak. The results of this study were presented in several 
meetings held to determine the response to the outbreak, were used to inform 
stakeholders of the outbreak and the associated risk factors, and highlighted high 
risk behaviours for acquisition of Salmonella that could be the topic of public 
education campaigns (Chapter 2). During the course of the outbreak, I also 
identified a cluster of cases of the same Salmonella PFGE type linked to a 
particular cafe, and performed the outbreak investigation. The initial data 
generated from this investigation identified sous-vide (or slow cooked) eggs as a 
common exposure, and lead to a site investigation of the cafe, and another site 
investigation of the egg production farm that supplied eggs to that cafe. The site 
investigations did not conclusively confirm that these eggs were the source of the 
outbreak, however, recommendations to address issues in biosecurity, egg 
handling, or egg processing identified during the inspections were provided to 
both facilities and no further cases occurred (Chapter 3). I also became involved 
with a site investigation of an egg production farm associated with an outbreak 
of Salmonella of a different strain. I helped conduct the site investigation and 
collect samples. We isolated Salmonella spp. from several samples that were 
identical to that of the cases. The production farm was informed of the findings, 
and although we were not updated of the control measures adopted, there were 
no further cases of infection. I presented this investigation at a seminar at the 
National Center for Epidemiology and Public Health (Australian National 
University), and highlighted the importance of finding out the type of production 
system (cage, barn, or free range) when conducting a site investigation and 
understanding the difference between each to help determine the sampling 
strategy. 
I also participated in the multijurisdictional response to an outbreak of syphilis 
occurring across northern Australia. The outbreak began in Queensland in 2011, 
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moved to the Northern Territory in July 2013, and finally crossed into the 
Kimberley region of Western Australia in June 2014. In April of 2015, at the 
request of the Communicable Disease Network of Australia (CDNA), a 
multijurisdictional outbreak working group (the MJSO) was established to help 
co-ordinate the response to outbreak. I was present at the pilot meeting and was 
delegated the role of secretariat for the group. In this position I organised 
monthly meetings, prepared the agendas, wrote the minutes, prepared quarterly 
documents to update CDNA of the outbreak status and MJSO activities, formed 
and provided secretariat support for a sub-committee to ensure Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander engagement in the response, drafted papers for submission 
to the Australian Health Principal Protection Committee (AHPCC), prepared a 
plain English communique for public circulation to update of the outbreak, and 
co-authored a paper published in the Communicable Diseases Intelligence journal 
describing the outbreak (see Chapter 5). At the request of the MJSO, I also gave 
presentations at several national conferences updating of the outbreak situation 
and describing the outbreak response. The MJSO and my activities supporting this 
group helped raise awareness of the outbreak and facilitate a coordinated 
response across the affected jurisdictions.  My experience in the MJSO also led 
me to evaluate the infectious syphilis surveillance system in Western Australia 
(Chapter 6). Although the system performed well overall, I was nonetheless able 
to identify areas for improvement to help the system to continue performing 
efficiently and effectively into the future.  
Beyond my individual projects, I was absorbed into the general everyday workings 
of the CDCD. I attended journal club meetings with the Sexual Health and Blood-
borne Virus team, weekly surveillance updates with the Epidemiology and 
Surveillance team, joint CDCD and Department of Agriculture and Food (animal 
health) meetings, CDNA meetings as a silent observer, quarterly sexual health 
forums, and public health nurse updates. All these activities exposed me to a wide 
range of public health activities and approaches, and gave me an in depth 
understanding of the field.  
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2.2 PathWest 
My PathWest laboratory placement was within the research laboratory group of 
Professor Thomas Riley. The Riley Laboratory group primarily investigates the 
anaerobic spore forming organism, Clostridium difficile, and to a lesser extent, the 
efficacy of natural anti-microbials such as tea tree oil and honey. PathWest is the 
state diagnostic laboratory for WA, and has many facilities throughout the state. 
The Riley Laboratory was based at a large PathWest facility in west Perth, that 
also housed many of the diagnostic laboratories including the serology, 
molecular, food and waters, haematology and bacteriology laboratories. 
Spending time at the laboratory familiarised me with the diagnostic capabilities 
and research advances that were occurring through attending seminars and 
interacting with members from various laboratory groups. It helped me to 
appreciate the integral role that the laboratory plays in communicable disease 
control, and the value of strong relationships with laboratories for optimal public 
health outcomes. 
 A central role of research laboratories such as that of Professor Thomas Riley, is 
to perform hypothesis driven research to answer questions of public health 
importance, the results of which can be translated into action for public health 
benefit. Accordingly, during my placement with the Riley Laboratory I used a large 
linked dataset to investigate the incidence and outcomes of Clostridium difficile 
infection in patients with inflammatory bowel disease (IBD) in Western Australia 
(Chapter 4). We were interested in this particular question as international 
studies had shown increasing incidence of Clostridium difficile infection in this 
patient group, and of more concern, the infection led to poorer outcomes in 
terms of increased mortality and morbidity. In our study we described the 
epidemiology of Clostridium difficile infection in IBD patients in Western Australia 
and demonstrated clinically relevant differences in age distribution compared 
with the general population. Similar to international studies, our study also found 
a high incidence of Clostridium difficile infection in this patient group. We also 
found, that although IBD patients with Clostridium difficile infection experienced 
increased length of stay, the association was not independent. Clostridium 
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difficile infection was not associated with increased mortality either, although we 
interpret the results cautiously given a small sample size and potential for type II 
statistical error. The results of this study have been drafted into a late stage paper 
for submission to a peer reviewed journal, and will provide gastroenterologists in 
Australia with a baseline understanding of the epidemiology of Clostridium 
difficile infection in IBD patients, as well as the outcome of Clostridium difficile in 
IBD patients in the Australian context, and highlight clinically relevant features of 
the infection in this high risk population. This information can help ensure that 
IBD patients receive the best possible medical management if infected with 
Clostridium difficile. 
During my time in the Riley Laboratory, I also helped laboratory members design 
and conduct epidemiological projects for their studies. I found this teaching 
activity, along with the structured teaching activities included in our coursework 
(lessons from the field and teaching the first year cohort) useful in solidifying my 
own understanding of the topic. 
3 Conclusion 
In summary, the two-years of my training for a Masters in Applied Epidemiology 
were rich with experiences and learnings from my two placements at the CDCD 
and the Riley Laboratory within PathWest. Although I fulfilled all course 
requirements at the two placements, detailed in Table 1, the placements were 
more than just completing projects -they were an intense experience in applied 
epidemiology and public health by complete immersion. 
4 Acknowledgements 
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without the help and support of numerous people.  
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Chapter 2 
Risk factors for infection with an epidemic clone of 
Salmonella Typhimurium pulse-field gel 
electrophoresis type 0001 in Western Australia,     
2014-16
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1 Prologue   
My role 
The day that I began my placement at the CDCD I was introduced to the OzFoodNet 
epidemiologist, Dr Barry Combs, and updated of an ongoing community wide outbreak 
of a Salmonella serotype clone, STM01. The community cases were sporadic and not 
clustered by time or location, so determining risk factors for infection was difficult. As 
a result, OzFoodNet decided to conduct a case-control study in an effort to identify 
those risk factors and initiate public health mitigating actions. I was asked to conduct 
the study. Dr Barry Combs from OzFoodNet was my immediate supervisor for this 
project and intimately involved from beginning to end. Dr Combs and I designed the 
study. From there, my responsibilities included: 
• Creating and piloting the questionnaire in the online survey tool, ‘Survey
Monkey’
• Conducting interviews – I was one of three interviewers that interviewed all
cases and controls
• Data extraction and management
• Data analysis
• Collation and interpretation of data ready for publication and dissemination
Lessons learned 
I learnt a large number of lessons from this study, from questionnaire design through 
to analysis of large and complex data sets. During the study I gained a huge 
appreciation for the art of designing interview questions. At the outset it seemed easy, 
but in practice, framing the question to ensure that there was no ambiguity, you were 
not leading the respondent, and you were not putting them in a position where they 
felt the need to answer what they thought you wanted to hear was incredibly 
difficulty. In many cases, it was only once the interview process began, or during 
analysis that ‘glitches’ in some of our questions became apparent. As frustrating as 
that was, it was also the ultimate learning experience. 
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The case-control study was an excellent project to become practiced at interview 
technique. This is not something I had had experience with previously. I realised that 
interviewing is a take AND give process. Despite strictly adhering to the interview 
questionnaire, I learned that you still needed to engage with the respondent, realise 
any of their concerns and answer their questions. Often their questions meant 
providing them with public health information - being prepared for this was very 
useful.  
 
In the final analysis, responses from over 150 cases and 295 controls for over 45 
exposures were used– this was a large amount of data. One big lesson I took away 
from this project was the huge importance of the data cleaning and preparing step of 
analysis. If you take the time to get that right, the analysis is easy, clean and accurate.  
 
This was the ideal project with which to become very familiar with STATA. With the 
sheer amount of data and the analyses that were needed to be conducted I was forced 
out of my comfort zone and constantly seeking the most concise coding to achieve the 
outcome. I very quickly learnt how to find the help that I needed (particularly how to 
frame ‘search’ queries to get the answer I required) and interpret STATA coding 
instruction pages. I also learned the value of DoFiles and LogFiles to document my 
activities – these allowed me to review what I had done and be confident in my 
analyses. 
 
Logistic regression was the major statistical learning that I took from this project. 
Because of the size of the data we found a large number of significant associations and 
developing a multivariate model using logistic regression was not straightforward. I 
spent a large amount of time reflecting on how predictors should be selected into the 
full model and subsequently reduced. I like black and white science, but realised that 
logistic regression modelling has a lot of ‘grey’ – and not only was this okay, but it was 
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necessary. Through reading many texts and becoming more familiar with logistic 
regression I was able to identify a process for selecting predictors and reducing the 
model that considered confounders and was objective, yet led to an appropriately 
parsimonious outcome. 
There are many, many more lessons that I learned through this project but there are 
too many to list all. Overall, it was an ideal project for learning epidemiology ‘by doing’. 
Public health impact 
The results of this study identified consumption of raw eggs as a risk factor for STM01 
infection, and highlighted poor knowledge of proper handling of raw eggs in both cases 
and controls. The finding that raw eggs were a risk factor for infection strengthened 
findings from numerous investigations of outbreak clusters of the same Salmonella 
type, where illness was also associated with raw egg consumption. Together these 
data were provided to the relevant authorities to stimulate investigation and initiate 
sampling strategies to identify the source and consider control measures. I also 
presented our data around the handling of raw eggs to the relevant authorities who 
suggested education campaigns to improve public knowledge of the risks associated 
with raw egg consumption and handling. This study was necessary to understand the 
epidemiology of STM01 and drive an evidence based response to the outbreak. 
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2 Abstract 
Background: In 2014 a large community-wide outbreak of salmonellosis due to 
Salmonella enterica serotype Typhimurium pulse-field gel-electrophoresis sub-type 
0001 (STM01) occurred across Western Australia. In that year, notification rates more 
than tripled from the previous six-year average, and STM01 became the most 
commonly notified strain. The majority of cases were not associated with recognised 
point sources and did not cluster by location or time, making it difficult to identify risk 
factors from descriptive epidemiology alone. We performed a case-control study 
describing the epidemiology of the outbreak and identifying the risk factors for 
infection, to provide recommendations for public health action in response to the 
outbreak. 
Methods: Between February 2015–March 2016, we interviewed all community cases 
of STM01 with a history of diarrhoea. For each case that met the inclusion criteria, we 
chose two controls selected randomly from the state-wide influenza notification 
database. Controls were matched to cases by age and location. Cases and controls 
were asked about exposures to potential risk factors in the seven days prior to illness 
onset of the matched case. Cases were asked additional questions about their clinical 
illness. 
Deidentified data were collected in the online survey tool, Survey Monkey, and 
analysed used STATA v 14.1. Demographic and clinical data were analysed using the 
appropriate statistical techniques for categorical or continuous data. We calculated 
Mantel-Haenszal odds ratios for STM01 infection and different exposures stratified by 
matching variables and interpreted the results to be significant if accompanied by a 2  
test (or Fisher’s Exact) p value ≤0.05. To determine if significant exposure factors were 
independently associated with illness, we performed multivariate analysis using logistic 
regression with a backwards stepwise reduction approach to identify the most 
parsimonious model. The population attributable proportion was calculated for all 
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exposure factors that remained in the final model. Data were further analysed as 
described above by two subgroups, MLVA-523 and MLVA-496, based on their multiple-
locus variable number tandem repeat (MLVA) profile. 
Results: A total of 152 cases and 295 controls were included in the study. In addition to 
diarrhoea, cases reported symptoms of fever (88%), abdominal pain (86%), and bloody 
diarrhoea (42%). Median duration of diarrhoea was 7 days (range 1-24 days) and 34% 
of cases were hospitalised. Eating chicken out-of-home (OR 1.51, 95%CI 1.00-2.27), 
consuming raw eggs (OR 2.20, 95%CI 0.99-4.89), and consuming brand A free range 
eggs (OR 2.14, 95%CI 1.03-4.44)  were associated with illness on univariable analysis. 
Raw eggs remained associated with infection in a final multivariate model (OR 3.3, 
95%CI 1.15-9.71). Through investigations of food handling and preparation behaviours, 
we also found that a large proportion of both cases and controls (over 40%) did not 
wash their hands after handling raw eggs. 
Clinical illness did not differ between MLVA-523 and MLVA-496 cases. Both subgroup 
analyses detected similar risk factors associated with illness to the full data set, 
although, an additional brand of eggs, Brand C, was also found to be associated with 
illness in cases infected with MLVA-496. 
Conclusions: We found an association between STM01 infection and consuming raw 
eggs by multivariate analysis. Initial analyses demonstrated an association between 
illness and consuming Brand A or Brand C free range. We also found that a large 
proportion of both cases and controls did not wash their hands after handling raw 
eggs. As a result, we recommend public health actions that include increased sampling 
of Brand A and Brand C eggs, increased sampling of flocks and egg laying environments 
that provide eggs under these two brands, and increased public health messaging 
around the risks and proper harm reducing activities associated with both handling and 
consuming raw eggs. We also detected a significant and independent association 
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between consumption of chicken prepared outside the home and STM01 illness. 
Further studies, such as surveys, are needed to determine if actions are required to 
increase the awareness of commercial food businesses of the risks associated with the 
handling and preparation of foods that are known vehicles of Salmonella transmission, 
and their food safety responsibilities. 
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3 Introduction 
Salmonella enterica are gram negative, rod-shaped bacteria that can cause severe 
illness in humans (salmonellosis) and are a leading cause of acute gastroenteritis in 
Australia, and worldwide 1, 2. There are over 2500 strains of Salmonella enterica (called 
serotypes), and most of those pathogenic to man belong to a single subspecies, 
Salmonella enterica subspecies enterica3. In Australia, the serotype most commonly 
implicated in human infections is Salmonella enterica subspecies enterica serotype 
Typhimurium (STM)4, 5. Transmission of Salmonella spp. occurs via the faecal-oral route 
which can be mediated through direct human-human contact, animal-human contact, 
or ingestion of contaminated foodstuffs (foodborne). Foodborne Salmonella infections 
in Australia, and worldwide, are most often associated with the consumption of eggs 
and egg-based dishes 4, 6, but other common sources of infection include poultry, dairy 
products, contaminated water, and foods prepared on contaminated food surfaces 7. 
 
In Australia, outbreaks of Salmonella infection prompt rapid public health investigation 
and response due to the potential severity of infection and impact on the community. 
In 2010, it was estimated that over 10% of Salmonella gastroenteritis cases in Australia 
were hospitalised with 126.3 deaths/100,000 acute cases. It was also estimated that 
over 8.8 percent of all Salmonella acute gastroenteritis cases went on to develop 
pathological sequelae including irritable bowel syndrome (IBS) and reactive arthritis 8; 
two considerably debilitating conditions9-11. Altogether, the impact of Salmonella 
infection in Australia has been calculated at a substantial 54.1 disability adjusted life 
years (DALYs) per 1000 cases of infection with sequelae8. As a result, Salmonella 
notifications are closely monitored by state and national disease control 
epidemiologists to ensure rapid detection of outbreaks and initiation of response 
activities to identify sources and interrupt transmission.  
 
In 2014, WA state enteric epidemiologists detected a sustained increase in 
notifications of Salmonella enterica serotype Typhimurium PFGE strain type 0001 
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(STM01). Notification rates rose to 4.74 notifications/100,000 population/year which 
was over threefold higher than that of the prior six-year average of 1.28 
notifications/100,000 population/year (range 0.76-1.82) and STM01 became the most 
commonly notified strain of Salmonella in WA that year. The vast majority of cases 
(over 95%) occurred in isolation and were not linked to other cases of infection by 
location or time. Given the greater than expected number of notifications and 
epidemiology of the cases, the situation was defined as a community-wide outbreak. 
Figure 3-1 Notifications of Salmonella enterica serotype Typhimurium  PFGE strain type 1 
(STM01)  in Western Australia, January 2010 to March 2015 
In response to the outbreak, all STM01 community cases were followed-up by 
interview to identify risk factors and potential sources of transmission. Initial 
hypothesis generating questionnaires found that 91% of community cases consumed 
eggs, particularly raw or runny eggs which was considerably higher than that observed 
for Salmonella cases historically (73%) and led to the hypothesis that community 
STM01 infection was associated with the consumption of raw eggs. The hypothesis was 
24 
consistent with what was known about the modes of transmission for Salmonella spp. 
and commonly implicated food sources. From these preliminary findings, commercial 
egg and chicken meat sampling activities were increased in an attempt to confirm the 
source of contamination and implement control measures to protect the public.  
However, in the first quarter of 2015, a further 99 cases of STM01 were notified 
(Figure 3-1), which was only 23 cases less than that recorded for the entire year of 
2014. Given the escalating situation, greater public health intervention measures were 
needed. To test the hypothesis for the cause of illness and to strengthen the evidence 
which could be used to focus interventions we decided to conduct an analytical study 
using a case control method to identify risk factors for illness. To help design and 
initiate a prospective case-control study for community illness with STM01 we used 
information gleaned from a literature review of previous STM01 outbreaks, and the 
results of the earlier hypothesis generating questionnaires.  
The specific aims of the study were to: 
1) describe the epidemiology of the outbreak; and
2) test the hypothesis that sporadic STM01 illness was associated with the
consumption of raw or runny eggs
The results of this study were expected to provide evidence to support further public 
health action in response to the community outbreak of STM01 in WA. 
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4 General methods 
4.1 Recruitment of study subjects 
4.1.1 Salmonella PFGE 1 cases (STM01) 
We used the Western Australian Notifiable Diseases Database (WANIDD) to identify all 
cases of STM01 notified to the West Australian Department of Health between 27 
February 2015 - 30 March 2016. 
For the purpose of this study, a case of STM01 was defined as any person residing in 
WA with diarrhoea (defined as three or more loose stools in a 24-hour period) and 
laboratory confirmed STM01 by pulse-field gel electrophoretic analysis (PFGE) 
between 27 February 2015 and 30 March 2016.  We attempted to interview all cases 
that met the study case definition. From 20 November 2015 to 30 March 2016, the 
volume of notifications for STM01 exceeded the capacity of staff to interview every 
case. As a result, every second case from that period was recruited into the study. This 
method of recruitment was random as the laboratory analysed samples and notified 
them as results become available with no systematic pattern.  
Cases were excluded from the study if they met any of the exclusion criteria listed in 
Table 4-1. 
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Table 4-1 Exclusion criteria applicable to cases and controls 
Exclusion criteria Cases Controls 
Interviewed more than 30 days since onset of diarrhoea ✓ -
Interviewed more than 55 days since case onset of diarrhoea - ✓
A householder experienced diarrhoeal illness or salmonella 
infection in the month prior to case onset of diarrhoea 
✓ ✓
Had salmonella or a diarrhoeal illness in the 2 weeks prior to 
onset of diarrhoea in the case 
- ✓
Travelled overseas in the 7 days prior to case onset of diarrhoea ✓ ✓
If a metropolitan resident – spent more than 3 days in a rural area 
in the 7 days prior to case onset of diarrhoea 
✓ ✓
If a rural resident – spent more than 3 days in the metropolitan 
area in the 7 days prior to case onset of diarrhoea 
✓ ✓
Was part of a STM01 point source outbreak ✓ -
Suffered from a condition that causes regular diarrhoea (such as 
irritable bowel syndrome, inflammatory bowel disease, 
malabsorption syndromes etc) 
✓ ✓
Could not be interviewed due to staff capacity constraints ✓ ✓
4.1.2 Influenza controls 
We frequency matched controls to cases by age group (0-4, 5-18, 19-45, 60+ years old) 
and location (Perth metropolitan or rural (any area outside of the Perth metropolitan 
area)) at a ratio of 2:1. Controls interviewed between 27 February 2015 and 29 
September 2015 were sourced from laboratory-confirmed influenza cases notified to 
WANIDD in 2014. Controls interviewed between 30 September 2015 and 30 March 
2016 were sourced from influenza cases notified to WANIDD between January and 
August 2015. This change was adopted to maintain the participation rate of controls in 
the study by keeping their influenza episode within a relevant time frame to the 
interview. Cases of influenza for each time period (2014 or January to August 2015) 
were identified, grouped by matching criteria (age group and location), and then 
generated into a random order using the Excel “Rand” function and sort command. 
27 
Controls were sequentially selected from the random list for each case as needed. 
Exclusion criteria for controls are listed in Table 4-1. 
4.2 Interview 
Both cases and controls were interviewed over the telephone by one of three trained 
interviewers using a standardized questionnaire for cases and another for controls. 
These questionnaires differed only in questions relating to clinical disease. 
Interviewers entered questionnaire data into an online survey tool, SurveyMonkey. 
Study subjects were identified by WANIDD number alone and other identifying 
information was not collected. The case questionnaire is included in Appendix 9-1. 
We attempted to contact study subjects five times, on at least two separate days. Of 
the five contact attempts, at least one was in the morning, one around lunchtime, and 
another in the late afternoon or evening. After five unsuccessful contact attempts, the 
study subject was removed from the study and listed as ‘uncontactable’. 
We interviewed parents or guardians of study subjects under the age of 16, and for 
study subjects age 16-18 years old, we obtained verbal consent to interview from 
parents or guardians.  
Cases and controls were interviewed about potential exposures that occurred within a 
7-day period, which coincided with the 7 days prior to onset of diarrhoea in a case
patient (‘period of interest’). Cases and controls (or parents/guardians) were also 
interviewed about general household practices around handling and buying raw 
chicken meat or eggs, if they prepared food for the household more than 50% of the 
time or bought groceries for the household more than 50% of the time. We contacted 
cases as soon as possible after notification to WANIDD and within 30 days of diarrhoea 
onset. All controls were interviewed within 55 days of diarrhoea onset in a case. The 
interview questionnaire collected information on participant demographics, clinical 
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illness, and potential exposures including; chicken meat exposures, egg exposures, 
other food exposures, and pet exposures. For subjects under the age of five, we 
included specific questions on consumption of breast milk and whether they attended 
day care or kindergarten in the period of interest. There were 45 questions in total for 
study subjects greater than 5 years or older, and 47 for study subjects less than 5 
years. 
 
4.3 Analysis 
4.3.1 Data management 
Interview data collected in SurveyMonkey were downloaded and converted into 
MicroSoft Excel file format, imported into the statistical program STATA v.14.1, and 
combined into a single data set. Data were checked and corrected for missing, 
duplicate, nonsensical and unusual values. The data were recoded into an 
appropriated format for analysis in STATA. Data reported as ‘unknown’ or ‘unsure’ 
were recoded as missing.  
 
4.3.2 Descriptive analysis 
We analysed the data using cross-tabulation and chi-squared (2) analysis or Fisher’s 
Exact (where less than 5 observations were expected in any cell) to determine whether 
significant differences existed between cases and controls on demographic variables. 
Demographic variables tested included age (matching factor), sex, Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander status, country of birth, and location of residence (matching 
factor). A 2  or Fisher’s Exact p value ≤0.05 was considered statistically significant. 
 
To assess potential selection bias between cases excluded from the study and those 
included, we compared demographic data of these two groups using the analytic 
approach described above. 
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Lastly, the clinical characteristics of Salmonella infection in cases were analysed and 
described. 
4.3.3 Initial analysis 
To test study hypotheses, we analysed data for associations between STM01 infection 
and exposure factors by estimating the odds ratio and adjusting for the matching 
variables age and location. Both the crude and adjusted Mantel-Haenszel odds ratios 
(OR) were assessed. Statistical significance was assessed using 2 test (or Fisher’s Exact 
test where there were less than 5 expected observations in any cell) at the p≤0.05 
level.    
4.3.4 Multivariate analysis 
Multivariate analysis was performed using logistic regression. All exposure variables 
with a p value less than 0.1 in univariate analysis were included in an initial ‘Full 
model’, as well as the two matching variables age and location. Age was modelled as a 
categorical variable based on matching categories. Gender was also included in the 
‘Full model’ as it is a common confounder. Exposure variables were not included in the 
full model if there were less than 5 observations in any cell of a 2x2 table or there were 
more than 10% missing data. If variables were co-linear, only the variable with the 
smallest p value was selected. After running the model, variables with p>0.05 were 
removed to create a ‘Reduced model’ (age and location were retained regardless of 
the p value).   The ‘Reduced model’ was compared to the ‘Full model’ using a likelihood 
ratio test (LR test) and checked for evidence of OR changes greater than 30% between 
the two models. If the LR test was not significant (p >0.05), and there were no major 
shifts in odds ratios (<30%), the reduced model was retained. If either the LR test was 
significant (p ≤0.05) or major shifts in ORs were observed (>30%), we concluded that a 
significant variable had been removed and the reduced model could not be retained. 
We then investigated the individual contribution of each variable to the model by 
starting with the ‘Full model’ and sequentially removing each variable beginning with 
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the least significant. After each removal, we compared the new model (Full-model-1, 
etc.) to the Full model by LR test, and checked for any significant shifts in the ORs of 
remaining variables. If either the LR test p-value was <0.05, or there were significant 
shifts in ORs, the variable was interpreted to contribute substantially to the model and 
retained, otherwise it was removed.  We cycled through these steps until no further 
variables could be removed without affecting either the LR test or the ORs. The ‘final’ 
reduced model was assessed for goodness of fit to the data using the Hosmer and 
Lemeshow test. We also plotted a receiver operator curve and calculated the area 
under the curve using 0.7 or greater as a cutoff measure of acceptable discrimination.  
Finally, the proportion attributable fraction was calculated for all exposure factors that 
retained significantly elevated odds ratios by multivariate analysis. The proportion 
attributable fraction was calculated using the formula: Pe(OR-1)/[Pe(OR-1)]+1, where 
Pe is the proportion exposed in the controls, and OR is odds ratio.  
All statistical and epidemiological analyses were performed using the statistical 
software package STATA v14.1.  
4.4 Multiple-locus variable number tandem repeat analysis (MLVA) subtyping 
To explore the relatedness of the STM01 bacteria isolated from cases, the PathWest 
laboratory sub-typed isolates using multiple-locus variable number tandem repeat 
analysis (MLVA). MLVA profiles are reported as a set of five numbers that reflect the 
number of repeats found by variable number tandem repeat analysis of five specific 
loci (STTR9-STTR5-STTR6-STTR10-STTR3). The number of repeats in the outer loci, 
STTR9 and STTR3, show slower rates of change than the inner loci (STTR5, 6 and 10) 
and, consequently, differences in isolates at these loci are interpreted to indicate more 
distant relationships, whereas changes at STTR5, 6 and 10, depending on the 
magnitude, are less influential 12. 
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To build a phylogenetic tree, typing data were imported into BioNumerics TM, 
Software package v7.5 (Applied Maths), for cluster analysis using categorical 
coefficients of zero tolerance and the unweighted pair-group method with arithmetic 
mean (UPGMA). 
 
We then grouped cases based on the outer two loci, STTR-9 and STTR3, and analysed 
the data from each group for potential differences in demographics or exposure 
variables using the methods described above. We chose to group on these two loci 
given they indicate the most distant relationship.  
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5 Results 
Study population 
 
From 27 February 2015 to 29 February 2016, 358 patients with STM01 were 
interviewed from a total of 386 cases notified to WANIDD. This represented an overall 
response rate of 92.7%. Of the 28 cases that were not interviewed, 18 were lost to 
follow-up, 6 for unknown reasons, 3 were un-contactable, and 1 declined. These ‘non-
responder’ cases did not differ significantly from the study population by age, gender 
or location of residence. 
 
According to pre-determined exclusion criteria (see Table 4-1 in methods), 206 of 358 
interviewed patients with STM01 were excluded from the study. Being associated with 
an outbreak was the most common reason for exclusion (25%), followed by exclusion 
due to staff capacity constraints (22%), interviewed more than 30 days after onset of 
diarrhoea (15%), and living in a household with another gastroenteritis patient (15%). 
The remaining 23% met the remaining exclusion criteria (see Methods 4.1.1). As a 
result, 152 patients with STM01 met the selection criteria and were recruited to the 
study.  Excluded cases did not differ significantly from recruited cases on age, gender, 
or location of residence. The epidemic curve of all patients with STM01 broken down 
by enrolled, excluded and non-responders, (Figure 5-1) and the age-sex notification 
rates (Figure 5-2) demonstrate that enrolled patients were representative of patients 
across the study period. From here on, enrolled STM01 patients will be referred to as 
‘cases’. 
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Figure 5-1 Cases of STM01 notified to WANIDD by month of diarrhoea onset, Western 
Australia 27 February 2015- 29 February  2016. 
Figure 5-2 Age-sex notification rate/100,000 population/ year for STM01 notified cases and 
STM01 enrolled cases between 27 February 2015 – 29 February 2016 
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The median age of cases was 26 years with an interquartile range (IQR) of 6-49 years 
(Table 5-1), however, age distribution was skewed to the right (Figure 5-2). Cases were 
similarly distributed between males and females (47% and 53%, respectively) and 85% 
lived in the metropolitan area of Perth, WA. Despite 74% of cases being born in 
Australia, no cases were of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander descent.  
 
Table 5-1 Demographic features of cases and controls 
Demographics Cases (n=152) Controls (n=295) P value 
Median Age (IQR)      24   (6-47)        31   (7-50) 0.501 
Male (%)    71    (47)    145    (49) 0.625 
Lives Metro (%)      129    (85)    251    (85) 
0.952 
Live Rural (%)    23    (15)      44    (15) 
Born in Australia (%)      111    (74)    214    (73) 0.871 
Aboriginal or  
Torres Strait Islander (%)* 
     0     (0)      14     (5) 0.006 
 
 
 
 We recruited 295 controls, frequency matched to cases by age group and location of 
residence. Two controls were matched to each case except in nine instances where 
only one control was able to be matched to a case within the given time period (55 
days of diarrhoea onset in the case). Controls differed significantly from cases only on 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander status (Table 5-1); no cases identified as Aboriginal 
or Torres Strait Islander whereas 5% of controls did (p=0.006). 
 
Time from the period of interest to the interview date for cases and controls is 
summarized in Appendix 9-2 and 9-3. Cases were interviewed a median of 22.5 days 
(IQR 19-25 days) following the period of interest, whereas for controls, the median 
time was 28 days (IQR 24-32 days). This difference was significant (Wilcoxon rank-sum 
test p<0.001).  
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Overall, participation rates for controls was moderate. Up until the 20 October 2015 
we sourced controls amongst influenza cases notified in 2014 (control group 1). 
Participation rates were low at 60.5% (Appendix 9-4). From the 20 October 2015 
onwards we sourced controls from influenza cases notified between January and 
August 2015 (control group 2) in an attempt to improve participation rates. Not only 
did participation rates not improve (55.6%), but a greater proportion of controls 
declined to participate (14% vs 4.3%). Excluded controls did not differ significantly 
from enrolled controls by age, however, a greater proportion of excluded cases were 
male (58% vs 49%) and lived in a rural location (23% vs 14%).  
 
 
Descriptive analysis: Cases 
The epidemic curve of all STM01 cases notified to WANIDD by month of diarrhoea 
onset (Figure 5-1) is suggestive of a seasonal pattern with fewest cases occurring in the 
winter and spring months of May to September. This pattern was retained in the cases 
recruited to the study. 
 
All cases reported experiencing diarrhoea (this was expected given diarrhoea was a 
requirement of case selection) and in 42% of cases, diarrhoea was bloody. Table 5-2 
demonstrates that the next most common clinical signs were abdominal pain and 
fever, reported by 86% and 88% of cases, respectively. Headache and nausea were 
experienced by more than 60% of cases, yet only 47% of cases reported vomiting. Of 
the 60 cases that reported other symptoms, those most commonly reported were: 
chills (23%, n = 14), dizziness (11%, n=7) and muscle or joint aches/pains (17%, n=10). 
Median duration of illness was 7 days (IQR 5-10 days). At the time of interview, 12% of 
cases reported ongoing illness which may have been up to 30 days since their onset of 
symptoms. A total of 34% of cases required hospitalization and the median period of 
time spent in hospital was 3 days (IQR 2-6 days).  
 
 36 
 
 
Table 5-2 Characteristics of Salmonella PFGE 1 infection 
Characteristic No. (Total n) % 
Diarrhoea 152 (152) 100 
Fever  130 (148) 88 
Abdominal Pain 125 (146) 86 
Headache   90 (135) 67 
Nausea   92 (141) 65 
Vomiting   72 (152) 47 
Other   60 (135) 44 
Bloody diarrhoea   62 (147) 42 
Hospitalised   51 (152) 34 
Still ill at time of interview   15 (121) 12 
 
MLVA analysis demonstrated 2 major groups within the case data set based on the 
outer loci; 76% of cases had an MLVA profile of 03-XX-XX-XX-523 (‘MLVA-523’ cases) 
and 23% a profile of 03-XX-XX-XX-496 (‘MLVA-496’ cases). The predominant profile of 
cases in the MLVA-523 group was 03-26-16-11-523 (25%) and in the MLVA-496 group 
the predominant profile was 03-10-15-11-496 (40%).  
 
Although the MLVA dendrogram, Figure 5-3, demonstrates considerable variability 
within the central loci of the MLVA-523 and MLVA-496 cases, 68% of MLVA-523 and 
92% of MLVA-496 profiles differed by less 2 nucleotides to the predominant profile for 
each group at any two loci. 
 
The findings led us to consider the possibility that two outbreaks of STM01 caused by 
different MLVA subtypes were occurring concurrently. We split cases into the MLVA-
496 and MLVA-523 sub-groups and analysed the data to determine if differences 
existed between the two sub-populations.  
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Figure 5-3 Dendrogram of STM01 isolates evaluated by MLVA from all cases included in the 
study  
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We found no significant differences between the two groups on demographic variables 
such gender, location of residence, born in Australia, and Aboriginal or Torres Strait 
Islander status (Appendix 9-5), although age approached statistical significance with 
MLVA-496 cases having a lower median age. Similarly, cases did not differ significantly 
in the clinical illness reported following infection in either MLVA group (Appendix 9-6).  
Descriptive analysis: Cases and controls 
We were interested to determine whether cases differed from controls in key 
behaviours associated with preparation, handling, and buying of raw chicken or eggs.  
Handling raw eggs 
Table 5-3 demonstrates that cases did not differ significantly to controls with respect 
to having handled raw eggs in the period of interest (p=0.415) or in their tendency to 
wash their hands after handling raw eggs (p = 0.959). However, it was notable that 
overall a large proportion of study subjects did not wash their hands after handling raw 
eggs (>40%) and over 10% were unsure.  
Table 5-3 Behaviour of cases and controls with regard to handling raw eggs in the 7 days prior 
to onset of illness (cases) or period of interest (controls). 
Response n (%) 
2  p-value 
No Yes Unsure 
Handled eggs 
Cases      (N=118) 23 (19)         95   (81) - 
0.415 
Controls (N=207) 33 (16) 174 (85) - 
Washed hands immediately after handling eggs 
Cases      (N=95) 39 (41) 45 (47) 11 (12) 
0.959 
Controls (N=174) 72 (41) 80 (46) 22 (13) 
39 
Handling raw chicken 
Cases differed significantly from controls with respect to washing raw chicken before 
cooking. Table 5-4 demonstrates that a greater proportion of controls than cases 
washed chicken always (30% vs 20%), or sometimes (15% vs 8%) before cooking 
(p=0.005). However, no significant difference between the two groups was detected 
for the behaviours of washing hands after handling raw chicken and washing surfaces 
after contact with raw chicken. Over 90% of cases and controls reported always 
washing their hands after handling raw chicken meat and over 80% always washed 
surfaces used to cut raw chicken meat before using them for other purposes.  
Table 5-4 Behaviour of cases and controls with regard to handling raw chicken 
Frequency of behavior  % (n) 2  
p-value Always Sometimes Never 
Wash raw chicken meat before cooking 
Cases         (N=111) 22 (20)  9   (8)  80  (72) 
0.011 
Controls    (N=197) 60 (30) 29 (15) 108 (55) 
Wash hands after handling raw chicken 
Cases         (N=111)     104 (94)  6  (5)   0 (0) 
0.614 
Controls    (N=197)     189 (96)  7  (4)   0 (0) 
Wash surfaces after contact with raw chicken 
Cases         (N=110)    93 (85)  8  (7)   8 (7) 
0.098 Controls    (N=197)     183 (93)  7  (4)   5 (3) 
Furthermore, cases did not differ from controls on their method of defrosting frozen 
chicken (Figure 5.4, Fisher’s Exact p=0.547). In Figure 5-4 it is apparent that most cases 
and controls chose to defrost chicken in the fridge (29% and 36%), followed by the 
bench at room temperature (17% and 16%) and a combination of in the fridge and on 
the bench (18% and 15%). 
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Figure 5-4 Defrosting methods used by cases and controls 
Of 363 cases and controls that prepared food for the household 302 reported how they defrosted 
chicken: in the fridge; at room temperature on the bench; in the microwave; in the sink; or other 
method. Subjects were able to report multiple methods. Data were analysed by Fisher’s exact to 
determine if cases defrosted chicken significantly differently to controls. 
 
 
 
Buying and packing raw chicken meat 
The results for investigations around buying and packing raw chicken meat are given in 
Appendix 9-7 and 9-8. They show that cases and controls did not differ significantly on 
where they bought raw chicken from (Fisher’s exact test p=0.244), or how they packed 
raw chicken whilst shopping (Fisher’s exact test p=0.088). Most cases and controls 
bought prepackaged chicken from the supermarket (58% and 50% respectively) rather 
than from the butcher or delicatessen, and the majority packed raw chicken on its own 
or with other raw meat (57% of cases and 51% of controls).  
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Univariate analysis 
The results of univariate analysis are summarized in Table 5-5, and further data 
describing results by MLVA sub-groups are provided in Appendix 9-9 and 9-10. 
Exposures associated with consuming chicken meat 
Prior to initiating the case control study, hypothesis generating questionnaires 
identified consumption of chicken meat as a potential risk factor for STM01 infection. 
Although univariate analysis of the case control data demonstrated several significant 
associations between chicken meat-related exposures and STM01 infection, most 
associations were linked to decreased, rather than increased odds ratios. Cases were 
less likely to consume fresh chicken parts (OR 0.63, 95% CI 0.41-1.00, p=0.043), whole 
chicken (OR 0.47, 95% CI 0.26-0.84, p=0.009), marinated chicken (OR 0.53, 95% CI 0.29-
0.95, p=0.029), crumbed chicken (OR 0.36, 95% CI 0.15-0.83, p=0.013), frozen chicken 
nuggets (OR 0.29, 95% CI 0.14-0.61, p<0.001), and frozen chicken strips (OR 0.28, 95% 
CI 0.10-0.83, p=0.015) than controls (Table 5-5). Only exposure to eating chicken 
outside of the home was associated with an elevated odds ratio (OR 1.51, 95%CI 1.00-
2.27, p=0.045). Although we asked cases to specify location of exposure, only 40% of 
cases and controls responded and the variable could not be interrogated further. No 
common food venue (point source outbreak) was identified.  
Negative associations between chicken related exposures and STM01 infection were 
also detected during sub-analysis by MLVA-523 but not MLVA-496 subgroups. Similar 
to the full dataset, MLVA-523 cases were less likely to consume whole chicken (OR 
0.47, 95% CI 0.24-0.91, p=0.025), crumbed chicken (OR 0.34, 95% CI 0.11-1.00, 
p=0.042) or frozen chicken nuggets (OR 0.29, 95% CI 0.12-0.68, p=0.003) than controls, 
and more likely to eat chicken outside of the home (OR 1.68, 95% CI 1.05-2.69, 
p=0.027).  
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Exposures associated with consuming eggs 
Significantly elevated odds ratios were detected between two egg associated 
exposures; consuming raw eggs (OR 2.20, 95% CI 0.99-4.89, p=0.048), and Brand A free 
range eggs (OR 2.14, 95% CI 1.03-4.44, p=0.037). There were no negative associations 
amongst the egg associated exposures. It was of note that, overall, there was generally 
poor recall of egg brands consumed during the period of interest; 44% of cases and 
40% of controls could not recall a particular brand of eggs. The high proportion of 
missing data indicates that these results should be interpreted with caution. 
 
Brand A free range eggs retained elevated odds ratios in the MLVA- 523 sub-analysis 
but not in the MLVA-496 sub-analysis. However, two new associations were observed 
in this sub group. MLVA-496 cases were more likely to consume any brand free range 
eggs, and Brand C free range eggs than controls. Both exposures were associated with 
an elevated odds ratio (OR 2.36, 95% CI 1.02-5.46, p=0.045 and OR 6.42, 95% CI 1.63-
25.29, p=0.002 respectively).  
 
Other food exposures 
Data were also collected on other foods and behaviours (such as eating out) that have 
been identified as risk factors for infection in previous salmonellosis outbreaks. 
Analysis of these data revealed only negative associations. Cases were significantly less 
likely to consume lamb meat (OR 0.37, 95% CI 0.24-0.58, p<0.001), pork meat (OR 0.58, 
95% CI 0.38-0.89, p=0.009), strawberries (OR 0.42, 95% CI 0.28-0.64, p<0.001), 
potatoes (OR 0.43, 95% CI 0.26-0.67, p=<0.001) or onions (OR 0.52, 95% CI 0.32-0.85, 
p=0.008) than controls (Table 3-7). Although eating chicken outside the home was 
previously found to be significantly associated with illness, eating at a restaurant or 
cafe was surprisingly associated with decreased odds ratio (OR 0.64, 95% CI 0.41-0.99, 
p=0.039). There were no other exposures with increased odds ratios.  
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On sub-analysis by MLVA, only lamb meat and strawberries retained a negative 
association with illness amongst the MLVA-496 cases, whereas, many more exposures 
retained their protective associations amongst MLVA-523 cases. Two new protective 
associations were observed during sub-analysis; within the MLVA-496 dataset cases 
were less likely to eat bananas than controls (OR 0.42, 95% CI 0.18-1.00, p=0.047); and 
within the MLVA-523 dataset cases were less likely to eat broccoli than controls (OR 
0.56, 95% CI 0.34-0.92, p=0.024). 
 
Pet associated exposures 
No associations between pet-related exposures and Salmonella PFGE1 illness were 
detected in the full and MLVA-496 sub-analysis. However, the MLVA-523 sub-analysis 
demonstrated a significant association between feeding pets raw liver and illness, 
although only two cases reported this exposure and no controls (p=0.040).   
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Table 5-5 Outcomes of univariate analysis from a case-control study of STM01 in Western Australia, 
2015-2016 
Exposure Cases 
 
Controls 
 
Crude  Age and Location adjusted (MH) 
D* 
No % 
 
No % 
 
OR 95%CI  OR 95% CI p-value 
Chicken exposures              
Ate any chicken 119 79 
 
252 86 
 
0.62 0.36-1.09  0.61 0.37-1.03 0.059  
Fresh Chicken 
        
 
    
 
     Chicken parts 108 72 
 
234 80 
 
0.66 0.41-1.08  0.63 0.41-1.00 0.043 ↓ 
     Whole chicken 17 12 
 
63 22 
 
0.45 0.24-0.85  0.47 0.26-0.84 0.009 ↓ 
     Marinated chicken 16 11 
 
53 18 
 
0.53 0.27-0.98  0.53 0.29-0.95 0.029 ↓ 
     Crumbed chicken 7 5 
 
34 12 
 
0.36 0.13-0.85  0.36 0.15-0.83 0.013 ↓ 
     Chicken mince 14 9 
 
24 8 
 
1.15 0.53-2.40  1.15 0.57-2.33 0.751  
Frozen chicken 
        
 
    
 
     Chicken parts 4 3 
 
19 7 
 
0.39 0.09-1.20  0.38 0.13-1.15 0.079  
     Whole chicken 3 2 
 
5 2 
 
1.15 0.18-5.99  1.15 0.27-4.87 0.845  
     Chicken nuggets 9 6 
 
50 17 
 
0.30 0.13-0.65  0.29 0.14-0.61 <0.001 ↓ 
     Chicken strips 4 3 
 
25 9 
 
0.28 0.07-0.85  0.28 0.10-0.83 0.015 ↓ 
Ate free range chicken 56 41 
 
127 49 
 
0.72 0.46-1.12  0.70 0.46-1.07 0.103  
Ate chicken out 83 58 
 
131 47 
 
1.53 1.00-2.35  1.51 1.00-2.27 0.045 ↑   
Egg exposures 
        
 
     
 
Ate eggs at home  115 78 
 
218 76 
 
1.14 0.69-1.90  1.13 0.70-1.81 0.616  
Ate eggs that were:            
     runny 61 42 
 
107 37 
 
1.22 0.76-1.87  1.22 0.81-1.82 0.336  
     well cooked 73 50 
 
164 57 
 
0.75 0.50-1.14  0.75 0.51-1.12 0.164  
     raw 13 9 
 
12 4 
 
2.25 0.92-5.54  2.20 0.99-4.89 0.048 ↑ 
     raw cake mix 11 8 
 
33 12 
 
0.63 0.28-1.33  0.64 0.31-1.31 0.216  
     cage eggs 19 14 
 
61 22 
 
0.59 0.32-1.06  0.58 0.33-1.03 0.063  
     barn eggs 13 10 
 
33 12 
 
0.78 0.36-1.60  0.78 0.40-1.54 0.474  
     free range eggs 76 55 
 
130 47 
 
1.42 0.92-2.17  1.42 0.94-2.14 0.090  
     home eggs 18 14 
 
43 16 
 
0.85 0.44-1.58  0.82 0.45-1.49 0.510  
If ate free range, what brand?… 
       
 
    
 
     Brand A 15 13 
 
16 6 
 
2.13 0.94-4.78  2.14 1.03-4.44 0.037 ↑ 
     Brand B 19 16 
 
30 12 
 
1.38 0.70-2.67  1.38 0.74-2.56 0.310  
     Brand C 11 9 
 
11 4 
 
2.15 0.82-5.64  2.22 0.93-5.30 0.067  
Ate eggs out 25 17 
 
41 15 
 
1.23 0.68-2.19  1.24 0.71-2.15 0.449  
Other food exposures 
        
 
     
 
Consumed: 
        
 
     
 
     lamb meat 39 29 
 
145 52 
 
0.38 0.24-0.60  0.37 0.24-0.58 <0.001 ↓ 
     pork meat 53 37 
 
136 49 
 
0.59 0.38-0.91  0.58 0.38-0.89 0.009 ↓ 
     bananas 106 71 
 
221 77 
 
0.75 0.47-1.20  0.74 0.47-1.17 0.196  
     strawberries 58 37 
 
169 60 
 
0.43 0.28-0.66  0.42 0.28-0.64 <0.001 ↓ 
     potatoes 107 71 
 
247 85 
 
0.43 0.26-0.72  0.43 0.26-0.67 <0.001 ↓ 
     tomatoes 103 70 
 
223 76 
 
0.71 0.45-1.13  0.69 0.43-1.11 0.125  
     onions 104 71 
 
238 83 
 
0.53 0.32-0.88  0.52 0.32-0.85 0.008 ↓ 
     raw salads 115 78 
 
225 77 
 
1.04 0.63-1.73  1.06 0.64-1.74 0.826  
     sushi 32 22 
 
76 27 
 
0.77 0.46-1.26  0.77 0.47-1.25 0.288  
Ate café or restaurant food 53 37 
 
132 48 
 
0.64 0.41-1.00  0.64 0.41-0.99 0.039 ↓ 
Pet exposures 
        
 
    
 
Dogs 84 57 
 
175 60 
 
0.89 0.59-1.36  0.90 0.60-1.34 0.598  
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Cats 36 24 78 27 0.86 0.53-1.39 0.87 0.55-1.37 0.546 
Pets ate: 
     raw Chicken Necks 13 10 28 10 0.91 0.42-1.89 0.92 0.46-1.83 0.802 
     raw Bones 13 10 24 9 1.07 0.48-2.29 1.07 0.53-2.18 0.842 
     raw Liver 2 2 1 0 4.10 0.21-242.25 3.90 0.37-41.77 0.218 
Contact with pets faeces 30 30 55 25 1.28 0.73-2.23 1.19 0.69-2.04 0.530 
 D: direction of association; ↑: elevated; ↓:reduced; BOLD text: significant associations 
Multivariate regression 
In multivariate analysis, we found that consumption of raw eggs and eating chicken out 
remained independently and significantly associated with STM01 illness in multivariate 
analysis, with elevated odds ratios of 3.33 (CI 1.15-9.71, p=0.027) and 1.79 (CI 1.03-
3.10, p=0.038) respectively. Of all the chicken associated risk factors that were 
identified to be protective by univariate analysis, only fresh crumbed chicken and 
frozen chicken nuggets retained reduced odds ratios (OR 0.36, CI 0.13-1.00, p= 0.049 
and OR 0.30, CI 0.11-0.80, 0.016 respectively). Lamb meat, strawberries, and potatoes 
also retained inverse associations with illness (Table 5-6).  
Results for multivariate regression by MLVA sub-group are given in appendices 9-11 
and 9-12. These results show that no exposure factors remained associated with illness 
on multivariate analysis of MLVA-496 sub-group data. However, chicken nuggets, lamb 
meat, strawberries and potatoes all maintained significantly decreased odds ratio on 
analysis of MLVA-523 sub-group data. Only eating chicken outside of the home 
retained elevated odds ratio in the MLVA-523 sub-analysis. 
The proportion attributable fraction was calculated for any factors that remained in 
the multivariate model and retained significant and positive associations with illness. 
The results are found in Table 5-7 below. 
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Table 5-6 Outcomes of multivariate analysis from a case-control study of STM01 in Western 
Australia, 2015-2016 
Variables 
Full Model Reduced Model 
OR 95% CI p-value OR 95% CI p-value
M
at
ch
in
g 
va
ri
ab
le
s Age group 
0-4 (reference)
5-17 2.38 0.85-6.64 0.097 1.82 0.74-4.48 0.195 
18-49 1.19 0.47-3.02 0.716 1.08 0.49-2.37 0.848 
50+ 1.42 0.52-3.85 0.490 1.33 0.56-3.14 0.519 
Location 1.67 0.72-3.84 0.229 1.28 0.603-2.71 0.523 
Ex
p
o
su
re
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
Gender 0.92 0.51-1.71 0.811 - - - 
Chicken exposures 
Fresh Chicken 
     Chicken parts 0.64 0.33-1.27 0.202 - - - 
     Whole chicken 0.54 0.23-1.25 0.147 0.49 0.23-1.04 0.064 
     Marinated chicken 0.85 0.37-1.94 0.693 - - - 
     Crumbed chicken 0.44 0.14-1.37 0.157 0.36 0.13-1.00 0.049 
Frozen chicken 
     Chicken nuggets 0.40 0.14-1.18 0.097 0.30 0.11-0.80 0.016 
Ate chicken out 1.82 0.99-3.37 0.055 1.79 1.03-3.10 0.038 
Egg exposures 
Ate eggs at home that were… 
     Raw 3.18 1.04-9.74 0.043 3.33 1.15-9.71 0.027 
     Cage eggs  0.56 0.24-1.34 0.192 0.66 0.32-1.36 0.259 
      Free Range eggs 1.32 0.72-2.43 0.369 - - - 
Other food exposures - - - 
Consumed 
     Lamb meat 0.29 0.15-0.55 <0.001 0.27 0.15-0.48 <0.001 
     Pork meat 0.75 0.39-1.41 0.367 - - - 
     Strawberries 0.38 0.21-0.71 0.003 0.35 0.20-0.61 <0.001 
     Potatoes 0.43 0.21-0.84 0.015 0.49 0.26-0.92 0.027 
     Onions 0.93 0.42-2.02 0.848 - - - 
Ate café or restaurant food 0.61 0.33-1.13 0.114 - - - 
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Table 5-7 Proportion attributable and preventative fraction in all significant variables from the 
reduced logistic regression model 
Exposure Factor Proportion exposed aOR PAF 
Ate chicken prepared outside the home 0.479 1.79 27.1 
Raw eggs 0.056 3.33 8.5 
aOR: adjusted odds ratio: PAF: proportion attributable fraction.  
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6 Discussion 
Risk factors for STM01 illness 
The results of our study demonstrated an association between STM01 illness and the 
consumption of raw eggs. Cases were found to be 3.33 times more likely to have 
consumed raw eggs in the seven days before illness than controls. The association is 
plausible as Salmonella Typhimurium is known to colonise the gastrointestinal tract of 
poultry and can be shed in the faeces for extended periods of time 13, 14. Human 
exposure to egg shells with contamination from faeces, or more generally from the 
environment present a real transmission risk for Salmonella Typhimurium. The 
association between consumption of undercooked eggs and human Salmonella 
Typhimurium infection is not novel and has been demonstrated previously in a number 
of outbreaks in Australia 4, 5, 15, 16. The risk of infection can be mitigated by reducing 
Salmonella infection in affected layer flocks, reducing cross-contamination during egg 
processing and packaging, and by proper cooking of raw eggs and appropriate hygiene 
practises following handling of raw eggs in the kitchen 17, 18. Taken together, our results 
support at least two public health actions in response to the community outbreak of 
STM01: 1) strategic sampling of eggs and layer flocks/farms to identify the source of 
contamination, to inform control measures, and 2) public health messaging around the 
safe handling and preparation of raw eggs or products containing eggs in households 
and food businesses to mitigate human illness.   
 
To gather information for strategic sampling of flocks and eggs, we specifically asked 
cases and controls about brands of eggs consumed in the period of interest. A greater 
proportion of cases than controls consumed Brand A free range eggs (Brand A eggs) 
and univariate analysis revealed a significantly elevated odds ratios associated with 
this risk factor. However, the association requires cautious interpretation as the 
relevant data contained a large number of missing values for both cases and controls 
(40 and 46% respectively). Missing data can lead to analyses with bias 19 and will 
decrease the power of multivariate analyses as a results of all subjects with missing 
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data for any predictor in the model being excluded. For these reasons, exposure to 
Brand A eggs was not included in the multivariate analysis, although we did include its 
higher order variable, exposure to free range eggs. Overall, the data do not allow for 
an assertion that STM01 illness is associated with Brand A eggs, but provide useful 
suggestion of where further sampling efforts should be concentrated.   
 
Eating chicken prepared outside the home was also associated with increased risk of 
illness by both univariate and multivariate analyses. The association is plausible given 
that Salmonella Typhimurium in faecal material on feet or feathers of chicken can 
contaminate the carcass during processing 13, 20, 21 and has been reported previously in 
other Salmonella outbreaks both in Australia and overseas16,22. No point source 
outbreaks associated with chicken meat consumption were identified as would be 
expected if chicken outside the home was implicated, so the result is difficult to 
interpret. Although difficult to prove, this may indicate that single servings of chicken 
meat prepared by many food businesses may very occasionally contain 
uncooked/partially cooked chicken meat leading to illness. This may appear as sporadic 
illness in the community.  Taken together, the results indicate that commercial food 
businesses may not recognise the risks associated with providing chicken products for 
human consumption and may not be adhering to food safety guidelines when handling 
or preparing raw chicken. A similar concern was raised in an Australia-wide study that 
detected increased risk of salmonellosis associated with the consumption of another 
risk factor, raw egg-containing foods, also from commercial venues 15. In WA 
commercial food businesses are required to understand and comply with food safety 
guidelines outlined in the food standards code (Australia and New Zealand) and 
legislated in the Food Act 2008. To determine whether additional educational 
strategies are needed to improve food safety in commercial venues in WA, we need to 
ascertain the degree to which commercial food businesses understand and comply 
with the food standards code, and understand the risks associated with the handling 
and preparation of foods that are known vehicles of salmonella transmission.  
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Although both raw egg consumption and exposure to raw chicken were associated 
with STM01 illness, they only provided small population attributable risk fractions 
(8.5% and 27.1 % respectively). The small population attributable risk fractions may 
indicate that other factors responsible for a substantial proportion of community 
STM01 illness have not been identified in this study. A logical explanation is that we 
simply didn’t ask the right questions. We designed our study questionnaire around 
findings from standard hypothesis-generating or ‘trawling’ interviews, and known risk 
factors from the literature, methods that would not capture novel exposure factors. To 
identify other potential risk factors, we need more descriptive epidemiology with the 
flexibility to identify novel risk factors. In future studies, that flexibility could be 
provided by investigations using qualitative and ethnographic/observational 
techniques.  
 
Our study identified five exposure variables that were inversely associated with STM01 
illness. It is not unusual to detect protective factors in large case control studies of 
outbreaks due to Salmonella and other enteric pathogens, such as Campylobacter 23-28. 
However, interpreting inverse associations can be complex 29. Ordinarily, inverse 
associations would be interpreted to mean that the risk factor is protective against 
infection (or negatively associated with illness). However, several other explanations 
for inverse relationships exist, particularly where the inverse association does not have 
a high index of plausibility for conferring protection. For instance, the inverse 
association could be a result of statistical chance, bias due to differential recall 
between cases and controls, or confounding due to an association between the risk 
factor and another unidentified factor that is truly protective29. Another consideration 
for inverse associations is that of confounding due to protective immunity. A recent 
study found that the development of protective immunity following frequent 
exposures to what is actually a risk factor may lead to erroneously inverse rather than 
positive associations 30. In our study, we first considered the plausibility of inverse 
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associations providing a protective effect, and then considered the impacts of bias and 
confounding.  
It was difficult to ascribe plausibility to any of the five risk factors in our study that 
demonstrated an inverse association with STM01 illness. Exposure to crumbed chicken 
and frozen chicken nuggets have been associated with increased rather than 
decreased risk of salmonellosis 31-33. It seems more likely that this inverse association is 
a result of bias (perhaps recall bias of a commonly eaten food item) or statistical 
chance than a truly protective factor. Again, it was hard to resolve the inverse 
relationship between lamb and STM01 infection particularly since exposure to lamb 
has also been associated with increased rather than decreased risk of salmonellosis 34,
35. It is possible that those who ate lamb were less likely to eat other high risk meats
such chicken and were protected by aversion rather than by an inherent protective 
factor of lamb meat consumption itself. The last inverse associations with STM01 
illness were that of strawberries and potatoes. There is some evidence to suggest that 
strawberries contain compounds with antimicrobial activity against Salmonella spp 36. 
Whether those compounds exist in sufficient concentration to deliver a therapeutic or 
prophylactic effect when eaten, to our knowledge, has not been determined. It is 
possible that both potatoes and strawberries may have provided protection from 
illness through their consumption as part of a healthy lifestyle, and thereby decreased 
exposure to other potential risk factors, but overall, more investigation is needed 
before considering either of these risk factors as protective. The inability to confidently 
ascribe plausibility to any of the inverse associations detected in this study restricted 
our ability to interpret them as protective. With that in mind, it was inappropriate to 
calculate and report population preventative fractions for these factors as a key 
assumption in that calculation is a cause and effect relationship between the exposure 
factor and illness. 
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Overall, analysis by MLVA subgroups, MLVA-523 and MLVA-496, revealed few 
differences in demographic characteristics, clinical presentation or risk factors 
between the two groups, but did suggest a potential difference in the source of 
infection. Similar to the full data set analysis, univariate analysis of the MLVA-523 
subset indicated a significant association between consuming Brand A eggs and STM01 
illness. However, univariate analyses of the MLVA-496 subset, demonstrated a 
significant association with another brand of eggs, Brand C free range eggs. For 
reasons discussed earlier, neither variable was included in the multivariate analyses. 
However, the univariate results clearly provide preliminary data that there may be two 
sources of contamination, and flocks providing free range eggs under either Brand A or 
Brand C should be sampled.   
 
Food handling and preparation 
Our findings regarding food handling behaviours indicate that health messaging 
around safe handling and preparation of raw eggs or products containing eggs is 
warranted. Over 40% of both cases and controls did not wash their hands after 
handling raw eggs and over 10% were unsure. Similar results were found in an 
Australian national survey of consumer behaviour and egg consumption in 2008, 
where 46% of respondents reported washing their hands ‘sometimes’ through to 
‘never’ after handling raw eggs 37.  Our data suggest that the public are not adequately 
aware of the risks associated with handling raw eggs and the potential for cross 
contamination. Clear educational messaging to raise the public’s awareness of these 
risks and the associated proper harm reducing activities is an intervention that could 
be effected immediately in response to the outbreak. 
 
We also surveyed cases and controls regarding their raw chicken handling behaviour. 
Our data showed that the need to wash hands and surfaces after handling raw chicken 
was well understood by both cases and controls. However, we found a surprising 
difference between cases and controls in their tendency to wash raw chicken before 
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cooking. Disease control experts advise against washing raw chicken before cooking as 
the activity does not consistently decrease the bacterial load, and could increase the 
risk of infection by spreading contamination around the kitchen 38. With this 
knowledge, we expected controls to be less likely to wash raw chicken. Contrary to 
what was expected, we found that a greater proportion of controls than cases washed 
raw chicken before cooking. This discrepancy could have two explanations. First, 
people who wash raw chicken may have overall higher levels of kitchen hygiene 
protecting them from infection, or second, it is possible that washing raw chicken does 
not actually increase the risk of infection with salmonella. A brief literature review 
found no published studies that explored the incidence of salmonellosis in households 
that washed chicken versus those that do not. A sensible study would be to investigate 
general kitchen hygiene practises between households that do, and those that don’t 
wash raw chicken before cooking. Nonetheless, the area clearly needs more 
investigation, using observational and microbiological studies as well as systematic 
literature review techniques. 
 
Limitations 
There were several reasons for using persons notified for influenza as controls in this 
study. Using notified influenza cases helped to reduce bias with respect to health 
seeking behaviours, and ensured a sufficiently large pool of potential controls to meet 
our requirements both for matching and absolute numbers. Notified influenza cases 
also met additional criteria for controls in that they were representative of the 
population from which the cases arose, were at risk of STM01, and could be identified 
and contacted in a timely manner 39. Last, using notified influenza cases as controls 
allowed us to employ a strategy to improve participation rates, by asking the controls 
questions of their influenza episode as well. Initially, we used influenza notifications 
from the year before (2014), however, towards the end of the influenza season in 2015 
(September) we detected a decrease in the participation rates of controls despite 
inquiring of their influenza episode. In an attempt to maintain participation rates, we 
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selected controls notified between January- August 2015 for all interviews conducted 
from the 22nd of October onwards. This kept the interview date of controls more 
timely to their influenza episode. Unfortunately, the strategy was not successful and 
we saw evidence for decreased rather than increased participation. Unlike the first 
group of controls, the second group of controls were interviewed outside of the 
influenza season (May – October), which perhaps contributed to the poor participation 
rates despite the smaller time-frame between interview and their influenza episode. 
Our attempt to increase control participation by changing the sampling frame from 
influenza notifications in 2014, to influenza notification between January to August 
2015 may have influenced our results. However, we believe this change was unlikely to 
have substantially affected the results or altered the overall conclusions of this study 
as variables that could have impacted on results such as age and location were 
matched.  
 
Another limitation of our study was the time-frame we chose as the period of interest 
for controls. We chose to interview controls about their risk factors during a time-
frame that coincided with that of a case. We chose this method in an effort to: 1) keep 
recall times similar between cases and controls, and 2) remove bias due to availability 
of food items. To establish the time period of interest, we interviewed cases prior to 
controls, meaning that controls had greater recall times. The median recall time for 
cases was 22.5 days (range 8-30) and for controls it was 28 days (range 11-52). The 
difference in recall time may have decreased the ability of controls to remember 
exposures to risk factors, biasing results away from the null, however, we don’t believe 
this would have substantially affected overall conclusions of the study given that the 
difference was small.  
 
In our study there was the potential for recall bias associated with the exposures 
‘eating chicken prepared outside the home’ and ‘raw eggs’. It is publically known that 
salmonellosis, or ‘food poisoning’, is often associated with chicken 40 and outbreaks of 
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salmonellosis from eggs are frequently reported in the media 41-43. It is, therefore, 
possible that cases considered these factors at the time of illness for easier recall than 
controls at a later date, biasing the results away from the null. Recall bias between 
cases and controls is a problem in any case-control study. However, in our study 
chicken consumption was asked in the context of a memorable event, eating food 
prepared outside the home and, therefore, there was likely smaller discrepancy 
between cases and controls in their ability to remember the exposure. In the case of 
raw eggs, we found that both cases and controls were similarly poor at recalling the 
brand of eggs eaten generally. We take this to indicate that although egg associated 
outbreaks are frequently reported in the media, in our study it did not lead to better 
recall of egg associated exposures in cases than controls and was unlikely to have 
considerably influenced the results.  
 
7 Conclusion  
 
In conclusion, we found that the consumption of raw eggs and eating chicken prepared 
outside the home were positively associated with STM01 illness. Our results support a 
number of public health actions. We recommend increased sampling of eggs and layer 
flocks to help identify the source of contamination and interrupt the transmission of 
infection. We suggest that a strategic approach would include sampling of eggs and 
flocks that provide eggs to Brand A and Brand C free range eggs. We also recommend 
increased public health messaging around the risks and proper harm-reducing 
activities associated with handling of raw eggs - there appears to be a knowledge gap 
in this area. Last, further investigations are needed to estimate the level by which 
commercial food businesses comply with food safety guidelines, to decide if actions 
are needed to increase awareness of their responsibilities and the risks associated with 
the handling and preparation of foods that are known vehicles of salmonella 
transmission.  
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9 Appendix 
Appendix 9-1 Case questionnaire 
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Appendix 9-2 Time to interview 
Median (days) IQR (days) Range (days) p value 
Cases 22.5 19-25 8-30
<0.001 
Controls 28 24-32 11-52
Appendix 9-3 Histogram showing days to interview for cases and controls 
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Appendix 9-4 Recruitment outcome of controls from recruitment group 1 and recruitment 
group 2 
Group 1 Group 2 
Recruitment n (%) n (%) 
Participated 156 (60.5) 139 (55.6) 
Ex
cl
u
d
ed
 Not contactable 59 (22.9) 43 (17.2) 
Declined 11 (4.3) 35 (14.0) 
Other 32 (12.4) 33 (13.2) 
Total 258 250 
Appendix 9-5 A comparison of the demographic features of MLVA-523 cases and MLVA-496 
cases 
Appendix 9-6 Characteristics of Salmonella infection in  MLVA- 523 vs MLVA- 496 cases 
Characteristics 
       523           496 
p value 
   n    (N) %   n  (N) % 
Bloody diarrhoea   46 (110) 42 14 (34) 41 0.947 
Vomiting   53 (114) 47 18 (35) 51 0.609 
Fever   94 (110) 85 33 (35) 94 0.168 
Nausea   66 (106) 62 24 (32) 75 0.185 
Abdominal Pain   93 (110) 85 29 (33) 88 0.635 
Headache   64 (102) 63 24 (31) 77 0.130 
Other   47 (100) 47 12 (33) 36 0.286 
Still ill at time of interview   13   (87) 15   2 (31) 6 0.223 
Hospitalised   39 (114) 34 11 (35) 31 0.760 
Median days in hospital 
(IQR) 
    4  (2-6)   3 (2-5) 0.264 
Demographics MLVA-523 n= 114 MLVA-496 n=35 p value 
Median Age (IQR)      27   (7-52)     18   (4-41) 0.051 
Male n.(%)     52      (45)     17   (49) 0.759 
Lives Metro n.(%)   99     (87)     28   (80)
0.318 
Live Rural n.(%)     15   (13)       7   (20)
Born in Australia n.(%)     83      (73)     25   (71) 0.814 
Aboriginal and/or 
Torres Strait Islander n.(%) 
      0     (0)       0     (0) -
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Appendix 9-7 Results from questions regarding buying and packing of raw chicken 
Breakdown of where cases(A) and controls (.) ordinarily bought raw chicken; prepackaged from 
the supermarket, from the deli section of the supermarket, from the butcher, or using another 
method. Proportions were compared for significant difference using a Fisher’s exact test. 
Appendix 9-8 Methods of packing raw chicken meat 
Method of packing chicken n (%) 
Fisher’s 
exact test 
On own, or 
with other 
raw meat 
With other 
groceries 
In an individual 
plastic bag 
with other 
groceries 
Other 
method 
N/A 
Case      
(n=118) 
67  (57) 8 (7) 31  (27) 0  (0) 12  (10) 
0.088 
Control 
(n=231) 
118 (51) 32 (14) 59 (26) 6  (3) 16 (7)
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Appendix 9-9 Outcomes of univariate analysis in MLVA-496 study subjects from a case-control study of 
STM01 in Western Australia, 2015-2016 
Exposure Cases Controls Crude Age and Location adjusted (MH) 
No % No % OR 95%CI OR 95% CI p-value 
Chicken exposures 
Ate any chicken 28 80 62 91 0.39 0.10-1.50 0.37 0.12-1.19 0.074 
Fresh Chicken 
     Chicken parts 24 71 59 86 0.41 0.13-1.25 0.35 0.12-1.05 0.060 
     Whole chicken 3 9 15 22 0.36 0.06-1.43 0.37 0.10-1.37 0.120 
     Marinated chicken 5 14 19 28 0.44 0.12-1.39 0.45 0.16-1.32 0.143 
     Crumbed chicken 3 9 13 19 0.39 0.07-1.58 0.38 0.10-1.49 0.163 
     Chicken mince         3 9 10 14 0.55 0.09-2.37 0.55 0.14-2.21 0.405 
Frozen chicken 
     Chicken parts 1 3 5 7 0.39 0.01-3.69 0.40 0.05-3.50 0.401 
     Whole chicken 1 3 0 0 - - - - 0.157 
     Chicken nuggets 2 6 10 15 0.35 0.04-1.78 0.38 0.08-1.69 0.142 
     Chicken strips 0 0 5 7 0 0.00-1.46 0 - 0.102
Ate free range chicken 14 44 34 54 0.66 0.26-1.70 0.65 0.27-1.56 0.342
         …of an unknown brand 6 18 2 4 5.67 0.91-59.84 6.26 1.10-35.73 0.282
Ate chicken out 17 53 33 50 1.13 0.45-2.88 1.12 0.48-2.62 0.797
Egg exposures 
Ate eggs at home  29 83 51 71 1.61 0.53-5.54 1.59 0.58-4.40 0.360 
Ate eggs that were: 
     runny 16 47 20 29 2.18 0.85-5.55 2.19 0.94-5.16 0.069 
     well cooked 14 41 39 57 0.54 0.21-1.34 0.51 0.22-1.21 0.134 
     raw 3 9 2 3 3.14 0.34-38.87 3.05 0.50-18.62 0.206 
     raw cake mix 6  17 11 16 1.09 0.30-3.62 1.09 0.35-3.40 0.883 
     cage eggs 3 9 13 19 0.41 0.07-1.67 0.41 0.11-1.58 0.194 
     barn eggs 1 3 8 13 0.21 0.01-1.72 0.18 0.02-1.79 0.121 
     free range eggs 24 69 32 47 2.45 0.97-6.43 2.36 1.02-5.46 0.045 ↑ 
     home eggs 3 9 14 21 0.38 0.07-1.53 0.39 0.11-1.36 0.115 
If ate free range, what brand?… 
     Brand A 0 0 2 3 0 0.00 – 4.60 0 - 0.342
     Brand B 2 9 3 5 1.78 0.14-16.56 1.60 0.24-10.46 0.632
     Brand C 8 29 3 5 7.47 1.56-46.69 6.42 1.63-25.29 0.002 ↑
Ate eggs out 8 24 7 11 2.70 0.76-9.69 2.86 0.87-9.40 0.081
Other food exposures 
Consumed: 
     lamb meat 10 31 35 54 0.39 0.14-1.03 0.40 0.17-0.96 0.040 ↓ 
     pork meat 12 36 39 57 0.44 0.17-1.12 0.46 0.20-1.08 0.067 
     bananas 20 57 51 76 0.42 0.16-1.10 0.42 0.18-1.00 0.047 
     strawberries 11 32 40 61 0.31 0.12-0.80 0.29 0.12-0.72 0.006 ↓ 
     potatoes 29 85 56 84 1.14 0.33-4.59 1.07 0.34-3.41 0.905 
     broccoli 27 77 45 70 1.43 0.51-4.29 1.41 0.55-3.60 0.460 
     tomatoes 23 66 52 75 0.63 0.24-1.69 0.57 0.21-1.54 0.264 
     onions 27 82 61 90 0.52 0.13-2.06 0.48 0.14-1.63 0.237 
     raw salads 22 63 53 78 0.48 0.18-1.30 0.45 0.17-1.15 0.091 
     sushi 23 21 55 26 0.74 0.41-1.33 0.74 0.42-1.31 0.310 
Ate café or restaurant food 13 43 30 48 0.82 0.31-2014 0.85 0.36-2.00 -
79 
Pet exposures 
Dogs 23 68 45 66 1.07 0.41-2.87 1.07 0.44-2.65 0.879 
Cats 7 20 20 30 0.60 0.19-1.72 0.62 0.24-1.61 0.313 
Pets ate: 
     raw Chicken Necks 1 3 7 11 0.26 0.01-2.22 0.26 0.03-2.22 0.195 
     raw Bones 3 10 9 15 0.63 0.10-2.81 0.62 0.16-2.39 0.474 
     raw Liver 0 0 1 2 0 - 0 - 0.450
Contact with pets faeces 10 43 14 26 2.20 0.69-6.86 1.72 0.64-4.68 0.278
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Appendix 9-10  Outcomes of univariate analysis in MLVA-523 study subjects from a case-control study of 
STM01 in Western Australia, 2015-2016 
Exposure Cases 
 
Controls 
 
Crude  Age and Location adjusted (MH)  
No % 
 
No % 
 
OR 95%CI  OR 95% CI p-value  
Chicken exposures              
Ate any chicken 88 79 
 
186 85 
 
0.65 0.35-1.23  0.64 0.35-1.14 0.125  
Fresh Chicken 
        
 
    
 
     Chicken parts 81 72 
 
171 78 
 
0.72 0.41-1.26  0.70 0.42-1.19 0.191  
     Whole chicken 14 13 
 
48 23 
 
0.49 0.24-0.96  0.47 0.24-0.91 0.025 ↓ 
     Marinated chicken 11 10 
 
34 16 
 
0.57 0.25-1.22  0.57 0.28-1.16 0.110  
     Crumbed chicken 4 4 
 
21 10 
 
0.33 0.08-1.03  0.34 0.11-1.00 0.042 ↓ 
     Chicken mince 11 10 
 
14 7 
 
1.58 0.62-3.89  1.60 0.69-3.71 0.272  
Frozen chicken 
        
 
    
 
     Chicken parts 3 3 
 
14 7 
 
0.39 0.07-1.44  0.39 0.11-1.38 0.130  
     Whole chicken 2 2 
 
5 2 
 
0.75 0.07-4.69  0.76 0.15-3.93 0.744  
     Chicken nuggets 7 6 
 
38 18 
 
0.31 0.11-0.75  0.29 0.12-0.68 0.003 ↓ 
     Chicken strips 4 4 
 
18 8 
 
0.40 0.10-1.25  0.38 0.13-1.19 0.090  
Ate free range chicken 41 40 
 
92 48 
 
0.73 0.43-1.21  0.71 0.43-1.56 0.167  
        …of an unknown brand 3 3 15 8 0.35 0.06-1.29  0.36 0.10-1.24 0.088  
Ate chicken out 64 59  94 46  1.70 1.03-2.81  1.68 1.05-2.69 0.027 ↑ 
Egg exposures 
        
 
     
 
Ate eggs at home  85 78 
 
162 76 
 
1.11 0.62-2.03  1.11 0.64-1.92 0.714  
Ate eggs that were:            
     runny 44 40 
 
84 39 
 
1.05 0.64-1.72  1.05 0.66-1.67 0.846  
     well cooked 58 53 
 
123 57 
 
0.83 0.51-1.35  0.83 0.52-1.32 0.431  
     raw 10 9 
 
10 5 
 
2.05 0.74-5.68  1.99 0.82-4.87 0.123  
     raw cake mix 5 5 
 
21 10 
 
0.45 0.13-1.27  0.45 0.17-1.22 0.109  
     cage eggs 16 17 
 
47 23 
 
0.69 0.33-1.29  0.64 0.33-1.23 0.182  
     barn eggs 11 12 
 
25 13 
 
0.92 0.39-2.06  0.90 0.42-1.93 0.786  
     free range eggs 51 52 
 
95 46 
 
1.23 0.74-2.05  1.24 0.77-2.01 0.369  
     home eggs 15 16 
 
29 14 
 
1.11 0.52-2.29  1.10 0.55-2.19 0.796  
If ate free range, what brand?… 
       
 
    
 
     Brand A 14 13 
 
14 7 
 
2.27 0.95-5.40  2.22 1.01-4.86 0.040 ↑ 
     Brand B 16 17 
 
26 14 
 
1.27 0.60-2.63  1.29 0.65-2.54 0.466  
     Brand C 2 2 
 
8 4 
 
0.50 0.05-2.60  0.53 0.11-2.55 0.422  
Ate eggs out 17 16 
 
33 16 
 
1.00 0.50-1.97  1.00 0.53-1.90 0.993  
Other food exposures 
        
 
     
 
Consumed: 
        
 
     
 
     lamb meat 28 28 
 
107 51 
 
0.38 0.22-0.65  0.36 0.21-0.61 <0.001 ↓ 
     pork meat 39 36 
 
94 47 
 
0.64 0.38-1.06  0.64 0.40-1.03 0.063  
     bananas 84 76 
 
164 76 
 
0.97 0.55-1.73  0.97 0.56-1.68 0.916  
     strawberries 47 42 
 
126 59 
 
0.49 0.30-0.80  0.49 0.31-0.78 0.003 ↓ 
     potatoes 75 66 
 
185 85 
 
0.34 0.19-0.61  0.34 0.19-0.59 <0.001 ↓ 
     broccoli 65 61 160 74 0.56 0.33-0.95  0.56 0.34-0.92 0.024 ↓ 
     tomatoes 79 72 
 
168 77 
 
0.74 0.43-1.31  0.74 0.43-1.28 0.282  
     onions 74 68 
 
173 81 
 
0.50 0.29-0.88  0.49 0.28-0.86 0.010 ↓ 
     raw salads 92 83 
 
168 77 
 
1.44 0.78-2.75  1.57 0.84-2.93 0.153  
     sushi 23 21 
 
55 26 
 
0.74 0.41-1.33  0.74 0.42-1.31 0.310  
Ate café or restaurant food 40 37 
 
101 49 
 
0.61 0.37-1.00  0.61 0.37-0.99 0.044 ↓ 
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Pet exposures 
        
 
    
 
Dogs 58 53 
 
127 58 
 
0.80 0.49-1.30  0.81 0.51-1.28 0.358  
Cats 28 25 
 
57 26 
 
0.94 0.53-1.62  0.94 0.56-1.59 0.822  
Pets ate: 
        
 
    
 
     raw Chicken Necks 12 12 
 
21 10 
 
1.13 0.48-2.53  1.14 0.54-2.42 0.732  
     raw Bones 9 9 
 
15 8 
 
1.20 0.44-3.05  1.22 0.51-2.90 0.662  
     raw Liver 2 2 
 
0 0 
 
- -  - - 0.040  
Contact with pets faeces 20 27 
 
40 25 
 
1.01 0.56-2.14  1.03 0.54-1.98 0.920  
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Appendix 9-11 Outcomes of multivariate analysis from MLVA-496 study subjects of a case-control 
study of STM01 in Western Australia, 2015-2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
Full Model  Reduced Model 
 OR 95% CI p-value  OR 95% CI p-value 
M
at
ch
in
g 
va
ri
ab
le
s Age group 
   
 
   
0-4 (reference) 
   
 
   
5-17 1.04 0.17-6.43 0.968  0.73 0.14-3.95 0.718 
18-49 0.37 0.06-2.31 0.288  0.32 0.06-1.72 0.184 
50+ 1.62 0.22-12.15 0.639  1.16 0.20-6.73 0.871 
Location 1.29 0.28-5.88 0.745  0.94 0.23-3.90 0.934 
Ex
p
o
su
re
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
Gender 0.85 0.26-2.80 0.787  - - - 
Chicken exposures        
Fresh Chicken 
   
 
   
     chicken pieces 0.42 0.10-1.88 0.259  0.30 0.08-1.20 0.090 
Egg exposures 
   
 
   
     runny 3.64 0.97-13.63 0.055  3.21 0.98-10.50 0.054 
     Free range  2.04 0.61-6.81 0.247  2.30 0.73-7.28 0.156 
     Eggs out of home 2.62 0.51-13.30 0.246  2.35 0.50-11.11 0.282 
Other food exposures 
   
 
   
Consumed 
   
 
   
     Lamb meat 0.35 0.10-1.26 0.108  0.39 0.12-1.32 0.130 
     Pork meat 0.47 0.12-1.75 0.258  0.45 0.13-1.62 0.223 
     Strawberries 0.41 0.11-1.52 0.184  - - - 
     Bananas 0.46 0.14-1.50 0.198  0.40 0.13-1.24 0.114 
     Raw Salads 0.38 0.08-1.84 0.231  - - - 
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Appendix 9-12 Outcomes of multivariate analysis from MLVA-523 study subjects of a case control 
study of STM01 in Western Australia, 2015-2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
Full Model  Reduced Model 
 OR 95% CI p-value  OR 95% CI p-value 
M
at
ch
in
g 
va
ri
ab
le
s Age group 
   
 
   
0-4 (reference) 
   
 
   
5-17 1.62 0.54-4.83 0.389  1.63 0.62-4.26 0.323 
18-49 1.02 0.37-2.83 0.973  1.09 0.47-2.53 0.838 
50+ 0.88 0.30-2.60 0.811  1.09 0.44-2.71 0.846 
Location 1.59 0.61-4.12 0.339  1.10 0.49-2.49 0.818 
Ex
p
o
su
re
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
Gender 0.97 0.49-1.90 0.920  - - - 
Chicken exposures        
Fresh Chicken 
   
 
   
     Whole chicken 1.08 0.44-2.63 0.866  - - - 
Frozen chicken 
   
 
   
     Chicken nuggets 0.31 0.10-0.95 0.040  0.24 0.09-0.67 0.006 
Ate chicken out 2.35 1.19-4.62 0.014  1.78 1.02-3.13 0.044 
Times ate chicken 
   
 
   
     Never (reference)  
  
 
   
     1-2x per week 0.98 0.43-2.21 0.956  - - - 
     3-5x per week  0.46 0.16-1.33 0.150  - - - 
     Daily 1.08 0.09-12.64 0.953  - - - 
Other food exposures 
   
 - - - 
Consumed 
   
 
   
     Lamb meat 0.31 0.15-0.62 0.001  0.31 0.17-0.56 <0.001 
     Pork meat 0.75 0.37-1.49 0.409  - - - 
     Strawberries 0.47 0.24-0.92 0.028  0.45 0.25-0.79 0.005 
     Potatoes 0.32 0.15-0.70 0.004  0.35 0.18-0.69 0.002 
     Broccoli 0.99 0.49-2.00 0.970     
     Onions 0.83 0.37-1.84 0.645  - - - 
Ate café or restaurant food 0.56 0.28-1.12 0.100  - - - 
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Chapter 3 
 
Outbreak investigations 
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Prologue 
My role 
Whilst I was working closely with OzFoodNet on the case-control study described in 
Chapter 2, I also became involved in two outbreak investigations. The first was a 
cluster of STM01 cases that we identified whilst interviewing for the case-control 
study. I took the lead on this investigation and developed an interview 
questionnaire specific to cases that ate at the cafe, interviewed all cases, collated 
the data and presented the results to the relevant authorities to initiate sampling. 
As a result, an environmental inspection of the cafe occurred, during which we 
identified that the eggs supplied to cafe were from one production farm. Eggs had 
been implicated in the outbreak during both the epidemiological and 
environmental investigation. I assisted with an environmental investigation of the 
associated farm and in this role, I helped prepare an investigation plan that 
included the questions to ask the producer and the samples to collect. I additionally 
used my background in veterinary medicine to consider and investigate the animal 
husbandry, egg processing and biosecurity practices in place on the farm. 
For the second outbreak, I was primarily involved with the farm investigation. Dr 
Nevada Pingault from OzFoodNet performed the initial epidemiological 
investigations of multiple focal outbreaks of Salmonella enterica serovar 
Typhimurium PFGE type 0003 (STM03) across prisons in WA. Dr Pingault identified 
that consumption of raw and undercooked eggs was associated with illness in the 
majority of outbreaks. The eggs implicated were all provided by Farm X, which led 
to an environmental investigation. In this role, I again, helped plan the inspection. I 
used learnings from my previous sampling experience, knowledge of the 
production system, and literature review to help develop the plan. During the 
investigation I interviewed the producer and the head stock person, collected 
samples, and inspected the husbandry, biosecurity and egg processing procedures. 
We adopted small modifications to both the sample collection and analysis 
procedures, and had good success with isolating STM03. 
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Lessons learned 
Conducting the epidemiological investigation of the STM01 cafe outbreak taught 
me many things. I learned the process of developing a site specific questionnaire 
for an outbreak investigation. An interesting aspect of this, was to create the 
questions in such a way, that it was not obvious to the interviewee that we were 
specifically investigating the implicated cafe. This was necessary to protect the 
integrity of the cafe whilst we were still not entirely sure (though highly suspicious) 
that it was the common denominator. I also learned techniques in acquiring 
information from cases who were protective of the venue and less willing to 
answer questions. I found that taking the time to build a rapport and trust with the 
interviewee quickly solved this problem. A highly important take home message 
that I gained was the value and absolute necessity of keeping a detailed diary of the 
investigation. The diary not only allowed me to double check on progress, but also 
confirmed what activities, findings and decisions had been made, and by whom. 
Last, I learned how to present data in a manner that was quickly digestible and 
conveyed all the necessary information, to the relevant authorities to provide 
evidence for further investigation, such as site inspections. 
I thoroughly enjoyed the farm investigations - there I could actively get out in to the 
field for some proper boot leather epidemiology. From the two farm inspections, I 
learned the value of researching and clearly understanding the production system 
and using this information to develop the inspection plan. I consolidated my 
understanding that, in the farm context, an environmental investigation is much, 
much more than just collecting samples. It is also about collecting all the additional 
epidemiological data necessary to understand the outbreak, such as animal 
husbandry, farm operating, biosecurity and egg processing procedures. I was able 
to draw on my veterinary training for collecting these data. Another important 
aspect of preparing for a farm inspection is to contact and let the laboratory know 
that a large number of samples will be coming, and also, to get advice on ideal 
sample types and collection techniques. Finally, I learned that producers will also 
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want information. For instance, if you are inspecting the washing component of the 
egg processing pathway, the producers will often become interested and request 
information so that they can improve their process. Having this kind of information 
on hand, ie. the industry standard, is appreciated. As I learned in many of my 
projects during this MAE, the collection of information from individuals (cases, 
producers, public health employees) is always a give and take process. 
Public health impact 
The investigation of the STM01 outbreak led to modifications in cooking methods 
employed at the implicated cafe. The investigation also led to an environmental 
inspection of an egg production facility, which resulted in informal discussions and 
recommendations for improvement of biosecurity and egg processing procedures 
to decrease the potential for contaminated eggs being used for human 
consumption. No further cases associated with the outbreak were detected 
following the close of the investigation. 
The investigation of Farm X confirmed the source of the STM03 outbreak among 
prisoners, though isolation of STM03 from several samples collected on site. The 
findings reinforced initial advice from OzFoodNet to the prison kitchens to cease 
producing ready-to-eat food with raw eggs; ensure that all eggs were fully cooked 
before consumption; and discourage prisoners from drinking protein shakes with 
raw eggs.  The site investigation also identified a few issues in biosecurity and egg 
processing, and recommendations to address these issues to help prevent 
contaminated eggs being used for human consumption were provided. Again, since 
the farm investigation, there have been no further outbreaks of STM03 in prisons in 
WA.  
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Chapter 3A 
An outbreak of Salmonella Typhimurium PFGE 0001 
(STM01) at a Cafe in Perth, April 2015 
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1 Abstract 
Background: On May 5, 2015, we identified nine cases of gastroenteritis with 
confirmed Salmonella enterica serovar Typhimurim PFGE 0001 infection, who all 
ate at a central Perth cafe within 11 days of one another. Given the clustering by 
location and time, we initiated an outbreak investigation to confirm the source, 
identify the vehicle of transmission, and implement public health action to prevent 
further cases of infection.  
Methods: All cases were interviewed with a Cafe specific questionnaire and data 
were collected regarding clinical illness, food and drink exposures, and movements 
within the café. Epidemiological, microbiological and environmental investigations 
of implicated food venues and production farms were also conducted. All data 
were collated and analysed.  
Results: There were a total of 9 cases associated with outbreak with a median age 
of 25 years. Over 77% of cases ate a dish containing undercooked or runny eggs, 
and the majority of those ate poached eggs that were cooked using a sous-vide 
method. STM01 was not isolated from any environmental samples, including sous-
vide cooked eggs, collected during the site investigation of the cafe, however, 
sampling occurred more than three weeks after the last case was exposed. 
Interview with café staff identified that the sous-vide method of poaching eggs was 
only newly adopted by the café, and that all eggs used during the period of 
exposure had been sourced from Farm Z. Samples collected during site 
investigation of Farm Z did not yield positive isolates for STM01, however, 
biosecurity and egg processing issues were identified. 
Conclusion: Epidemiological data from cases of STM01 suggested that undercooked 
eggs eaten at Cafe X were the vehicle of infection. Although, Salmonella was not 
isolated from environmental samples collected at the Cafe, given that the sous vide 
method of poaching eggs had only recently been adopted, Environmental health 
officers advised the cafe to cease using this method. Similarly, STM01 was not 
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isolated from environmental samples from Farm X, however, methods to address 
the issues identified in biosecurity and egg processing were discussed with the 
producer. No further cases of STM01 were reported following the investigations. 
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2 Introduction 
In chapter 2, I described a large community-wide outbreak of Salmonella enterica 
serovar Typhimurim PFGE 0001 (STM01). In that outbreak, cases occurred in 
isolation with little evidence for clustering by location or time. On 5 May, 2015, 
during the course of interviewing laboratory confirmed cases of STM01 in response 
to the community-wide outbreak, we identified two unrelated cases that had eaten 
at the same café, Cafe X, one day apart on 12 and 13 April, 2015. Both cases 
reported eating a meal containing undercooked (poached) eggs. In response, we 
prioritised interviewing Salmonella cases from suburbs proximal to the café, and 
rapidly identified a further seven cases of STM01 that had eaten at Cafe X within 11 
days of one another.   
Unlike the community-wide outbreak, these cases were clustered by both time and 
location, which suggested that a point-source outbreak had, or was, occurring. As a 
result, we initiated an independent outbreak response that included 
epidemiological, microbiological and environmental investigations of food premises 
and implicated production farms to identify the source of infection and mode of 
transmission. The results of those investigations are detailed in this report.  
3 Methods 
3.1 Epidemiological investigations 
All cases notified with STM01 infection between 3-14 April 2015 were interviewed. 
Initially, cases were interviewed according to a questionnaire for an STM01 
community-wide case-control study (see appendix 9.1 of previous chapter). The 
questionnaire asked demographic questions and details about the clinical disease 
experienced, followed by food exposures. Early in the food exposure section of the 
questionnaire, cases were asked if they ate out during their incubation period. If 
cases answered yes, they were asked where they ate out. If cases reported that 
they had eaten at Cafe X during their incubation period they were referred to 
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another interviewer to complete a Cafe X cluster-specific hypothesis generating 
questionnaire (Appendix 7-1). The hypothesis generating questionnaire asked 
questions relating to the Cafe X menu, other dining companions, and activities 
during the visit, such as attending the toilet. Data were stored in Excel and 
summarised. 
3.2 Microbiological investigations 
Additional to pulse field gel electrophoretic analysis (PFGE), stool samples from 
each of the cases were further subtyped by multiple-locus variable number tandem 
repeat analysis (MLVA) as the reference laboratory was changing from PFGE to 
MLVA typing. MLVA profiles are reported as a set of 5 numbers that reflect the 
number of repeats found by variable number tandem repeat analysis of five 
specific loci (STTR9-STTR5-STTR6-STTR10-STTR3). Differences in the number of 
repeats at each locus can give an indication of the degree of relatedness between 
isolates. 
3.3 Environmental health investigations 
Environmental Health Officers from the local government authority performed the 
site inspections of the cafe. The inspection included a food safety assessment and 
collection of food samples for microbiological testing. Samples were collected 
according to protocols outlined in the Guidelines for the Environmental Health 
Investigation of a Food-borne Disease Outbreak1.  
3.4 Farm investigations 
Farm investigations were carried out by an environmental health officer from the 
local government authority in which the farm was located, a food safety officer 
from the Environmental Health Directorate of the Western Australian Department 
of Health, and a representative from the Communicable Disease Control 
Directorate, also of the Western Australian Department of Health. The producer 
was interviewed about the farm operation, animal husbandry, and egg processing 
practices. The producer also described the egg processing pathway in use on the 
farm (Figure 3-1). We visually inspected the outer premises, the animal sheds and 
the processing facility. Six eggs were sampled from within each shed, and a further 
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12 eggs post-processing and ready for distribution. We sampled faeces using the 
drag swab method from each barn by moistening a tampon (Tampax Pearl Regular) 
in peptone salt solution and dragging the moistened tampon along the length of 
the barn under the slatted flooring where the faeces collect2. Additional swab 
samples were collected from the egg processing room at key points along the egg 
processing pathway (including the candling and grading machine) (Figure 3-1). 
Swab samples were collected by hydrating a sponge-swab with sterile peptone salt 
solution and swabbing a 100cm2 area. 
3.5 Sample analysis 
All samples were transported on ice, and submitted to the government testing 
laboratory, PathWest, for analysis according to Australian Standard protocols (AS 
5013.10-2009). 
3.6 Data analysis 
All data were collected, stored and analysed in MicroSoft Excel. 
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Figure 3-1 Egg processing pathway and sampling strategy  
Eggs flow through the processing pathway as demonstrated above.   During the environmental 
investigation, samples were collected from the areas circled in red:  
1. Sponge swabs of the grading table
2. Sponge swabs of the rollers in 3 different places along the table
3. Sponge swabs from a random selection of suction cups
4. Whole eggs diverted as seconds
5. Sponge swabs of each grading section of the grading table
6. Whole eggs ready for distribution
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4 Results 
4.1 Epidemiological Investigation 
Nine STM01 cases were linked to eating at Cafe X during their incubation period 
between 3–14 April 2015. Onset of clinical disease ranged from 9–19 April 2015 
(Figure 4-1). The median incubation period was 3 days (range 1-7 days). There 
were six female and three male cases, and the median age of cases was 25 years 
(range 1-52 years). Cases reported symptoms including diarrhoea (9/9, 100%), 
abdominal pain (6/7, 86%), fever (6/7, 86%), vomiting (1/7, 14%), nausea (5/7, 
71%) and bloody diarrhoea (3/7, 43%). One case was hospitalised.  
Figure 4-1 Epidemic curve of STM1 cases linked to Cafe X, Western Australia with illness 
onset between 9-19 April 2015 
Table 4-1 summarises the food exposures at Cafe X for each case. Eight of the 
nine cases ate breakfast at the cafe, and the ninth case ate lunch. The majority of 
cases ate a dish which included poached eggs (67%) and drank a milk based hot 
drink such as a coffee or hot chocolate (67%). One case, who did not have 
poached eggs, ate a chicken crepe that contained egg in both the chicken filling mix 
(cooked) and the mayonnaise (raw), meaning that over 77 % of cases (7/9) ate a 
dish containing undercooked or runny eggs. Two cases reported drinking smoothies 
only, however, they were in the company of other diners and could not confirm they 
did not share in the meals or drinks of their dining companion. At least one of the 
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dining companions reported eating a poached egg dish. One of these cases visited 
the cafe on three occasions, and drank a banana smoothie each time. 
Table 4-1 Food and drink exposures amongst STM01 cases that ate at Cafe X, Western 
Australia 9-19 April 2015 
Exposures 
Total 
(N) 
Frequency 
(%) 
Food exposures 
Poached eggs 6 67 
Ham 1 11 
Bacon 1 11 
Chorizo 1 11 
Bread/Toast 4 44 
Hollandaise 1 11 
Avocado 3 33 
Field Mushrooms 1 11 
Caramelised onion 1 11 
Rocket salad 1 11 
Chicken crepe 1 11 
Drink exposures 
Hot milk-based drinks* 6 67 
Pepsi Max 1 11 
Smoothie 
    (Mango) 1 11 
    (Banana) 1 11 
* includes coffee, hot chocolate and chai latte
OzFoodNet approached the Food Unit May 14, 2015, 9 days after commencing the 
investigation, to obtain a booking list from the Cafe to initiate active case finding. 
The intention was to perform a cohort study to determine which foods were 
statistically associated with illness. The request was denied and neither active case 
finding nor further analytical studies were performed. 
Salmonella isolates from eight of the nine cases were analysed by MLVA. 
The samples returned two MLVA types: 3-26-16-12-523 (n=7) and 3-27-17-
12-523 (n=1).
4.2 Environmental Health Investigation 
The City of S (CoS), the appropriate local government authority for Cafe X, 
was notified of the suspected outbreak on May 8, 2015, and provided with an 
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interim summary of the first five cases and suggestions for what to sample 
and investigate. That same day, CoS authorised officers commenced the 
site inspection of Cafe X.  
Initial interview by the inspection team determined that the eggs used by 
Café X were Z Free Range eggs from the Z Free Range farm supplied by 
Cannington Fresh Markets in Beckenham. Food safety assessment of the 
cafe identified that the poached eggs were being cooked using the sous-vide 
method (cooked at 63ºC for 60 minutes), a method that had only recently 
been employed by the cafe. Eggs were then held in ‘hot-holding’ at 58 ºC 
until served, and in some instances eggs could be held under these 
conditions for the day. Raw eggs were stored at room temperature.  
Samples of sous-vide cooked eggs stored in ‘hot holding’ were collected and 
submitted to PathWest laboratories for analysis - raw eggs were not 
sampled. The samples submitted to PathWest were negative for STM01, 
however, these samples were from a batch different to those consumed by 
the cases, up to three weeks earlier.  
Subsequent to the initial investigation of the premises, the two cases who 
only reported having consumed smoothies were notified by the laboratory. A 
further site inspection by CoS confirmed that smoothies did not contain any 
egg based products and were prepared in front-of-house with little potential 
for contamination. It was assessed that further sampling of the premises 
(such as swabbing of the smoothie blender) would be unlikely to produce 
representative results given that exposures occurred more the three weeks 
earlier. 
As a result of these findings, CoS advised Café X to cease cooking eggs 
using the sous-vide method and to store eggs in the fridge once purchased.  
4.3 Production Farm Investigation 
Coincidental to the investigation, eggs sampled from the Z Free Range farm 
on 15 May 2015 as part of an independent routine sampling program, 
returned positive for STM01, with an MLVA subtype of 3-27-17-12-523, on a 
6 egg composite analysis. This MLVA subtype was identical to that identified 
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in one of the cases from the Cafe X outbreak. The epidemiological evidence 
together with the microbiological evidence lead to the initiation of a farm 
investigation of Z Free Range Farm. Environmental Health Officers from the 
Shire of K (SoK), the appropriate enforcement agency for Z Free Range 
Eggs, and representatives from the Department of Health (DOH) Food Unit 
and OzFoodNet (OFN) inspected the farm on 2 separate occasions, 25 May 
2015 and 19 June 2015.  
The farm carried a flock of 8,000 birds housed in six sheds, each with an 
outside run. The birds ranged from 12-70 weeks and were removed from site 
at 70 weeks. The farm operated and ‘All-in, All-out’ system, meaning that all 
birds were introduced or removed from a pen in one go. Mortality rates were 
stable at approximately 0.5% per month.  
The farm produced and sold approximately 48-49,000 eggs per week. Most 
eggs were distributed off the farm within 3 days. Eggs were collected and 
processed daily. Floor eggs were discarded, and cracked eggs (seconds) 
were diverted from the remaining grading process and sold as seconds to be 
further processed (pasteurised). Any unclean eggs were washed in a 
chlorinated solution made fresh each day, however, the concentration level 
of chlorine in the water was not monitored. The wash solution was at a 
temperature of 42 ºC. Washed eggs were sold as seconds for further 
processing (pasteurisation). ‘Firsts’ eggs awaiting distribution were stored at 
room temperature, seconds were stored at 4 ºC. 
Overall the flock was in good health. Birds were clean (no evidence of 
soiling), engaging in normal behaviours (scratching, bathing, normal 
vocalisation and inquisitive) and of good condition score. No sickly or dead 
birds were observed, and vaccination protocols were appropriate. 
Overall, biosecurity of the premises was inadequate. Birds from different 
sheds could contact one another through chicken wire separating the 
chicken runs, thereby compromising the effects of an All-in All-out system. 
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The chicken run of one shed was separated from the road by a single 
chicken wire barrier. Foot baths were not in-use and visitors were not 
provided with ‘farm’ overalls and shoes/booties to decrease the introduction 
of pathogens. 
All samples collected for microbiological analysis were culture negative for 
STM01. 
5 Discussion 
A cluster of STM PFGE 1 cases was identified with the common exposure of 
having eaten at Cafe X during their likely incubation period. Seven of the 
nine cases reported eating eggs or food containing eggs. Eggs are 
frequently implicated in outbreaks of Salmonella spp. 3 and have been 
identified as an exposure factor associated with a large community wide 
outbreak of STM PFGE 1 illness in Western Australia currently under 
investigation (see Chapter 2). Environmental investigation of the premises 
detected increased risk for accidental temperature abuse, with eggs cooked 
using the sous vide (or low temperature) method (a cooking technique newly 
adopted by the cafe) and then stored on hot holding (58 ºC) for extended 
periods of time. In light of the outbreak coinciding with introducing a new 
method of preparing eggs at the cafe, Environmental health officers advised 
the café to cease using the sous vide cooking method. Although egg 
samples from the Cafe X did not culture STM01, these samples were 
collected more than three weeks after the last case had eaten at the cafe, 
and were likely from a different batch of eggs. While the evidence indicates a 
link between consumption of eggs and STM1 illness, in the absence of an 
analytical study a measurable association could not be determined.  
Hypothesis generating interviews also found that most STM01 cases (67%) 
drank a hot milk based drink such as coffee or hot chocolate. The high 
frequency of consumption amongst cases likely reflects the general high 
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percentage of people that consume hot milk based drinks when at a café 
rather than an association between it and illness. An analytical study could 
have clarified the situation. In any case, a link between consuming under-
cooked eggs and illness is a strong hypothesis for the cause of illness based 
on precedence in the literature, and the epidemiological, microbiological and 
environmental data.  
Two salmonella subtypes were detected by MLVA analysis from stools 
samples of eight of the nine cases; 3-26-16-12-523 (n=7), and 3-27-17-12-
523 (n=1). Salmonella spp. are under selective pressure to evolve, and 
changes in the number of repeats will occur as a result of recombination and 
replication errors affecting their MLVA sequence 4. Serial in vitro passage 
studies have shown that loci STTR5 and STTR6 (eg. xx-XX-XX-xx-xxx, loci 
SSTR5 and STTR6 in capitalised bold font) may vary by 1 repeat after 10-45 
passages 5, and therefore, differences in MLVA types that are not greater 
than 1 repeat, can be interpreted as highly related 6. As the two MLVA types 
detected from the human specimens in this study only had a single repeat 
difference at loci 5 and loci 6, it was interpreted that all specimens were 
highly related indicating a common source outbreak.  
An epidemiological and molecular link was established between the Cafe X 
STM01 outbreak and eggs produced from Z Free Range Farms. 
Environmental investigation revealed that eggs served at the Cafe X during 
the outbreak were from Z Free Range Farm. Furthermore, routine (and 
unrelated) egg sampling of Z Free Range Farm eggs detected one of two 
MLVA subtypes identified in human outbreak cases from Cafe X, 3-27-17-
12-523, providing an additional molecular link to the outbreak. As a result, a
site investigation of Z Free Range Farm was conducted and numerous 
samples collected. All samples were culture negative for STM01, which may 
have one of three interpretations:1) the organism was not present on the 
farm, 2) the organism had been present but was no longer present at time of 
sampling or, 3) the sampling strategy and subsequent processing were 
inadequate to detect the organism. To avoid similar difficulties with 
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interpretation in the future, the investigation team agreed to review the on-
site sampling strategy and culture method used and determine whether 
improvements could be made. Thus, although an epidemiological and 
molecular link could be established between the Cafe X outbreak and eggs 
supplied by the Z Free Range Farm, this could not be substantiated with 
evidence of infection on site at the time of sampling.  
The farm site investigation highlighted areas in biosecurity and egg 
processing that could be improved to limit introduction and spread of 
pathogens, and contamination of eggs in the future. The farm was 
surrounded by a chicken wire perimeter fence that doubled as the fence to 
one of the chicken runs. This fencing set-up meant that chickens could graze 
right to the edge of the property and come into contact with animals or 
materials on the other side. To prevent this contact, the producer could 
consider using two separate fences, one for the perimeter and another for 
the chicken run, with a buffer zone between 7. There were also minimal 
hygiene barriers between sheds. The national guidelines for egg production 
farm biosecurity recommend footbaths and shoe-sole scrapers at the 
entrance to all sheds and, if possible, designated clothing and footwear to 
each shed 8. Lastly, the egg wash process accorded with industry 
recommendations 9, but there were no methods in place to measure and 
monitor active chlorine concentration in the wash solution as recommended 
by industry experts. This could be addressed by using simple chlorine test 
strips to rapidly measure and monitor the chlorine levels in the wash 
solution. Addressing these issues and optimizing biosecurity and egg 
processing on farm in general, could limit future introduction of pathogens 
onto the farm, spread of pathogens within the farm, and contaminated eggs 
reaching market to cause salmonellosis. 
Two cases reported only drinking smoothies from Cafe X during their 
incubation period. The cafe reported that smoothies were made in front-of-
house and suggested that the chance for cross contamination was minimal. 
Swabs from the blender used to make the smoothies were not obtained as 
105 
they were unlikely to be representative given the long time lapse between 
the outbreak and sampling. Blenders and other homogenizing machines 
have been implicated in salmonellosis outbreaks previously as a result of the 
difficulty in adequately cleaning the appliance 10-12. There is also a possibility 
that these cases were exposed to STM01 in foods and drinks consumed by 
other individuals they were dining with, rather than from the smoothies 
themselves, or via person-to-person spread. The latter, however, is less 
likely given that none of the dining companions reported illness. 
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6 Conclusion 
There were nine cases of STM01 associated with an outbreak of 
salmonellosis at Cafe X. Most cases reported eating under-cooked eggs 
prepared using the sous-vide (low temperature) method. Although 
consumption of undercooked eggs was most likely the cause of the 
outbreak, the association could not be confirmed with an analytical study. 
Nonetheless, appropriate recommendations regarding food safety were 
provided to Cafe X to help prevent future cases. An epidemiological and 
molecular link was established between the eggs served at Cafe X and a 
free range egg producer, Farm Z. Although environmental sampling did not 
detect the organism on Farm Z, issues in biosecurity and egg washing 
procedures were identified.  
Post script 
No further cases associated with the outbreak have been detected since 19 
April, 2015. Cafe X ceased serving sous vide cooked eggs upon 
recommendation by the local government authority, electively chose to 
dispose of their current egg supplies, and sourced new eggs from another 
supplier. Given the lack of evidence for contamination on farm Z no formal 
recommendations were provided to the producer, although the issues in 
biosecurity and egg processing pathways described were discussed with the 
producer informally.  
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8 Appendix 
Appendix 8-1 Hypothesis generating questionnaire, STM01 outbreak at Cafe X, Western 
Australia, April 2015 
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1   Abstract	  
Background:	   Between	   January	   and	   February	   2015,	   multiple	   focal	   outbreaks	   of	  
Salmonella	   enterica	   serovar	   Typhimurium	   pulse-­‐field	   gel	   electrophoresis	   (PFGE)	  
type	   0003	   (STM03)	   were	   detected	   across	   several	   prisons	   in	   Western	   Australia.	  
Consumption	   of	   raw	   eggs	   in	   foods	   such	   as	   protein	   shakes	   and	  mayonnaise	  were	  
implicated,	  and	  most	  of	  the	  affected	  prisons	  were	  supplied	  with	  eggs	  produced	  at	  
Farm	   X.	   Corrective	   Services	  were	   advised	   to	   cease	   producing	   ready	   to	   eat	   foods	  
containing	   raw	  eggs;	   ensure	   that	   all	   eggs	  were	   fully	   cooked	  before	   consumption;	  
and	   discourage	   prisoners	   from	   drinking	   protein	   shakes	   with	   raw	   eggs.	   However,	  
greater	   than	   expected	   numbers	   of	   cases	   continued	   to	   occur	   prompting	   an	  
environmental	  investigation	  of	  Farm	  X,	  the	  common	  supplier	  of	  eggs	  to	  all	  prisons.	  
Here,	  I	  describe	  the	  results	  of	  that	  investigation.	  
Methods:	   The	   environmental	   investigation	   was	   conducted	   by	   two	   state	  
Environmental	   Health	   officers,	   a	   local	   Environmental	   health	   officer	   and	   a	  
representative	  from	  the	  Department	  of	  Health	  (myself).	  The	  investigation	  consisted	  
of	  an	  interview	  of	  the	  farm	  manager	  and	  head	  stock	  person,	  egg	  and	  environmental	  
sampling	   for	   STM03,	   and	   observational	   inspection	   of	   the	   site.	   All	   samples	   were	  
analysed	   at	   the	   state	   diagnostic	   laboratory,	   PathWest,	   and	   sub-­‐typed	   using	   both	  
PFGE	  and	  multi-­‐locus	  variable	  number	  tandem	  repeat	  analysis	  (MLVA)	  	  
Results:	   STM03	  was	   isolated	   from	  numerous	   environmental	   samples	   collected	   at	  
Farm	  X,	  including	  feed,	  litter,	  surface	  and	  drag	  swab	  samples.	  Four	  MLVA	  patterns	  
were	  identified	  amongst	  isolates	  of	  which	  three	  were	  highly	  related	  to	  that	  isolated	  
from	  human	  cases.	  Site	  inspection	  revealed	  issues	  in	  animal	  husbandry,	  biosecurity	  
and	   egg	   processing	   that	   may	   have	   contributed	   to	   pathogen	   entry	   and	   spread	  
throughout	  the	  flock,	  and	  contaminated	  eggs	  being	  used	  for	  human	  consumption.	  	  
Conclusions:	   Environmental	   investigation	   provided	   evidence	   to	   suggest	   that	   eggs	  
from	  Farm	  X	  were	  the	  source	  of	  STM03	  infections	  in	  humans.	  Recommendations	  to	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address	  issues	  in	  animal	  husbandry,	  biosecurity	  and	  egg	  processing	  were	  provided	  
to	  decrease	  the	  risk	  of	  contaminated	  eggs	  being	  used	  for	  human	  consumption.	  No	  
further	  cases	  of	  STM03	  were	  reported	  following	  the	  farm	  investigation.	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2   Introduction	  
From	   January	   to	   February	   2015,	   OzFoodNet	   identified	   and	   investigated	   multiple	  
focal	   outbreaks	   of	   Salmonella	   enterica	   serovar	   Typhimurium	   pulse-­‐field	   gel	  
electrophoresis	   type	   0003	   (STM03)	   across	   several	   prisons	   in	   Western	   Australia	  
(WA).	  The	  predominant	  subtype	  by	  multiple-­‐locus	  variable	  number	  tandem	  repeat	  
analysis	  (MLVA)	  amongst	  prison	  cases	  was	  03-­‐11-­‐15-­‐10-­‐523,	  which	  differed	  to	  that	  
of	   non-­‐prison	   cases,	   consistent	   with	   an	   outbreak	   peculiar	   to	   the	   prison	   system.	  
Consumption	   of	   raw	   eggs	   in	   foods	   such	   as	   protein	   shakes	   and	  mayonnaise	  were	  
implicated	   as	   the	   infection	   source	   in	  many	   of	   the	   prison	   outbreaks.	  Most	   of	   the	  
affected	  prisons	  were	  supplied	  with	  eggs	  produced	  at	  Farm	  X.	  	  
In	  response	  to	  the	  outbreaks,	  Environmental	  Health	  Officers	  (EHOs)	  from	  the	  local	  
shire	   of	   Y	   inspected	   kitchen	   facilities	   at	   one	   affected	   prison	   and	   identified	   issues	  
with	  handwashing	  and	  cleaning	  procedures.	  The	  egg	  production	  facility	  at	  Farm	  X	  
was	  also	  inspected	  and	  STM03	  was	  detected	  in	  samples	  from	  one	  feed	  dispenser.	  
However,	  follow-­‐up	  samples	  collected	  on	  a	  second	  visit	  were	  negative.	  	  
As	  a	   result	  of	   the	   initial	  epidemiological	   findings	  and	  site	   investigations,	   the	  early	  
public	  health	   response	   (February	  2015)	   requested	   that	  Corrective	   Services	   advise	  
all	  prisons	  to:	  cease	  producing	  ready	  to	  eat	  foods	  containing	  raw	  eggs;	  ensure	  that	  
all	   eggs	   were	   fully	   cooked	   before	   consumption;	   and	   discourage	   prisoners	   from	  
drinking	  protein	  shakes	  with	  raw	  eggs,	  as	   this	  was	  considered	  a	  high	  risk	  practice	  
for	  Salmonella.	  	  
However,	   greater	   than	   expected	   numbers	   of	   cases	   continued	   to	   occur	   after	   the	  
initial	  public	  health	  actions	  were	  initiated	  in	  February	  2015,	  indicating	  that	  further	  
investigation	  and	  public	  health	  actions	  were	  required.	  To	  that	  end,	  members	  of	  the	  
local	  shire	  (Shire	  of	  Y),	  the	  Department	  of	  Health	  Food	  Unit	  and	  the	  Department	  of	  
Health	   OzFoodNet	   returned	   to	   Farm	   X	   on	   July	   8,	   2015	   for	   further	   extensive	  
sampling	  and	  inspection	  of	  the	  facilities	  and	  processes.	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In	  this	  paper,	  I	  describe	  the	  results	  of	  those	  investigations	  at	  Farm	  X	  on	  July	  8,	  2015.	  
3   Methods	  
3.1   Environmental	  inspection	  
Two	   EHOs	   from	   the	   Environmental	   Health	   Directorate	   of	   the	  WA	  Department	   of	  
Health,	  one	  local	  EHO	  from	  the	  appropriate	  local	  council	  authority,	  and	  myself,	  an	  
MAE	   scholar	   at	   the	  Department	   of	   Health,	   investigated	   Farm	  X	   on	   8	   July	   2015.	   I	  
interviewed	  the	   farm	  manager	  and	  head	  stock	  person	  and	  asked	  questions	  about	  
the	   production	   system,	   facilities,	   animal	   husbandry	   and	   egg	   processing	   practices.	  
The	   layout	   of	   the	   farm	  was	   crudely	  mapped	   and	  we	  walked	   through	   the	   facility	  
observing	   and	   photographing	   the	   environment,	   husbandry	   and	   egg	   processing	  
activities.	  
3.2   Sampling	  
Egg	  sampling	  
A	  representative	  sample	  of	  12	  eggs	  was	  collected	  from	  within	  each	  of	  nine	  pens	  of	  
the	   farm	   (excluding	   the	   infirmary	   pen).	   A	   further	   12	   eggs	   were	   sampled	   post-­‐
processing	  from	  the	  ‘ready-­‐for-­‐distribution’	  store	  in	  the	  egg	  processing	  room.	  
Environmental	  Sampling	  
All	  samples	  collected	  are	  detailed	  in	  Table	  3-­‐1.	  
I	  collected	  swab	  samples	  from	  within	  each	  pen	  (water	  dispensers),	  each	  shed	  (feed	  
hoppers,	   surfaces	   and	   husbandry	   equipment),	   and	   in	   the	   egg	   processing	   room	  
(surfaces	  and	  egg	  trays).	  Swab	  samples	  were	  collected	  by	  hydrating	  a	  sponge-­‐swab	  
with	   sterile	   peptone	   salt	   solution	   and	   swabbing	   a	   100cm2	   area.	   Swabs	   were	  
handled	   in	  a	  manner	   that	  prevented	  contamination	  by	   the	  operator’s	  hands,	  and	  
were	  stored	  in	  sterile	  ‘whirl’	  packs	  on	  ice	  for	  transport	  to	  the	  laboratories.	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From	  within	   each	   pen,	   I	   collected	   feed	   samples	   by	   placing	   two	   large	   handfuls	   of	  
feed	   from	   the	   troughs,	   equivalent	   to	   more	   than	   100	   grams,	   into	   sterile	   sample	  
bags.	  Litter	  samples	  were	  also	  collected	  from	  each	  pen.	  A	  large	  sterile	  sample	  bag	  
was	  inverted	  over	  both	  hands	  and	  a	  large	  scoop	  of	  litter,	  equal	  to	  or	  greater	  than	  
150grams,	  collected	  in	  a	  sterile	  manner.	  	  
Samples	  of	  the	  pen	  floor,	  boot	  swabs,	  were	  collected	  using	  the	  method	  described	  
by	  McCrea	  et	  al	  with	  modifications	   1.	  Briefly,	  a	  pair	  of	  clean,	  non-­‐skid	  over	   shoes	  
(booties:	  bare+medical	  re-­‐order	  code	  2039355)	  were	  placed	  over	  the	  shoes	  of	  the	  
sampler	  and	  moistened	  with	  peptone	  (0.1%)	  salt	  solution.	  The	  sampler	  then	  walked	  
a	   defined	   path	   around	   the	   pen	   as	   shown	   in	   Appendix	   8-­‐1.	   The	   booties	   were	  
removed	  and	  place	   into	  a	  sterile	   ‘whirl’	  pack.	  Water	  samples	  were	  collected	  from	  
the	  on-­‐site	  chlorinated	  reticulated	  water	  system	  that	  supplied	  each	  shed,	  and	  the	  
eventual	  pen	  water	  dispensers.	  Water	  samples	   in	  shed	  2	  were	  collected	  from	  the	  
reticulated	  supply	  tap	  point,	  whilst	   in	  sheds	  1	  and	  2	  they	  were	  collected	  from	  the	  
connection	  hoses	  supplying	  the	  water	  dispensers	  in	  the	  shed.	  	  
We	   collected	   12	   eggs	   in	   total	   from	   each	   shed,	   approximately	   3	   eggs	   per	   pen,	  
excluding	  shed	  3	  where	  all	  12	  eggs	  came	  from	  one	  pen	  (Pen	  9).	  We	  also	  collected	  a	  
sample	   of	   12	   eggs	   from	   the	   store	   of	   eggs	   ready	   for	   distribution	   in	   the	   egg	  
processing	  room.	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Table	  3-­‐1	  Samples	  collected	  during	  inspection	  of	  Farm	  X,	  8	  July	  2015	  
Area	   Samples	  collected	  
Pens	   Feed	  	  
Litter	  	  
Surface	  swabs	  of	  water	  dispensers	  
Boot	  swabs	  of	  pen	  floor	  
Eggs	  (approximately	  3	  per	  pen)	  
Sheds	   Surface	  swabs	  of	  feed	  hoppers	  (if	  present)	  
Water	  from	  supply	  source	  
Surface	  swabs	  of	  dust	  on	  various	  surfaces	  
Egg	  processing	  
room	  
Surface	   swabs	   of	   surfaces	   in	   the	   egg	   processing	   room	  
(including	  the	  main	  table	  used	  for	  processing)	  
Surface	  swabs	  of	  egg	  collection	  trays	  
3.3   Sample	  culture	  
Samples	   were	   transported	   on	   ice	   directly	   to	   the	   WA	   government	   diagnostic	  
laboratory,	   PathWest.	   Samples	   were	   processed	   according	   to	   Method	   10	   of	   the	  
Australian	   Standards	   for	   Food	   Microbiology:	   Microbiology	   of	   food	   and	   animal	  
feeding	   stuffs	   –	   Horizontal	   method	   for	   the	   detection	   of	   Salmonella	   spp.	   (ISO	  
6579:2002,	   MOD).	   Two	   modifications	   were	   incorporated	   into	   the	   protocol	   to	  
maximise	   culturing	   success.	   First,	   we	   used	   125	   grams	   rather	   than	   25	   grams	   of	  
starting	  material	  from	  solid	  samples	  (litter	  and	  feed),	  and	  second,	  we	  increased	  the	  
incubation	  temperature	  of	  sample	  culture	  inoculated	  RVS	  broth	  from	  41.5+/-­‐1	  °C	  to	  
44	  °C	  (see	  figure	  3-­‐1).	  It	  has	  been	  found	  that	  increasing	  the	  incubation	  temperature	  
at	   this	   stage	   of	   the	   culturing	   process	   decreases	   growth	   of	   competing	   bacteria	  
(personal	   communication	   Trudy	   Graham,	   supervising	   scientist,	   Public	   Health	  
Microbiology,	  Queensland	  Government,	   July	  2015).	  Starting	  material	   for	  eggs	  was	  
either	   composite,	   where	   a	   defined	   number	   of	   eggs	   were	   homogenised	   in	   their	  
entirety	   and	   a	   sample	   of	   the	   resulting	   homogenate	   used	   for	   analysis,	   or	   rinsed,	  
where	  intact	  eggs	  were	  rinsed	  in	  peptone	  (1%)	  salt	  solution	  and	  the	  resulting	  rinse	  
solution	  used	  for	  analysis.	  The	  second	  method	  allowed	  for	  investigation	  of	  bacterial	  
contamination	  on	  the	  outside	  of	  the	  eggs,	  whereas	  for	  the	  composite	  method,	  the	  
area	  of	  contamination	  could	  not	  be	  determined	  when	  samples	  were	  positive.	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We	   further	   sub-­‐typed	   all	   STM03	   positive	   isolates	   using	   multiple-­‐locus	   variable	  
number	  tandem	  repeat	  analysis	   (MLVA).	  MLVA	  profiles	  are	  reported	  as	  a	  set	  of	  5	  
numbers	   that	   reflect	   the	   number	   of	   repeats	   found	   by	   variable	   number	   tandem	  
repeat	  analysis	  of	  five	  specific	  loci	  (STTR9-­‐STTR5-­‐STTR6-­‐STTR10-­‐STTR3).	  Differences	  
in	   the	   number	   of	   repeats	   at	   each	   locus	   can	   give	   an	   indication	   of	   the	   degree	   of	  
relatedness	  between	  isolates.	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Figure	  3-­‐1	  Culture	  protocol	  for	  isolation	  and	  detection	  of	  Salmonella	  spp	  
A. Standard	  protocol	  for	  isolation	  and	  detection	  of	  Salmonella	  as	  documented	  in	  the
Australian	  Standards	  for	  Food	  Microbiology:	  Microbiology	  of	  food	  and	  animal	  feeding
stuffs	  –	  Horizontal	  method	  for	  the	  detection	  of	  Salmonella	  spp.	  (ISO	  6579:2002,	  MOD)	  B.
Modifications	  to	  the	  protocol	  employed	  in	  this	  study	  (red	  boxes).	  Figures	  modified	  from
Australian	  Standards	  for	  Microbiology.
B.  
A.
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4   Results	  
4.1   Environment	  	  
4.1.1   Husbandry	  set-­‐up	  
The	  poultry	   laying	  component	  of	   the	   farm	  consisted	  of	  3	  sheds:	   sheds	  1,	  2	  and	  3	  
(Figure	  4-­‐1).	  The	  sheds	  had	  4,	  4	  and	  1	  pen	  respectively	  (see	  schematic	  in	  Figure	  4-­‐1	  
below).	  Each	  pen	  housed	  between	  500-­‐600	  chickens.	  	  
In	  shed	  1,	  pens	  2	  and	  3	  shared	  a	  common	  wall.	  The	  wall	  was	  made	  of	  solid	  material	  
from	  the	  ground	  to	  approximately	  1.5	  meters	  followed	  by	  wire	  construction	  to	  the	  
roof	  –	  chickens	  could	  interact	  across	  the	  wire	  between	  the	  pens.	  Pens	  1	  and	  4	  were	  
separated	  completely	  from	  2	  and	  3	  by	  a	  one	  meter	  gap	  walkway.	  In	  shed	  2,	  pens	  5	  
and	  7,	  and	  pens	  6	  and	  8	  shared	  a	  common	  wall.	  This	  wall	  was	  completely	  solid	  from	  
ground	  to	  roof	  prohibiting	  interaction	  between	  the	  flocks.	  Pen	  7	  was	  empty	  at	  the	  
time	  of	   sampling.	   Shed	   3	   contained	   an	   infirmary	   pen	   that	   housed	   sick	   birds.	   The	  
pen	  was	  separated	  from	  pen	  9	  by	  open	  wire	  fencing	  allowing	  the	  birds	  to	  interact	  
between	  the	  pens.	  
Pen	   floors	   were	   laid	   with	   sawdust	   supplied	   by	   JJ	   Hawkins	   &	   Company	   Pty	   Ltd.	  
Sawdust	  was	  stored	  undercover	  to	  protect	  from	  the	  elements,	  but	  we	  do	  not	  know	  
if	   it	  was	   in	   an	   enclosed	   structure	   to	   exclude	   animals	   and	   insects.	   At	   the	   time	   of	  
inspection,	   the	   temperature	   in	   the	   sheds	   was	   cool,	   approximately	   10	   degrees	  
Celsius.	  No	  thermometers	  for	  monitoring	  temperature	  were	  observed.	  	  
Pens	  were	   cleaned	   after	   each	   de-­‐flocking	   (for	  more	   details	   see	  Decontamination	  
and	  re-­‐flocking	  procedures	  below)	  and	  the	  areas	  outside	  the	  pens	  (represented	  by	  
the	  white	  areas	  in	  Figure	  4-­‐1)	  were	  periodically	  cleaned	  with	  a	  dust	  blower.	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Figure	  4-1 Farm X	  layout	  
A. Schematic	  of	  shed	  layout	  B.	  Aerial	  view	  of	  facility,	  sheds	  indicated	  by	  yellow	  arrows
4.1.2   Water	  and	  Feed	  
Water	  was	  supplied	  to	  the	  sheds	  from	  an	  on-­‐site	  dam.	  The	  water	  was	  chlorinated	  
and	   routinely	   tested	   for	   coliform	   counts	   to	   determine	   drinking	   quality.	   Water	   
dispensers	   were	   suspended	   from	   the	   ceiling	   and	   were	   of	   the	   type	   displayed	   in	  
Figure	  4-­‐2.	  There	  were	  four	  dispensers	  per	  pen.	  Despite	  being	  approximately	  20	  cm	  
above	  the	  ground	  at	  least	  one	  water	  dispenser	  in	  every	  pen	  was	  significantly	  soiled.	  
Figure	  4-­‐2	  Water	  dispensers	  
A.Water	  dispenser	  in	  situ	  B.	  Replica	  dispenser;	  water	  is	  dispensed	  at	  the	  top,	  flows	  down
the	  outside	  of	  the	  dispenser,	  and	  collects	  in	  the	  trough	  below	  (black	  arrow)
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The	   chickens	   were	   fed	   commercial	   feed	   supplemented	   with	   meat	   meal,	   both	  
supplied	  by	  West	  Feeds.	  Feed	  was	  placed	  into	  feeding	  troughs	  which	  were	  located	  
directly	  under	  the	  nesting	  boxes	  (the	  boxes	  in	  which	  the	  chickens	  retire	  to	  lay	  eggs)	  
see	   Figure	   4-­‐3.	   Although	   birds	   tend	   not	   to	   defecate	   in	   their	   nesting	   boxes,	  
environmental	  material	  on	  the	  birds	  can	  be	  transported	  into	  the	  boxes.	  Therefore,	  
there	  was	  potential	  for	  both	  faeces	  and	  environmental	  material	  to	  fall	  through	  the	  
slats/brush	  mats	  of	  the	  nesting	  boxes	  contaminating	  the	  feed	  in	  the	  troughs	  below.	  
Chickens	   were	   also	   provided	   with	   shell	   grit	   in	   a	   feeder	   trough	   suspended	   20cm	  
above	  the	  ground.	  
Figure	  4-­‐3	  Nesting	  boxes	  	  
Two	  rows	  of	  nesting	  boxes	  (N)	  were	  situated	  directly	  above	  the	  feeding	  troughs	  (F)	  
4.1.3   Animals	  
Pullets	  were	  sourced	  from	  Hy-­‐Line	  Layers	  Australia	  Pty	  Ltd,	  reared	  to	  16	  weeks	  on	  a	  
contract	  grower	  farm	  and	  brought	  onto	  Farm	  X	  as	  pullets	  at	  16	  weeks	  of	  age.	  We	  
could	   not	   ascertain	   which	   specific	   contract	   grower	   farm	   was	   used	   for	   pullets	  
supplied	  to	  Farm	  X.	  	  
On	   visual	   inspection,	   the	   birds	   were	   healthy,	   inquisitive	   and	   performing	   normal	  
animal	  behaviours.	  No	  indicators	  of	  poor	  flock	  health	  were	  observed	  excluding	  one	  
depressed	  chicken	  that	  was	  notified	  to	  personnel	  and	  transferred	  to	  the	  infirmary	  
for	  appropriate	  care.	  Vaccination	  protocols	  were	  comprehensive	  and	  appropriate.	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The	  farm	  reported	  monthly	  mortality	  rates	  consistently	  between	  1.3-­‐1.6%,	  with	  no	  
increase	  in	  the	  previous	  6-­‐month	  period.	  
4.1.4   Biosecurity	  
4.1.4.1  General	  
There	   were	   no	   footbaths	   between	   pens	   or	   sheds,	   although	   discussion	   with	  
personnel	   indicated	  this	   to	  be	  a	  measure	  that	  will	  be	  adopted	   in	   the	  near	   future.	  
The	  main	  doors	  to	  sheds	  2	  and	  3	  were	  open	  and	  able	  to	  be	  accessed	  by	  native	  or	  
domestic	  animals.	  
One	  pet	  chicken	  was	  roaming	  free	  outside	  the	  pens	  able	  to	  interact	  with	  chickens	  in	  
sheds	  1	  and	  3	  and	  possibly	  2.	  
4.1.4.2  Decontamination	  and	  re-­‐flocking	  procedures	  
The	   farm	   operates	   an	   ‘all-­‐in	   all-­‐out	   procedure’	   at	   the	   level	   of	   the	   pen	   (not	   the	  
shed).	  All	  birds	  from	  the	  pen	  are	  removed	  and	  the	  bedding	  material/litter	  cleaned	  
out	   by	   bob-­‐cat.	   The	   area	   is	   then	   physically	   cleaned	   by	   high	   pressure	   hosing	  
followed	   by	   surface	   disinfection	   using	   a	   quaternary	   ammonium	   based	   product,	  
Taskforce	  (Diversey	  Australia	  Pty	  Ltd.).	  The	  pen	  is	  not	  re-­‐flocked	  for	  at	  least	  3	  (more	  
often	  7)	  days	  following	  cleaning	  and	  disinfection.	  	  
4.1.4.3  Vermin	  control	  
Baits	  were	  set	  for	  rats,	  but	  there	  was	  no	  regular	  insect	  control.	  
4.1.5   Egg	  collection	  and	  processing	  
4.1.5.1  Collection	  
Nest	  boxes	  were	  sloped	  and	  eggs	  roll	  out	  onto	  a	  collection	  trough	  external	  to	  the	  
pen.	  Eggs	  were	  collected	  daily	  at	  7.30am	  and	  transported	  in	  collection	  trays	  to	  the	  
processing	  room.	   Inspection	  of	   the	  pens	  revealed	   large	  collections	  of	  eggs	  on	  the	  
floor	   (piles	   of	   10-­‐15	   eggs	   observed	   –	   see	   Figure	   4-­‐4).	   Floor	   eggs	   were	   most	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commonly	   seen	   in	   shed	  1.	  The	   site	  manager	  explained	   that	  occasionally	  eggs	  will	  
also	  remain	  in	  the	  nest	  boxes	  and	  not	  roll	  out	  onto	  the	  collection	  tray	  –	  no	  nest	  box	  
eggs	  were	   observed	   during	   our	   inspection.	   Pens	   are	   inspected	   5	   times	   daily	   and	  
floor	   eggs	   and	   nest	   box	   eggs	   collected.	   	   Both	   floor	   eggs	   and	   nest	   box	   eggs	   are	  
processed	  for	  human	  consumption.	  
Figure	  4-­‐4	  Nest	  boxes	  and	  floor	  eggs	  
A. Two	  rows	  of	  nest	  boxes,	  grey	  arrow	  indicates	  where	  eggs	  roll	  out	  into	  the	  collection	  tray
B. Example	  of	  eggs	  laid	  on	  floor	  'floor	  eggs'	  (indicated	  by	  grey	  arrow)
4.1.5.2  Egg	  processing	  
In	  the	  processing	  room,	  eggs	  were	  visually	   inspected	  for	  defects,	   including	  cracks.	  
Cracked	   eggs	   were	   discarded.	   There	   was	   no	   candling	   device.	   Any	   environmental	  
contamination	  (faeces	  or	  dirt)	  on	  the	  eggs	  was	  removed	  through	  ‘dry	  washing’	  by	  
rubbing	  with	  rubber-­‐grip	  gloves.	   If	  contamination	  remained,	  eggs	  were	  washed	   in	  
water	  at	  42	  degrees	  Celsius.	  Washing	  water	  did	  not	  contain	  a	  sanitiser.	  
Eggs	  were	  then	  packed	  for	  distribution	  and	  stored	  at	  ambient	  temperature.	  There	  
was	  no	  separation	  between	  the	  area	  housing	  the	  eggs	  for	  initial	  processing	  and	  the	  
area	  storing	  eggs	  ready	  for	  distribution	  (the	  final	  product).	  
4.2   Sampling	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Table	   4-­‐1	   summarises	   the	   results	   of	   PFGE	   and	  MLVA	   analysis	   of	   isolates	   from	  all	  
samples	   collected	   during	   the	   inspection.	   There	   was	   at	   least	   one	   litter	   sample	  
positive	   for	   STM03	   from	   each	   shed.	   Most	   positive	   samples	   were	   collected	   from	  
shed	  2	  and	   included:	   litter	   from	  all	   four	  pens;	  swabs	  of	   the	  water	  dispensers	   in	  2	  
pens;	   bootie	   samples	   and	   feed	   from	   3	   pens.	   There	   were	   four	   different	   MLVA	  
patterns	  detected,	   the	  predominant	  pattern	  was	  3-­‐11-­‐15-­‐10-­‐523	   (53%	  of	  positive	  
samples)	  followed	  by	  3-­‐11-­‐18-­‐10-­‐523	  (32%).	  Although	  one	  sample	  was	  positive	  for	  
Salmonella	   Typhimurium	   PFGE	   type	   605	   rather	   than	   03,	   the	   MLVA	   pattern	   was	  
consistent	  with	  the	  predominant	  pattern	  for	  STM03.	  
Table	  4-­‐1	  Samples	  positive	  for	  STM03	  (PFGE03)	  by	  culture,	  and	  their	  MLVA	  profile	  
Shed	   Pen	  
Sample	  type	  
Fe
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tie
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  d
isp
en
se
r	  s
w
ab
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e	  
Du
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  sa
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  o
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e	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ed
	  sh
oo
t	  
Co
lle
ct
io
n	  
tr
ay
	  
Gr
ad
in
g	  
ta
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1	  
1	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   +	  
-­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  2	   -­‐	   +	   +	   +	  3	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
4	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
2	  
5	   +	   +	   -­‐	   +	  
-­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   +	  6	   -­‐	   +	   +	   +	  7	   +	   +	   -­‐	   +	  
8	   +	   -­‐	   +	   +	  
3	   9	   -­‐	   -­‐	   +	   +*	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
Processing	  room	  surfaces	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
Eggs	  ready	  for	  dispatch	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
+:	  sample	  positive	  for	  STM03	  (PFGE03);	  	  -­‐	  :	  sample	  negative	  for	  STM03	  (PFGE03);	  *PFGE605	  not	  PFGE03;	  grey	  areas:	  no	  samples	  collected	  
MLVA	  patterns	  are	  denoted	  by	  colours:	  	  	  	   	   3-­‐11-­‐14-­‐10-­‐523;	   	   3-­‐11-­‐15-­‐10-­‐523;	  	  	  	  	   	   3-­‐11-­‐18-­‐10-­‐523;	  	  	  	  	   	   3-­‐11-­‐18-­‐11-­‐523	  
126	  
5   Discussion	  
The	   results	   of	   our	   investigation	   provide	   microbiological	   evidence	   to	   support	   the	  
epidemiological	  link	  between	  consumption	  of	  eggs	  produced	  at	  Farm	  X	  and	  illness	  
with	  STM03	  amongst	  prisoners.	  STM03	  was	  isolated	  from	  numerous	  environmental	  
samples	  collected	  on	  Farm	  X	  that	  included	  feed,	  litter,	  surface	  swab	  and	  drag	  swab	  
samples.	   More	   than	   half	   of	   the	   samples	   also	   returned	   an	   MLVA	   pattern	  
indistinguishable	  to	  that	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  human	  cases,	  and	  the	  remainder	  were	  
highly	  related.	  With	  the	  identification	  that	  eggs	  from	  Farm	  X	  were	  the	  likely	  source	  
of	   the	   human	   cases,	   public	   health	   actions	   to	   prevent	   further	   infections	   could	   be	  
implemented	  at	   the	   level	  of	   the	   consumer	  and	   the	  production/supply	   system.	  At	  
the	   level	  of	   the	  consumer,	  public	  health	  action	  already	   taken:	  advising	  prisons	   to	  
provide	  well	  cooked	  eggs,	  to	  cease	  providing	  foods	  that	  contain	  raw	  eggs	  (such	  as	  
mayonnaise	  and	   tiramisu),	   and	   continue	   to	  discourage	  prisoners	   from	  eating	   raw	  
eggs	  or	  making	  raw	  egg	  milkshakes	  for	  muscles	  building	  purposes,	  are	  appropriate	  
and	   should	   continue.	   At	   the	   level	   of	   production/supply,	   there	   are	   two	   major	  
approaches	  to	  decrease	  the	  risk	  of	  further	  cases	  of	  human	  salmonellosis.	  The	  first	  is	  
to	   decrease	   infection	   or	   degree	   of	   shedding	   in	   the	   flock,	   and	   the	   second	   is	   to	  
optimise	   the	   egg	   processing	   pathway	   to	   minimise	   the	   risk	   of	   contaminated	  
products	  being	  used	  for	  human	  consumption.	  
Reduction	  of	  salmonella	  in	  the	  flock	  can	  be	  aided	  by	  good	  biosecurity,	  however,	  the	  
results	   of	   our	   investigation	   suggested	   that	   there	   were	   inadequate	   biosecurity	  
measures	   in	   place	   to	   limit	   spread	   of	   infection	   between	   flocks	   on	   the	   farm.	   We	  
found	   the	   highest	   number	   of	   positive	   samples	   in	   Shed	   2,	   and	   although	   positive	  
samples	  were	  also	  detected	  in	  the	  other	  two	  sheds,	  positivity	  rates	  were	  lower.	  The	  
distribution	  of	  positive	   samples	  was	  consistent	  with	  entry	  of	   the	  pathogen	   into	  a	  
pen	   or	   pens	   of	   shed	   2	   and	   subsequent	   spread	   to	   the	   other	   sheds	   and	   pens.	  We	  
observed	   biosecurity	   practices,	   or	   lack	   of	   practices	   on	   Farm	   X	   that	   may	   have	  
contributed	   to	   such	   a	   spread.	   First,	   there	   was	   no	   established	   hierarchy	   of	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movement	   between	   pens	   to	   restrict	   spread	   of	   pathogens.	   With	   hierarchical	  
movement,	   the	   aim	   is	   to	  move	   from	   areas	   where	   there	   is	   known,	   or	   likely,	   low	  
levels	  of	  contamination	  to	  those	  of	  higher	  contamination.	  One	  method	  is	  to	  move	  
from	  pens	  with	   the	   youngest	   birds	   to	   the	  oldest	   birds	   followed	  by	   the	   infirmary,	  
and	  last	  of	  all	  any	  infected	  or	  ill	  flocks	  2.	  Using	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  movement	  decreases	  
the	  risk	  of	  inadvertently	  spreading	  pathogens	  from	  a	  highly	  contaminated	  to	  lowly	  
contaminated	   environments.	   Second,	   there	   were	   few	   strategies	   in	   place	   to	   limit	  
pathogen	  movement	  between	  sheds	  on	  the	  shoes,	  hands	  and	  clothing	  of	  workers.	  
In	  an	  ideal	  world,	  one	  worker	  would	  be	  assigned	  to	  a	  single	  shed	  and	  there	  would	  
be	  no	  movement	  between.	  However,	   in	  a	   small	  operation	   such	  as	  Farm	  X,	   this	   is	  
unlikely	  to	  be	  feasible	  and	  introducing	  simple	  measures	  to	  create	  hygiene	  barriers,	  
such	  as	  footbaths	  at	  the	  entrance	  to	  each	  shed,	  providing	  separate	  overalls	  for	  use	  
in	   each	   shed,	   and	   encouraging	   handwashing	  when	   entering	   and	   exiting	   separate	  
sheds	  would	  help	  improve	  the	  situation.	  Third,	  the	  entrances	  to	  sheds	  2	  and	  3	  were	  
open	  allowing	  access	  by	  both	  wild	  and	  domestic	  animals	   (including	  a	  pet	   chicken	  
that	   was	   allowed	   to	   roam	   free	   between	   the	   sheds).	   Because	   many	   wild	   and	  
domestic	  animals	  are	  susceptible	  to	  Salmonella	  spp	  infection	  3	  and	  can	  spread	  the	  
disease	  between	  sheds	  (and	  pens),	  restricting	  their	  access	   is	  a	  tool	   for	  preventing	  
spread	   of	   infection	   4.	   Last,	   having	   feed	   troughs	   positioned	   under	   nest	   boxes	   and	  
using	   wire	   mesh	   fencing	   to	   separate	   flocks	   may	   also	   have	   facilitated	   pathogen	  
spread.	  All	  the	  biosecurity	  issues	  we	  identified	  are	  simple	  to	  rectify	  and	  could	  help	  
prevent	  further	  spread	  of	  salmonella	  infection	  within	  the	  flock,	  or	  limit	  spread	  if	  a	  
new	  pathogen	  were	  introduced.	  	  
We	   identified	   a	   number	   of	   points	   in	   the	   egg	   processing	   pathway	   that	   were	   not	  
optimal	   for	   preventing	   contaminated	   eggs	   from	   being	   distributed	   for	   human	  
consumption.	   First,	   Farm	   X	   allowed	   floor	   eggs	   to	   enter	   the	   regular	   processing	  
pathway.	  Eggs	   that	  are	   laid	   in	  a	  contaminated	  environment	  such	  as	   the	  pen	  floor	  
(floor	  eggs)	  and	   remain	   there	   for	  any	  period	   time	  have	  greater	   loads	  of	  bacterial	  
contamination	  and	   risk	  of	  penetration	   than	   those	   that	   are	   laid	   in	   a	  nest	  box	  and	  
rapidly	   roll	   out	   of	   the	   pen	   into	   the	   collection	   tray	   5,	   6.	   For	   this	   reason,	   it	   is	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encouraged	   to	   divert	   floor	   eggs	   away	   from	   the	   regular	   processing	   pathway	   for	  
human	  consumption,	  or	  heat	  treat	  the	  eggs	  (pasteurisation),	  as	  they	  are	  at	  higher	  
risk	  of	  both	  internal	  and	  external	  contamination	  with	  environmental	  contaminants	  
such	  as	  Salmonella	   spp.	  Second,	  Farm	  X	  had	  no	  methods	   in	  place	  to	   identify	  eggs	  
with	   microcracks.	   Eggs	   with	   microcracks	   may	   be	   more	   readily	   penetrable	   by	  
bacteria	  7	  and,	  therefore,	  should	  not	  be	  prepared	  or	  used	  for	  human	  consumption	  
unless	  they	  undergo	  a	  pasteurisation	  process	  8.	  There	  are	  various	  methods	  in	  use	  to	  
identify	  eggs	  with	  microcracks,	  such	  as	  candling	  9.	  Without	  these	  methods	  in	  place,	  
it	   is	   likely	   that	   on	   Farm	  X,	   eggs	  with	  microcracks	   are	  being	  processed	   for	   human	  
consumption	  without	  appropriate	  heat	   treatment.	  Third,	  dirty	  eggs	  were	   first	  dry	  
cleaned	  by	  rubbing	  with	  cloth	  and	  then,	  if	  visible	  dirt	  remained,	  they	  were	  washed.	  
The	  washing	  solution	  was	  at	  the	  correct	  temperature,	  42¡C,	  however,	  no	  sanitiser	  
was	  used	  in	  the	  solution	  and	  there	  was	  no	  active	  drying	  process.	  It	  is	  recommended	  
in	   the	   national	   Code	   of	   Practice	  for	   Shell	  egg	  production,	   grading,	   packing	   and	  
distribution	  to	  use	  a	  sanitiser	  in	  the	  wash	  solution	  and	  dry	  the	  eggs	  after	  washing	  8.	  
Once	  washed,	  the	  cuticle	  of	  the	  egg	  that	  acts	  as	  a	  barrier	  to	  microbial	  penetration	  
is	   compromised	   and	   the	   drying	   process	   can	   prevent	  moisture	   and	   bacteria	   from	  
being	  drawn	  in	  10.	  Inappropriate	  washing	  of	  eggs	  may	  exacerbate	  contamination	  11.	  
The	   three	   points	   listed	   are	   easy	   to	   address:	   discard	   or	   pasteurise	   floor	   eggs;	  
implement	   a	   method	   for	   detecting	   microcracks,	   such	   as	   candling;	   and	   add	   a	  
sanitiser	  and	  drying	  step	  to	   the	  washing	  protocol.	  These	  simple	   interventions	  can	  
help	   optimise	   the	   egg	   processing	   pathway	   on	   Farm	   X	   and	   decrease	   the	   risk	   of	  
salmonellosis	  by	  helping	  to	  prevent	  heavily	  contaminated	  eggs	  from	  being	  used	  for	  
human	  consumption.	  	  
There	   are	   several	   reports	   in	   the	   literature	   where	   site	   investigations	   of	   farms	  
supplying	   eggs	   implicated	   in	   outbreaks	   of	   human	   salmonellosis	   have	   successfully	  
isolated	  identical	  organisms	  from	  environmental	  samples	  and	  confirmed	  the	  source	  
of	   transmission	   12-­‐15.	   However,	   we	   know	   that	   often,	   investigations	   of	   farms	   for	  
which	   there	  are	   strong	  epidemiological	   links	  with	   salmonellosis	  outbreaks	  do	  not	  
always	  yield	  positive	  samples	  (personal	  communication	  Barry	  Combs,	  OzFoodNet).	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As	  with	  any	  negative	  results,	  these	  are	  rarely	  reported	  in	  the	  literature.	  With	  this	  in	  
mind,	   we	   modified	   the	   standard	   laboratory	   culture	   method	   outlined	   in	   the	  
Australian	   Standards	   for	   Food	  Microbiology	   to	   increase	   sensitivity	   and	  maximise	  
our	  chances	  of	  successfully	  isolating	  the	  organism	  if	  it	  were	  present.	  We	  employed	  
modifications	   based	   on	   expert	   advice	   from	   laboratories	   that	   have	   been	   testing	  
samples	   from	   large	   ongoing	   outbreaks	   of	   Salmonella	   in	   the	   Australian	   state	   of	  
Queensland.	   With	   this	   method,	   we	   had	   considerable	   success.	   However,	   the	  
unmodified	   protocol	   was	   not	   run	   in	   parallel	   to	   the	   modified	   protocol	   and,	  
therefore,	  we	  cannot	  determine	  whether	  our	  high	  isolation	  rate	  was	  a	  result	  of	  our	  
modifications	  or	  not.	  It	  is	  in	  our	  best	  interests	  to	  have	  the	  optimal	  culture	  methods	  
in	  place	  for	  analysis	  of	   field	  samples.	  Therefore,	   it	  should	  be	  a	  priority	  to	  validate	  
the	  modified	  protocol	  and,	  if	  more	  effective	  than	  the	  standard,	  consider	  including	  it	  
in	  all	  future	  investigations.	  	  
Four	   different	  MLVA	   patterns	  were	   detected	  when	   STM03	   positive	   isolates	  were	  
subtyped.	   Two	   subtypes	   accounted	   for	   58	   and	   32%	  of	   isolates	   and	   differed	   by	   3	  
repeats	  at	  STTR6.	  It	  has	  been	  recommended	  that	  for	  monitoring	  and	  responding	  to	  
food	  borne	  outbreaks	  of	  disease	  in	  Australia,	  to	  consider	  isolates	  with	  one	  or	  two	  
repeat	  differences	  at	  no	  more	  than	  two	  loci	  as	  highly	  related	  16.	  By	  this	  definition,	  
the	   two	   predominant	   profiles	   detected	   on	   Farm	   X	   would	   not	   be	   interpreted	   as	  
highly	  related.	  However,	  a	  recent	  paper	   investigating	  Salmonella	  MLVA	  profiles	   in	  
the	  context	  of	  public	  health	  investigations,	  suggests	  that	  highly	  related	  isolates	  can	  
have	  differences	  in	  the	  repeats	  at	  one	  loci	  of	  any	  magnitude,	  whereas	  differences	  
at	  two	  loci	  of	  any	  magnitude	  (however	  small)	  indicate	  more	  distant	  relationships	  17.	  
By	   this	   definition,	   the	   two	   predominant	   MLVA	   patterns	   detected	   at	   Farm	   X	   are	  
highly	  related.	  Another	  two	  MLVA	  patterns	  accounted	  for	  5%	  of	  isolates	  each.	  One	  
pattern	   fulfils	   the	   latter	   criteria	   for	   highly	   related,	   and	   the	   other	   fulfils	   neither.	  
Salmonella	   spp	  of	   the	   same	   serotype	  but	  with	  multiple	  MLVA	  profiles	  have	  been	  
isolated	  from	  chicken	  flocks	  in	  other	  studies	  18.	  Given	  that	  salmonella	  infections	  can	  
persist	   in	   chicken	   production	   systems	   allows	   time	   for	   mutations	   to	   arise	   and,	  
therefore,	   it	   is	   not	   surprising	   that	   multiple	   MLVA	   profiles	   may	   be	   observed.	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Multiple	  MLVA	  profiles	  could	  also	  represent	  multiple	   introductions.	  Overall,	   three	  
of	   the	   four	   MLVA	   profiles	   identified	   on	   Farm	   X	   were	   highly	   related	   and	   the	  
predominant	   profile	   was	   identical	   to	   that	   of	   the	   majority	   of	   human	   cases.	   The	  
meaning	   of	   the	  more	   distantly	   related	   profile	   is	   unclear	   and	  may	   be	   a	   result	   of	  
evolutionary	   change	   during	   passage	   through	   the	   flock	   or	   represent	   a	   separate	  
introduction.	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6   Conclusion	  
In	  this	  investigation	  we	  confirmed	  the	  presence	  of	  STM03	  isolates	  with	  identical	  or	  
highly	   related	  MLVA	   profiles	   to	   that	   of	   human	   cases	   associated	  with	   the	   prisons	  
supplied	  by	  Farm	  X.	  We	   recommend	   that	   Farm	  X	   consults	  with	   their	   veterinarian	  
and	  develops	  a	  plan	  to	  control	   infection	  in	  affected	  flocks	  and	  decontaminate	  the	  
environment.	  To	  prevent	  further	  spread,	  simple	  improvements	  in	  biosecurity,	  such	  
as	   establishing	   a	   hierarchy	   of	   worker	   movement	   between	   pens	   from	   lowest	   to	  
highest	  contamination,	  footbaths	  at	  the	  entrance	  to	  each	  shed	  and	  ideally	  separate	  
work	   clothes	   for	   each	   shed,	   and	   exclusion	   of	  wild	   or	   domestic	   animals	   from	   the	  
shed	   should	   be	   implemented.	   Improvements	   in	   the	   egg	   processing	   pathway	   will	  
ultimately	   limit	   contaminated	   eggs	   being	   used	   for	   human	   consumption.	   Such	  
improvements	   would	   include	   preventing	   floor	   eggs	   from	   entering	   the	   regular	  
processing	   pathway,	   employing	   a	   device	   to	   identify	   eggs	   with	   microcracks,	   and	  
modifying	   the	   egg	  washing	   procedure	   to	  meet	   national	   guidelines.	   Regardless	   of	  
our	  best	  efforts	  to	  manage	  infection	  in	  the	  flock,	  and	  optimise	  the	  egg	  processing	  
pathway	   to	  minimise	   contaminated	  eggs	  being	  used	   for	  human	  consumption,	  we	  
cannot	  guarantee	  that	  eggs	  will	  be	  free	  of	  Salmonella	   spp.	  Therefore,	  the	  original	  
public	   health	   actions	   requesting	   that	   implicated	   correctional	   facilities	   only	   serve	  
eggs	   that	  are	  well	   cooked,	  do	  not	   serve	  dishes	  or	   sauces	  which	  contain	   raw	  eggs	  
(such	  as	  mayonnaise	  and	   tiramisu),	  and	  actively	  discourage	  prisoners	   from	  eating	  
raw	  eggs	  or	  having	  raw	  egg	  milkshakes	  for	  body	  building	  purposes,	  continue	  to	  be	  
important	  and	  relevant.	  	  
6.1   Post	  script	  
There	  have	  been	  no	  further	  reports	  of	  STM03	  salmonellosis	  cases	  at	  prisons	  in	  WA	  
since	  June	  2015.	  We	  do	  not	  know	  what,	  if	  any,	  interventions	  or	  changes	  were	  put	  in	  
place,	  as	  follow-­‐up	  with	  Farm	  X	  through	  the	  EHOs	  has	  not	  been	  successful.	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Chapter 4 
The incidence and epidemiology of Clostridium 
difficile infection in hospitalised patients with 
inflammatory bowel disease in Western Australia, 
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1 Prologue 
 
My role 
My supervisor, Thomas Riley, had a large linked dataset combining Clostridium 
difficile notifications, hospital morbidity data system data, and statutory death 
notifications for all hospitalisation in WA, July 2011 to June 2012. The data set had 
been previously used to characterise Clostridium difficile infections in hospitalised 
patients in WA, and to explore the outcomes of Clostridium difficile infection (CDI) 
in haematological oncology patients. Prof Riley, had become increasingly aware of 
a concerning international trend of increasing incidence of CDI in inflammatory 
bowel disease patients, as well as poor outcomes in this patient group following 
infection. We discussed the possibility of using the linked dataset to explore the 
situation in Australia. 
 
I explored the possibility by performing a background literature review to 
understand the situation globally and, more specifically, what had been reported in 
Australia. I found that there were no published reports describing incidence or 
outcomes of CDI in inflammatory bowel disease patients in Australia. This 
background research identified a clear gap in our knowledge, from which I could 
develop a number of research questions. I explored the data available in the linked 
datasets, and spoke with people familiar with the data, to determine the research 
questions were possible to answer. From there, I developed a research proposal 
that outlined the objectives and the research questions, described the data 
available, and the analyses that would be used to address each of the research 
questions. I applied to be included on the existing ethics approval and submitted an 
independent ethics application to the Australian National University. 
 
I performed all the data cleaning, recoding and analysis. I analysed the data using a 
variety of techniques including descriptive epidemiological techniques, survival 
analysis and negative binomial regression. I collated the data and drafted a 
manuscript detailing the findings for publication in a peer reviewed journal. I also 
conferred with specialist gastro-enterologist with experience of CDI in 
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inflammatory bowel disease patients along the way to ensure that the study would 
provide clinically relevant results.  
 
Lessons learned 
This was not an easy project and I learned many lessons in handling and analysing 
large data sets. First, I learned of the importance of getting to know the data and 
understanding its idiosyncrasies. For instance, for each individual entry there are a 
number of possible discharge codes indicating the reason for a patient being 
discharged from hospital. However, one code, indicated a ‘statistical separation’, 
meaning that the patient had not been discharged from hospital care, but had 
simply been transferred to another section. Thus, a single admission might have 
multiple entries, and all entries prior to the final entry would have a ‘statistical 
separation’. This carried considerable implications when calculating length of stay 
(LOS), as in an admission with multiple entries the LOS for all entries must be 
summed to arrive at the total LOS for the single admission. There were many such 
idiosyncrasies, and many only became apparent when working with the data set 
often leading to re-running of analyses to take into account a feature of the data 
that had been overlooked. This lead to the second major lesson, the value of do-
files and log-files. I created do-files for the analyses that addressed each research 
question. These do-files were invaluable and massively time-saving when needing 
to modify and re-run analyses. I found the log-files equally vital as a record of what 
I had done when reviewing the work. And last, I learned the value of clearly 
defining the measure at the outset, for instance, the number of new infections of 
CDI in IBD patients/100,000 follow-up days. This prevented confusion and set a 
clear path for how the data needed to be organised and analysed to achieve the 
answer. 
 
To perform this analysis required knowledge of survival analysis and I undertook 
extra-curricular STATA courses on the topic. I learned how to organise the data to 
make it amenable to survival analysis and how to interpret results. I also learned 
about various regression techniques and how to appraise which technique was 
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most appropriate for the data based on meeting assumptions. For this exercise, 
regarding analysis of LOS data, I considered and compared, linear, passion, negative 
binomial, and zero truncated negative binomial regression. Through this activity, 
although it felt like mind acrobatics at the time, I now feel more confident in my 
ability to determine appropriate regression techniques based on the type of data 
and its distribution. 
 
Public health impact 
To our knowledge there are no data describing the incidence or impact of CDI in 
IBD patients in Australia. Without this data, we cannot monitor if incidence is 
increasing, as has been seen in Europe and the US, or understand what impact the 
infection has on outcomes in this patient group. This analysis provides the first step 
towards addressing that knowledge gap. There are findings that carry direct 
implications for physicians caring for patients with IBD, for instance, the different 
age distributions for CDI in patients with inflammatory bowel disease and those 
without, meaning that CDI should also be considered a differential diagnosis in 
younger patients with inflammatory bowel disease. The manuscript will be 
submitted for publication in a peer reviewed journal. 
 
Following on from this work, we are in the process of extending the time-frame for 
the linked data set from one year to five. This will allow us to analyse incidence of 
CDI in IBD patients over time and identify any increasing or decreasing trends. An 
increasing trend would indicate that better control measures against infection at 
the individual and community level are needed in this sub-population. The data will 
also allow us to confirm our findings with respect to outcomes following CDI in 
inflammatory disease patients with a larger sample size.  
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1 Abstract 
 
International studies demonstrate that patients with inflammatory bowel disease 
have increased incidence of, and poorer outcomes following, Clostridium difficile 
infection. Despite the serious implications, the situation in Australia is unknown. In 
this study we used a linked database combining hospital administrative data, 
Clostridium difficile surveillance data, and statutory death notification data to 
describe the epidemiology, incidence and outcomes of Clostridium difficile infection 
in inflammatory bowel disease patients in Western Australia. We found a high 
incidence of infection in inflammatory disease patients at 8.56/100,000 patient 
follow-up days at risk, or 29.9/10,000 patient bed-days. The latter was over 6 times 
higher than that observed in the general population. Although inflammatory bowel 
disease patients with Clostridium difficile infection had longer median lengths of 
stay in hospital than those without, this was not an independent association. We 
also found that Clostridium difficile infection in inflammatory bowel disease 
patients was not associated with increased risk of mortality, although the sample 
size was small. The results of this study highlight that in Australia, inflammatory 
bowel disease patients are at increased risk of Clostridium difficile infection. These 
results have implications for the optimal diagnostic and therapeutic approaches to 
inflammatory bowel disease patients with diarrhoea and additionally, provide 
baseline data from which trends in incidence of Clostridium difficile infection in this 
patient group can now be monitored. 
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2 Introduction 
 
Clostridium difficile is an anaerobic spore forming bacterium that can cause severe 
disease in humans and is a leading cause of health care-associated infections 
worldwide. C difficile infection (CDI) has a spectrum of clinical manifestations from 
asymptomatic carriage through to severe illness 1, 2. Clinical disease is characterised 
by diarrhoea, with or without the symptoms of colitis (fever, abdominal cramps and 
discomfort in the lower quadrants) and biochemical abnormalities, depending on 
the severity of infection2. Despite the availability of treatment, many studies report 
higher than 15% mortality within 30 days following infection 3. Several risk factors 
for CDI have been identified and these include exposure to health care facilities, 
exposure to antibiotics, immunological abnormalities and other co-morbid 
conditions such as inflammatory bowel disease (IBD) 4, 5.  
 
The relationship between CDI and IBD is well documented 6. IBD is a chronic 
inflammatory condition of the gastrointestinal tract that is divided into two 
histologically distinct categories: ulcerative colitis (IBD-UC), which primarily affects 
the large intestines; and Crohn’s disease (IBD-CD) which affects the remaining 
gastrointestinal tract and proximal regions of the colon 7. Affected persons 
experience flares of disease with clinical signs not dissimilar to CDI, including bouts 
of diarrhoea, abdominal pain, cramps, and fever 7. The condition leads to frequent 
visits to healthcare facilities and may be treated with immunomodulatory 
therapies, two factors associated with increased risk for CDI 8. Additionally, the 
condition disrupts normal gut flora, which may play a role in preventing CDI 
colonisation 9, 10. Therefore, IBD itself is a documented risk factor for CDI 11, yet in 
IBD patients the similarity in clinical picture between IBD flare and CDI may mean 
that CDI is overlooked as a differential diagnosis for diarrhoeal symptoms. 
 
Over the past decade, significant changes in the incidence of CDI in IBD patients 
have been reported in North America and Europe 8, 11-16. In North America, the 
proportion of all hospitalisations for IBD that were complicated by CDI rose from an 
estimated 1.4% in 1998 to 2.9% in 200412. In the UK, a similar rise was observed, 
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from 0.73% in 2002 to 1.12% in 2008, however, more recent studies indicate the 
incidence may be decreasing again 14, 17. Nonetheless, periods of increasing 
incidence are concerning given that CDI in IBD patients has been associated with 
excess morbidity and mortality. Hospitalised IBD patients with CDI had a four to six 
fold higher risk of death than those without 12, 14, 15 and up to a five-fold longer 
length of stay in hospital (LOS) 14, 18 .  
 
In Australia, the situation with respect to CDI in IBD patients is not clear. There is 
concern that the incidence of CDI in IBD patients may also be increasing. However, 
while Australia has one of the highest incidence rates of IBD worldwide 19-21, and 
the incidence of CDI has been increasing 22 there are no available data specifically 
reporting the incidence of CDI in IBD patients to support or refute that concern. 
There are also no data describing the outcomes of CDI in IBD patients in Australia.  
 
There is a clear need for baseline data in Australia describing CDI in IBD patients. To 
address this need we analysed data from a retrospective cohort of IBD patients in 
Western Australia to:  
1) characterise CDI illness in IBD patients, 
2) estimate the incidence of CDI in IBD patients 
3) investigate the association between CDI and length of stay in IBD patients, 
and  
4) investigate the association between CDI and mortality in IBD patients  
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3 Methods 
 
The study was a retrospective cohort study including all patients admitted to a 
Western Australian hospital with a diagnosis of IBD between 01 July 2011 and 30 
June 2012. Patients were identified using data held in the Western Australian 
Hospital Morbidity Data system (HMDS) which includes demographic and clinical 
details of all admissions to tertiary hospitals, metropolitan non-tertiary hospitals, 
private hospitals and community health services across Western Australia. We 
selected IBD patients based on the ICD-10-AM diagnosis codes K50 (IBD-Crohn’s 
disease) and K51 (IBD-ulcerative colitis). ICD-10-AM is the Australian modification 
of the WHO ICD-10 disease and external cause base classification system23. 
 
Outcomes of interest were: CDI rates, hospital length of stay (LOS), 30-day case 
fatality and mortality rates. To identify CDI episodes and deaths in IBD patients, we 
linked HDMS data to statutory death notification data and routinely collected 
surveillance data from the Healthcare Associated Infection Surveillance WA 
(HISWA) program (Healthcare Associated Infection Unit, Government of Western 
Australia Department of Health). Notification for CDI is mandatory in WA, and all 
laboratory-confirmed CDI cases are notified to HISWA by laboratories. Notification 
data included patient and hospital details, CDI ribotype, and probable source of 
acquisition. Sources of acquisition included hospital acquired-hospital onset (HA-
HO), defined as a diagnosis of CDI made >48 h after admission to a healthcare 
facility (HCF); hospital acquired-community onset (HA-CO), defined as a diagnosis 
of CDI made <48 h after admission to a HCF but <4 weeks after the last discharge 
from an HCF; community-acquired (CA), defined as a diagnosis of CDI made <48 h 
after admission where symptom onset occurred >12 weeks after last discharge 
from an HCF; and indeterminate (I), defined as a diagnosis of CDI with insufficient 
data to determine the source of acquisition, or where the case did not meet any of 
the previous criteria (e.g. onset 4-12 weeks post-discharge)24. 
 
For the purposes of this study, a case of CDI was defined as having three or more 
loose stools in a 24 h period and meeting the following criteria: the stool sample 
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was positive for C. difficile toxin A and/or B by laboratory assay, or a toxin-
producing strain was detected in the sample by culture or PCR. Specimen collection 
date was used as the proxy date for CDI onset for all episodes of CDI. In the 
instance of repeat samples, a new episode was assigned only if the diagnosis did 
not occur within 8 weeks of a previous episode. Patients less than 2 years old were 
not included in the study due to the high rates of asymptomatic colonization with 
C. difficile in this age group 25. 
 
Data analysis 
CDI incidence was calculated as the number of new episodes of CDI per 100,000 
days of patient follow-up time. We also report episodes per 10,000 patient bed-
days to enable comparison with previously published estimates. Days of follow up 
time were calculated from the date of the first admission for IBD through to 30 
June 2012 or date of death, whichever was earliest. Because all admission data 
were stored as month rather than date of admission, the date of first admission for 
IBD was assigned the 15th day of the month of admission. Given the definition for a 
‘new CDI episode’(> 8 weeks since previous episode), participants were not at risk 
for the 8 weeks following CDI episode onset, hence the number of days that fell 
within this time period was not included in the total time at risk. Incidence rates 
were calculated overall, and by age, sex, IBD type (Ulcerative colitis/Crohn’s 
Disease) and comorbidities (based on the Elixhauser system, see below). Cox 
proportional hazard regression was used to model the association between each of 
these factors and CDI, adjusting for age and sex. 
 
Comorbidities were defined for all study participants using the Elixhauser system 26, 
a validated and widely used comorbidity measure. We used the Elixhaus Macro for 
STATA to derive the presence or absence of 30 comorbidities from the primary and 
20 additional diagnoses fields in the HDMS. Presence of comorbidities for each case 
was categorized into counts of 0, 1, and 2 or more (2+). 
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We compared median LOS in IBD patients with and without a diagnosis of CDI 
during admission (ascertained from specimen collection dates), using the Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test, or the Kruskal-Wallis test where less than five observations were 
expected in any cell. We transformed the data (LOS-1 for each admission) and used 
negative binomial regression to examine associations between CDI and LOS, 
adjusting for age, sex, IBD type and comorbidity.  
 
We calculated 30-day case-fatality rates from first admission for IBD up until 
30/05/2012, which allowed for at least 30 days of follow-up data.  We compared 
these rates in those with and without CDI using Fisher’s exact test. As the short 
follow-up period resulted in few mortality data for analysis, we additionally report 
mortality rates per 100,000 follow-up days calculated from date of first IBD 
admission through to 30/06/2012. Mortality rates were estimated for the total 
group and then stratified by age, sex, CDI status and comorbidity. Cox proportional 
hazard regression was used to examine associations between these factors and 
mortality, mutually adjusting for all covariates.    
 
Data were analysed using Stata version 14.1. 
 
Ethics approval 
The study was approved by the WA Department of Health Human Research Ethics 
Committee (number 2013/35), and the Australian University Human Research 
Ethics Committee (number 2015/436). 
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4 Results 
 
Study population 
 
Between 1 July 2011 and 30 June 2012, 4378 admissions for IBD representing 2313 
individuals were reported in the HMDS data base. All 2313 individuals were eligible 
for inclusion in the study. Of all study participants: 48% were male; the median age 
was 44 years (range 3-95); and 5.0% were aged 2-20, 55.5% were aged 20-49, 
24.5% were aged 50-64, and 15.0% were 65 or older.  
 
Thirty-seven study participants (1.6%) recorded at least one episode of CDI during 
the study period; one participant had two episodes and another had three. The 
median age of cases (ie. those with CDI) was 48 years (IQR 27-61) and 59% were 
male. The majority of cases presented with CDI to tertiary hospitals (67.5%); similar 
proportions presented to metro non-tertiary and private hospitals (10.0% and 
17.5% respectively); and fewest presented to West Australian community health 
services (5.0%). Most episodes were community acquired (42.5%) followed by 
hospital acquired-hospital onset (15%) and hospital acquired-community onset 
(10%); CDI acquisition was indeterminate in 32.5% of CDI episodes. Of all cases that 
presented to tertiary hospitals, CDI was still most commonly reported to be 
community acquired (59%).  
 
Ribotyping 
Table 4-1 demonstrates that the predominant ribotype was UK014/020 (15%) 
followed by UK002 (7%). C. difficile strains were not ribotyped in twenty-one 
episodes (53%) of illness among IBD patients.  
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Table 4-1 Ribotypes of C. difficile isolated from IBD patients diagnosed with CDI  between 
01/07/2011 – 30/06/2012 in Western Australian hospitals 
 
Ribotype N (n=40) % 
UK014/020 6 15.0 
UK002 3 7.5 
UK056 2 5.0 
QX014 1 2.5 
QX077 1 2.5 
UK010 1 2.5 
UK018 1 2.5 
UK046 1 2.5 
UK054 1 2.5 
UK095 1 2.5 
UK070 1 2.5 
Unknown 21 53.0 
 
 
 
Incidence rate 
 
The incidence of CDI among the study population was 29.9/10,000 patient bed-
days, or 8.56/100,000 patient follow-up days at risk (95% CI 6.28-11.67). Incidence 
rates per 100,000 patient follow-up days did not differ by gender, type of IBD, or 
patient age (Table 4-2). 
 
IBD patients with any comorbidity had higher incidence rates of CDI, and were 10 
times more likely to be diagnosed with CDI than IBD patients with no comorbidities, 
after adjusting for both age and gender (Table 4-3). Specific comorbidities 
comprising a broad range of conditions that demonstrated significant hazard ratios 
with CDI are also presented in Table 4-3. The highest adjusted hazards of CDI were 
found in patients with HIV, paralysis and lymphoma.    
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Table 4-2 Number of CDI cases, rate of infection, and age and sex adjusted hazard ratios among IBD patients by 
patient characteristics, between 01/07/2011-30/06/2012 in Western Australia 
Variable 
Case* 
N (%) 
Non-Case 
N (%) 
p-
value 
Incidence rate^ 95% CI aHR 95% CI 
Age  
   2-19 
   20-49 
   50-64 
   65+ 
 
  3   (8) 
18  (49) 
  9  (24) 
  7  (19)     
 
  120   (5) 
1265 (56) 
  557 (24) 
  334 (15) 
 
0.602 
 
11.45 
7.14 
9.87 
11.0 
 
3.7-35.5 
4.6-11.2 
5.5-17.8 
5.2-23.1 
 
1.54 
1 
1.42 
1.65 
 
0.5-5.2 
- 
0.7-3.0 
0.7-3.9 
Sex 
   Male   
 
22   (59) 
 
1082   (48) 
 
0.150 
 
11.1 
 
7.5-16.4 
 
1 
 
- 
   Female 15   (41)    1194   (52) 6.2 3.7-10.3 0.56 0.3-1.1 
Type of IBD at first admission      
   IBD-UC  20  (54) 1075  (47)  
0.246 
7.9 4.9-12.4 1 
1.07
4 
- 
0.6-2.0    IBD-CD 
16  (43) 1175 (52) 9.0 
5.9-13.9 
   Unknown   1    (3)     26   (1) -  - - 
*n=37, 2 cases had multiple episodes of CDI (1 case had 2 and another had 3) totaling  40 CDI episodes; ^CDI 
episodes/105 days follow-up time; CI: confidence interval; aHR: hazard rate adjusted for age and sex 
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Table 4-3 Incidence rate of CDI in IBD patients , by comorbidities with significant hazard ratios, Western Australia 2011-2012 
Predictor Present N IR* 95% CI cHR^ 95% CI aHR^ 95% CI 
Any comorbidity No 1932 3.6 2.1-6.0 
9.4 4.9-17.9 10.0 5.1-19.4 
 Yes 381 34.0 23.1-49.9 
Specific comorbidities         
Drug abuse No 2301 8.17 5.9-11.2 
14.1 3.4-59.1 15.2 3.6-64.4 
 Yes 12 101.5 25.4-405.9 
Pulmonary circulation disorders No 2302 8.0 5.8-11.0 
13.3 4.1-43.1 13.6 4.1-45.4 
 Yes 11 118.3 38.2-366.8 
Paralysis No 2307 7.7  5.6-10.7 
55.7 19.7-157.8 52.2 16.8-161.9 
 Yes 6 448.4 168.3-1200  
Neurological disorders No 2297 8.0 5.8-11.0 
13.2 4.1-43.0 - - 
 Yes 16 104.4 33.7-323.7 
Renal failure No 2294 7.7 5.6-10.7 
24.3 8.5-69.1 - - 
 Yes 19 167.2 62.7-445.4 
HIV Aids No 2312 8.3 6.1-11.4 
220.5 28.21-1723.0 159.8 18.8-1356.2 
 Yes 1 1900 270.9-14000 
Lymphoma No 2309 8.4 6.1-11.4 
17.3 2.4-125.8 12.1 1.5-98.8 
 Yes 4 164.2 23.1-1200 
Coagulopathy No 2293 8.0 5.8-11.0 
10.8 3.3-35.0 10.0 3.1-33.1 
 Yes 20 78.5 25.3-243.4 
Obesity No 2306 8.4 6.1-11.5 
7.6 1.0-55.7 7.0 0.9-51.4 
 Yes 7 61.0 8.6-433.13 
Weight loss No 2298 8.2 6.0-11.2 
8.7 2.1-36.2 - - 
 Yes 15 74.3 18.6-297.2 
Fluid and electrolyte disorders No 2094 5.0 3.2-7.6 
8.4 4.5-15.7 10.5 5.5-20.0 
 Yes 219 42.9 27.3-67.2 
*incidence rate per 100,000 patient follow-up days; uHR: crude hazard ratio; ^proportional hazards test >0.05 in all cases; - proportional hazard assumption not 
met; aHR: hazard ratio adjusted for age and sex. 
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Length of stay 
 
There were 35 in-patient episodes of IBD-CDI included in the LOS analysis and 4029 
IBD-only episodes. In total five IBD-CDI cases were excluded from the study: two 
were out-patients and three could not be assigned to a hospital admission and 
their inpatient status unknown. 
 
Median LOS was significantly longer in IBD-CDI patients compared to IBD-only 
admissions (Wilcoxon rank sum p<0.001). The median LOS for IBD-CDI cases was 6 
days (IQR 4-14 days) whereas for IBD-only cases it was 1 day (IQR 1-1 days). LOS 
varied significantly for age, gender, IBD type, and number of co-morbidities (Table 
4-4). However, following adjustment for all other variables by negative binomial 
regression, CDI, type of IBD and gender were no longer significantly associated with 
LOS, and comorbidity burden appeared to be the strongest predictor of LOS in this 
patient group.  
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Table 4-4 Length of stay in IBD patients hospitalised in Western Australian between 
01/07/2011-30/06/2012 by patient characteristics 
Predictor 
Median LOS 
(range) 
p-value 
(Wilcoxon test) 
aIRR 95% CI 
CDI status     
      IBD-only       1.0 (1-92) 
<0.001 
1.00 1.00-1.00 
      IBD-CDI       6.0 (1-66) 1.54 0.53-4.42 
Type of IBD     
      UC 1.0 (1-92) 
0.002 
1.00 1.00-1.00 
      CD 1.0 (1-89) 0.83 0.68-1.03 
Age group     
     2-19 1.0 (1-55) 
<0.001a  
2.07 1.35-3.15 
     20-49 1.0 (1-92) 1.00 1.00-1.00 
     50-64 1.0 (1-84) 0.57 0.44-0.74 
     65+ 1.0 (1-89) 1.30 0.94-1.80 
Sex     
     Male 1.0 (1-84) 
0.007  
1.00 1.00-1.00 
     Female 1.0 (1-92) 1.09 0.88-1.34 
Comorbidities     
     0 1.0 (1-89) 
<0.001a  
1.00 1.00-1.00 
     1 5.0 (1-92) 9.10 6.18-13.39 
     2+    13.0 (2-84) 25.83 11.86-56.27 
aKruskal-Wallis test; aIRR: incidence rate ratio adjusted for all predictors; CI: confidence 
interval; UC: ulcerative colitis; CD: Crohn’s disease 
 
 
 
 
Mortality 
 
There was one death amongst IBD-CDI patients and 8 deaths amongst IBD-only 
patients within 30-days of the first admission. While the 30-day case fatality rate 
was higher for IBD-CDI patients (2.7%, 95% CI 0.4-17.3%) than for IBD-only patients 
(0.4%, 95%CI 0.2-0.7%), the difference was not statistically significant (Fisher’s 
exact test p=0.143). 
 
Over the entire study period there was a total of 22 deaths amongst 2313 IBD 
patients (1.0%). Of these, three deaths occurred in CDI cases. The mortality rate for 
IBD-CDI cases was 24.45 per 100,000 patient follow-up days (95% CI 6.11-97.75), 
which was higher than that for IBD-only at 4.34 per 100,000 patient follow-up days 
(95% CI 2.80-6.72). Figure 4-1 shows the survival curve following first admission for 
IBD. 
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Figure 4-1 Kaplan-Meier survival curve for patient follow-up time from first IBD admission 
to 30/06/2012, in patients with (IBD-CDI) and without CDI (IBD) in Western Australia 
 
Results of the Cox proportional hazards regression are presented in Table 4-5 and 
show that having more than 2 comorbidities, being aged 65 or older and having 
had an episode of CDI had the highest unadjusted mortality rates and hazard ratios. 
After mutually adjusting for covariates, having had a case of CDI was no longer 
significantly associated with mortality and hazard ratios were only marginally 
elevated, while age greater than 65 and comorbidities retained increased hazard 
ratios that were statistically significant.  
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5 Discussion 
 
In this study we found that the incidence of CDI in hospitalised patients in WA with 
IBD was 8.56 per 100,000 follow-up days. Whilst incidence was not associated with 
age, sex or type of IBD, it was significantly elevated in patients with co-morbidities. 
We also found that IBD patients with CDI had increased lengths of stay in hospital 
than those without CDI, although, this was not an independent association. Finally, 
we found that IBD patients with CDI were not at greater risk of mortality than those 
without. To our knowledge, this is the first study to report the incidence and 
outcomes of CDI in patients hospitalised with IBD in Australia. Our results provide 
much needed baseline information from which to monitor the epidemiology of CDI 
in Australian IBD patients. 
 
 In our study, the calculated incidence of CDI in IBD patients was 29.9/10,000 
patient bed-days, which was over six fold higher than that reported for CDI in any 
hospitalised patient in WA at 4.63/10,000 patient bed-days 22. Additionally, the 
proportion of IBD hospitalisations with a concurrent diagnosis of CDI (1.6%) was 8 
times higher than that calculated from our own analysis of all hospital admissions 
over the same time period, where only 0.2% of cases with a hospital admission 
developed CDI. Overall, these results accord with what has been found in similar 
studies in the US. In a nationwide inpatient database study, Ananthakrishnan et al. 
reported, that 2.9% of IBD hospitalisations in 2007 were complicated by CDI, 
compared with 0.82% of all hospitalisations 12. The study by Ananthakrishnan et al. 
supported the results of earlier nationwide and single center tertiary hospital 
cohort studies in the US that also found higher incidences of CDI in IBD patients 
compared with non-IBD patients 8, 11, 15. Taken together, the data suggest that IBD 
patients hospitalised in Western Australia are at greater risk of CDI than non-IBD 
patients. 
 
IBD patients with CDI were not significantly different to those without CDI with 
respect to age and gender. CDI incidence rates did not differ significantly by these 
variables either. Similar results were found by Issa et al, in a single center 
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retrospective study of all IBD patients attending a specialist IBD referral center in 
the US 8. Overall, these results indicate that unlike the non-IBD population, where 
CDI occurs disproportionately occur in older patients (>65 years) 13, 18, age does not 
appear to be significantly associated with IBD patients acquiring CDI. Clinicians 
need to be aware that the epidemiology of CDI in IBD patients is different, and 
ensure that CDI is considered in the differentials for IBD patients of any age with 
gastrointestinal symptoms.  
 
In IBD patients, the majority of CDI was community acquired. Two studies in the US 
also reported a high level of community acquisition of CDI in IBD patients 8, 11. It is 
possible that IBD patients are susceptible to acquiring CDI from community sources 
due to factors associated with their condition, such as dysbiosis 27, or 
immunosuppression from immunomodulatory therapy 28. Community acquisition 
was further supported by the strain typing results which demonstrated a wide 
range of C difficile ribotypes from IBD patients, consistent with multiple sources of 
acquisition. Similar results have been found in studies from Ireland of C difficile 
carriage in IBD patients in remission 29. In that study, not only were a variety of 
ribotypes detected, but the common nosocomial ribotype, RT027, was not 
detected at all. Interestingly, our ribotype distribution did not differ considerably to 
that reported for CDI in any patient in WA investigated in a 1 month period in 2010 
30, suggesting that patients from the general population acquire CDI from similar 
sources as those with IBD. Overall, the results highlight the need to educate 
susceptible persons on how to protect themselves from acquiring CDI in the 
community. However, education may not be straight forward given that 
mechanisms of CDI transmission in the community are still incompletely 
understood 31. Transmission in the community is thought to be primarily 
environment-to-person via the feacal-oral route, but there is growing evidence that 
additional sources of infection exist 32. More research is needed to understand 
transmission and risk factors for CDI in the community setting, so that effective 
strategies can be developed to protect susceptible populations from infection. 
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Length of hospital stay is a useful measure of both the disease impact on the 
individual, and the burden on the hospital system. In our study we found a 
significantly longer median LOS for IBD-CDI patients compared with IBD-only 
patients (6 days vs 1 day, p<0.001). A UK nationwide study of CDI in IBD patients 
also found longer LOS in the IBD-CDI population, although the magnitude of that 
difference was much larger at 27 days for IBD-CDI patients (IQR 12-51 days) and 5 
days for IBD-only patients (IQR 2-10 days)14. In contrast, three single center studies 
from the US, UK and Romania reported no difference in the median or mean LOS 
data between patients with and without CDI 16, 17, 33. It should be noted that all 
three of these studies had considerably smaller samples sizes than our study and 
the nation-wide UK study reported above. Furthermore, the latter two studies 
recruited patients admitted to tertiary referral centers meaning that the 
comparison IBD-only group may have had, on the whole, more severe IBD disease, 
resulting in median lengths of stay comparable to the IBD-CDI group.  
 
Despite significantly increased median LOS in IBD patients with CDI compared to 
those without, after adjusting for age and sex, we found that this was not an 
independent association. These results contrasted with those previously reported 
in the literature by Ananthakrishnan et al. and Nguyun et al. In those retrospective 
nationwide inpatient database studies of CDI in IBD patients in the US, CDI 
increased LOS in IBD patients after adjusting for age, sex and number of other 
factors 15, 18. The reason for the difference in our results and those from the US 
studies is unclear but may lie in dissimilarities between countries in terms of 
circulating C difficile strains (and their virulence), and patient management and 
prescribing practices for both IBD and CDI.  
 
Similar to LOS, CDI was not associated with higher mortality in IBD patients, 
although our sample size was small. While both 30-day case fatality rates and 
mortality rates (per 100,000 patient follow-up days) were greater in IBD-CDI versus 
IBD-only patients, in neither case was the difference significant. In contrast with 
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our results, two studies from the US, one from the UK, and another from Canada all 
reported increased risk of mortality associated CDI infection in IBD patients after 
adjusting for potential confounders including comorbidities 12, 14, 18, 34. The UK study 
and two US studies were based on nationwide administrative datasets, and 
demonstrated increased risk of mortality in IBD-CDI patients with odds ratios that 
ranged from 3.38 to 6.32 12, 14, 18. The Canadian study used a statewide 
administrative data set and investigated patients with ulcerative colitis only.  In 
that study they reported a 2.56 times increased hazard of dying following CDI in IBD 
(ulcerative colitis) patients 34. The difference in direction of risk of mortality 
following CDI in IBD patients in Australia versus the US and Europe may be 
explained by C difficile strain types. C difficile strain RT027, an epidemic strain 
associated with increased morbidity and mortality in North America and Europe 35, 
36, has not become established in Australia. Absence of this hypervirulent strain in 
Australia may explain why CDI is not associated with increased mortality in IBD 
patients in Australia whereas it has been in the US and the Europe. However, we 
interpret the findings cautiously given the small sample size and potential for type 
II statistical error. 
 
A major limitation of our study was that HDMS does not collect data pertaining to 
IBD disease severity or treatment, both of which are potential confounders 
particularly for outcome measures. Ananthakrishnan et al addressed the latter 
issue in a study similar to ours by developing a disease severity scoring system for 
IBD patient with Crohn’s Disease from specific predictors in the dataset 12, 37. 
Developing and validating a comparable scoring system for data stored in HDMS 
would allow for control of this potential confounder in future studies, and should 
be investigated. Our study was also limited by data from a 1-year time frame, and 
the study may have been underpowered. With a large administrative dataset there 
is always the possibility of misclassification of both exposures and outcomes. In our 
study, CDI exposure status was provided from two sources, HDMS and an 
independent surveillance system (HISWA) and, therefore, the chance for 
misclassification errors was reduced by cross referencing. LOS and death are less 
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likely to be subject to error given they are based on computer calculated data in 
HDMS and statutory death notification data. Finally, the data account only for 
hospital identified cases of CDI and, therefore, the study does not provide 
information about patients diagnosed in general practice, private practice or in the 
regional sector potentially affecting the external validity of the results.  
 
In spite of these limitations, our study provides insights into the epidemiology of 
CDI in IBD patients in Western Australia. We found a higher incidence of CDI in IBD 
patients than what has been reported in the literature for the general hospitalised 
population. The results also suggest that CDI in IBD patients in Western Australia is 
not associated with increased risk of death or LOS. The majority of cases of CDI 
were community acquired which highlights the need for a better understanding of 
the mechanisms of CDI transmission and acquisition in the community. Following 
on from this work, further longitudinal studies are needed to assess and monitor 
trends in infection over time, to determine if increases in incidence rates are 
occurring similar to those reported in the US and the Europe, so that appropriate 
responses can be implemented if necessary.  
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1   Prologue	  
	  
My	  role	  
One	   month	   after	   starting	   my	   placement	   at	   the	   Communicable	   Disease	   Control	  
Directorate,	   Professor	   Donna	   Mak	   asked	   me	   if	   I	   would	   like	   to	   participate	   in	   a	  
teleconference	  to	  discuss	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  multijurisdictional	  outbreak	  group	  to	  help	  
in	   the	   response	   to	  an	  outbreak	  of	   infectious	   syphilis	  across	  northern	  Australia.	   I	  was	  
aware	  of	  the	  outbreak	  and	  very	  interested	  for	  the	  opportunity	  to	  experience	  firsthand	  
(and	   for	   the	   first	   time)	   the	   formation	   and	   initiation	   of	   a	  multijurisdictional	   outbreak	  
response.	  This	  initial	  pilot	  meeting	  included	  a	  representative	  from	  each	  of	  the	  affected	  
jurisdictions.	   Initially,	   the	   situation	   and	   current	   outbreak	   numbers	   were	   discussed,	  
leading	  onto	  the	   logistics	  of	  setting	  up	  a	  multijurisdictional	  outbreak	  response	  group,	  
including	  nomination	  of	  a	  chair	  and	  discussion	  of	  initial	  membership.	  I	  volunteered	  to	  
perform	  the	  secretariat	  duties	  for	  the	  group.	  In	  this	  role	  I	  organised	  and	  minuted	  every	  
monthly	   meeting;	   drafted	   the	   terms	   of	   reference;	   created	   standardised	   reporting	  
templates	  for	  the	  affected	  jurisdictions	  to	  report	  their	  case	  numbers	  at	  each	  meeting;	  
prepared	  and	  finalised	  the	  first	  communique	  for	  disseminating	  data	  to	  the	  public	  which	  
then	  served	  as	  the	  template	  for	  all	  subsequent	  communiques;	  investigated	  and	  wrote	  a	  
report	  for	  the	  group	  on	  the	  feasibility	  of	  using	  syphilis	  subtyping	  to	  better	  understand	  
the	   epidemiology	   of	   the	   outbreak;	   drafted	   a	   briefing	   note	   for	   the	   Australian	   Health	  
Principal	   Protection	   Committee	   (AHPPC)	   and	   agenda	   papers	   and	   quarterly	   MJSO	  
updates	   for	   the	  Communicable	  Disease	  Network	  Australia	   (CDNA	  –	   the	  MJSO	  parent	  
group);	  set	  up	  and	  performed	  secretariat	  duties	  for	  one	  subcommittee	  of	  the	  group,	  and	  
helped	   with	   another	   subcommittee;	   and	   presented	   outbreak	   information	   at	   several	  
domestic	  and	  national	  conferences	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  group.	  I	  performed	  the	  secretariat	  
duties	  for	  one	  year,	  from	  April	  2015	  to	  April	  2016.	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Lessons	  learned	  
Although	  extremely	  time	  consuming	  and	  at	  times	  tricky	  due	  to	  the	  sensitive	  nature	  of	  
the	  topic,	   I	   learned	  many	  valuable	   lessons	   from	  this	  experience.	  Six	  of	   those	   lessons,	  
with	  respect	  to	  administratively	  running	  a	  large	  outbreak	  response	  group,	  are	  detailed	  
in	   the	   following	   chapter.	   However,	   the	   lessons	   were	   more	   than	   just	   about	  
administration,	   by	   attending	   all	   the	   meetings	   I	   was	   able	   to	   learn	   about	   outbreak	  
response	  from	  a	  wide	  group	  of	  highly	  skilled	  and	  experienced	  people	  from	  multiple	  areas	  
of	  Public	  Health.	  I	  participated	  in	  many	  epidemiological	  discussions	  about	  the	  outbreak	  
which	   included	  how	  we	  could	   interpret	  case	  numbers	  and	  whether	  the	  situation	  was	  
improving	   or	   deteriorating,	   what	   parameters	   would	   we	   used	   to	   determine	   that	   the	  
outbreak	   over,	   how	   we	   would	   determine	   if	   the	   outbreak	   had	   transitioned	   from	   an	  
outbreak	  to	  a	  new	  high	  level	  of	  endemicity	  (and	  whether	  that	  question	  should	  even	  be	  
considered)	   and	   what	   additional	   data	   were	   needed	   (plus	   the	   logistics/difficulties	   in	  
accessing	  that	  data).	  In	  addition,	  I	  gained	  a	  solid	  appreciation	  of	  the	  extreme	  value	  of	  
developing	  relationships	  with	  colleagues	  in	  other	  jurisdictions,	  and	  the	  absolute	  need	  
for	  diplomacy	  and	  consideration	  when	  chasing	  up	  action	  items,	  reports,	  or	  data	  in	  my	  
capacity	  as	  secretariat.	  I	  also	  learned	  about	  the	  differences	  in	  the	  response	  to	  a	  ‘slow	  
burning’	  outbreak	  such	  as	  those	  caused	  by	  syphilis	  as	  opposed	  to	  ‘explosive’	  outbreaks	  
such	  as	  those	  caused	  by	  measles	  (something	  that	  I	  was	  more	  familiar	  with).	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Public	  health	  impact	  
The	   nature	   of	   the	   infectious	   syphilis	   outbreak	   across	   three	   jurisdictions	   in	   northern	  
Australia	   required	   a	   truly	   collaborative	   effort	   in	   the	   outbreak	   response.	   I	   feel	   very	  
fortunate	   to	   have	   been	   able	   to	   participate	   in	   and	   supported	   the	   multijurisdictional	  
response	  to	  the	  outbreak	  through	  the	  MJSO.	  The	  MJSO	  not	  only	  facilitated	  sharing	  of	  
data	   across	   affected	   jurisdictions	   to	   optimise	   the	   response,	   but	   also	   ensured	  
dissemination	  of	  data.	  Dissemination	  of	  data	  was	  pivotal	  to	  increasing	  awareness	  of	  the	  
outbreak	  not	  only	  within	  the	  at-­‐risk-­‐populations,	  but	  also	  within	  the	  primary	  health	  care	  
and	  public	  health	  sectors,	  to	  facilitate	  early	  diagnosis,	  treatment	  and	  education.	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2   Abstract	  
	  
Background:	  In	  April	  2015,	  a	  multijurisdictional	  syphilis	  outbreak	  working	  group	  (MJSO)	  
was	  formed	  in	  response	  to	  an	  outbreak	  of	  infectious	  syphilis	  across	  northern	  Australia	  
that	   affected	   three	   jurisdictions;	   Queensland,	   the	   Northern	   Territory	   and	   Western	  
Australia.	  The	  group	  was	  formed	  at	  the	  request	  of	  the	  Communicable	  Disease	  Network	  
of	  Australia	  (CDNA)	  with	  a	  purpose	  to	  help	  co-­‐ordinate	  the	  outbreak	  response	  across	  the	  
jurisdictions.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  describe	  6	  key	  administrative	  actions	  that	  
I	   learned	   whilst	   performing	   secretariat	   duties	   for	   the	   MJSO,	   that	   helped	   establish	  
efficient	  running	  of	  a	  large	  multijurisdictional	  group.	  
	  
Results:	   During	   my	   time	   as	   secretariat	   I	   identified	   six	   key	   activities,	   which,	   if	  
implemented	  early	   can	   facilitate	   smooth	   running	  of	  a	   large	  multijurisdictional	   group.	  
These	  key	  activities	  were:	  develop	  the	  terms	  of	  reference	  early;	  establish	  standardized	  
reporting	  templates;	  identify	  areas	  or	  issues	  that	  are	  best	  addressed	  out	  of	  session	  by	  
specialized	  groups	  or	  subcommittees;	  establish	  the	  outbreak	  case	  definition;	  consider	  
methods	  to	  ensure	  data	  are	  disseminated;	  and	  establish	  a	  communication	  plan.	  	  
	  
Implementing	  these	  six	  activities	  provides	  clarity	  around	  group	  structure,	  function	  and	  
objectives;	   improves	  efficiency	  by	  providing	  clear	  guidelines	  as	   to	  what	   constitutes	  a	  
case	   and	   allows	   comparison	   of	   case	   numbers	   and	   demographics	   across	   wide	  
geographical	   regions;	   improves	   efficiency	   by	   delegating	   specific	   tasks	   to	   sub-­‐groups	  
and/or	  experts	  that	  can	  be	  addressed	  outside	  of	  meetings	  allowing	  the	  group	  to	  address	  
and	   move	   on	   with	   more	   general	   agenda	   items;	   and	   ensure	   that	   data	   are	   being	  
disseminated	  in	  a	  coordinated	  and	  agreeable	  way	  to	  affected	  stakeholders.	  
	  
Conclusions:	   I	   describe	   key	   learnings	   from	   my	   experience	   helping	   to	   establish,	   and	  
performing	  secretariat	  duties,	  for	  a	  large	  multijurisdictional	  outbreak	  response	  group.	  
The	  learnings	  described	  are	  generic	  and	  can	  be	  considered	  and	  implemented	  early	   in	  
most	   multijurisdictional	   outbreak	   response	   groups.	   I	   found	   these	   activities	   to	   be	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instrumental	  in	  facilitating	  smooth	  group	  operation	  and	  progress	  towards	  achieving	  the	  
objectives.	  	  	  
	   173	  
3   Introduction	  
	  
In	  April	  2015,	  a	  multijurisdictional	  syphilis	  outbreak	  working	  group	  (MJSO)	  was	  formed	  
in	  response	  to	  an	  outbreak	  of	  infectious	  syphilis	  across	  northern	  Australia	  that	  affected	  
three	  jurisdictions;	  Queensland	  (Qld),	  the	  Northern	  Territory	  (NT)	  and	  Western	  Australia	  
(WA).	  The	  group	  was	  formed	  at	  the	  request	  of	  the	  communicable	  disease	  network	  of	  
Australia	  (CDNA)	  with	  a	  purpose	  to	  help	  co-­‐ordinate	  the	  outbreak	  response	  across	  the	  
jurisdictions.	  
	  
The	   first	   meeting	   of	   the	   MJSO	   was	   held	   on	   April	   7,	   2015.	   It	   was	   attended	   by	  
representatives	   from	   equivalent	   communicable	   disease	   control	   branches	   for	   each	  
affected	  jurisdiction,	  Qld,	  NT	  and	  WA,	  as	  well	  as	  South	  Australia	  given	  its	  proximity	  and	  
cultural	   links	  with	  active	  outbreak	   regions.	  Epidemiological	  details	  of	   the	  outbreak	   in	  
each	   jurisdiction	   were	   presented	   followed	   by	   discussions	   on	   how	   the	   MJSO	   would	  
function,	   and	   I	   was	   nominated	   to	   perform	   the	   secretariat	   duties.	   The	   following	   is	   a	  
report	  describing	   the	  background	  to	   the	  outbreak,	  my	  role	   in	   the	  MJSO,	  and	  the	  key	  
administrative	  take	  home	  learnings	  I	  gained	  performing	  secretariat	  duties	  for	  the	  MJSO,	  
that	  are	  applicable	  to	  the	  efficient	  running	  of	  any	  large	  outbreak	  response	  group.	  	  
	  
4   Background	  
4.1   Syphilis	  infection	  
	  
Syphilis	  is	  a	  sexually	  transmitted	  infection	  caused	  by	  the	  bacterium	  Treponema	  pallidum	  
subsp.	  pallidum	  (T.pallidum)1.	  It	  has	  three	  recognized	  clinical	  stages:	  primary,	  secondary	  
and	   tertiary.	   Primary	   syphilis	   occurs	   between	   1-­‐3	   weeks	   following	   infection,	   and	   is	  
characterized	   by	   a	   painless	   indolent	   ulcer	   (occasionally	   multiple),	   at	   the	   site	   of	  
inoculation.	  Lesions	  may	  be	  found	  on	  internal	  or	  external	  genitalia,	  but	  can	  occur	  at	  non-­‐
genital	  sites	  including	  the	  anus,	  rectum	  and	  oral	  cavity,	  and	  are	  often	  accompanied	  by	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local	  lymphadenopathy.	  Without	  treatment,	  lesions	  spontaneously	  resolve	  within	  3-­‐10	  
weeks	  2.	  Secondary	  syphilis	  represents	  systemic	  spread	  of	  the	  infection	  and	  presents	  as	  
a	   generalized,	   often	  widespread,	  macular	   papular	   rash	   that	   can	   be	   accompanied	   by	  
constitutional	  symptoms	  such	  as	  fever	  and	  malaise	  2.	  Again,	  symptoms	  spontaneously	  
resolve	  without	  treatment	  within	  3-­‐6	  weeks.	  At	  this	  time	  the	  patient	  enters	  a	  period	  of	  
latency	   where,	   although	   the	   organism	   is	   still	   present,	   they	   are	   asymptomatic.	  
Approximately	   35%	   of	   these	   latent	   syphilis	   patients	   will	   go	   on	   to	   develop	   tertiary	  
syphilis,	  the	  most	  severe	  stage	  of	  the	  disease	  1.	  Tertiary	  syphilis	  presents	  as	  a	  central	  
nervous	  system	  disease,	  cardiovascular	  disease,	  or	  as	  granulomatous	  locally	  destructive	  
lesions,	  known	  as	  gumma,	  that	  can	  occur	  in	  any	  tissue	  but	  most	  commonly	  in	  skin	  or	  
bone.	   Infectious	   syphilis	   is	   easily	   treated	  with	   antibiotic	   therapy,	  most	   notably	   long-­‐
acting	   benzathine	   penicillin	   3.	   This	   fact,	   coupled	   with	   a	   strong	   primary	   health-­‐care	  
system,	  means	   that	   in	   Australia	   very	   few	   people	  who	   become	   infected	  with	   syphilis	  
progress	  to	  the	  tertiary	  stage.	  
	  
Where	   the	   risk	   of	   tertiary	   disease	   is	   low,	   one	   the	   greatest	   concern	   associated	   with	  
infectious	  syphilis	  is	  the	  potential	  for	  intrauterine	  infection	  in	  pregnant	  women	  leading	  
to	  babies	  born	  with	  congenital	  syphilis.	  In	  pregnant	  women,	  T.	  pallidium	  can	  cross	  the	  
placenta	  and	  infect	  the	  fetus	  with	  serious	  outcomes	  4.	  Without	  treatment,	  fetal	  infection	  
results	  in	  intrauterine	  fetal	  death,	  still	  birth,	  premature	  birth,	  and	  babies	  with	  congenital	  
syphilis2.	   The	   cornerstone	   of	   congenital	   syphilis	   control	   is	   antenatal	   screening	   (early	  
diagnosis)	  and	  prompt	  treatment	  of	  mothers	  with	  penicillin.	  However,	  as	  elevated	  rates	  
of	  infectious	  syphilis	  particularly	  among	  women	  of	  child-­‐bearing	  age	  increase	  the	  risk	  of	  
congenital	  syphilis,	  an	  added	  control	  measure	  is	  to	  keep	  infectious	  syphilis	  rates	  in	  the	  
community	  as	  low	  as	  possible.    
	  
4.2   Brief	  epidemiology	  of	  infectious	  syphilis	  in	  Australia	  
	  
In	  Australia,	  infectious	  syphilis	  disproportionately	  affects	  men	  who	  have	  male	  sexual	  
partners	  (MSM),	  and	  the	  Aboriginal	  and	  Torres	  Strait	  Islander	  communities.	  Within	  the	  
	   175	  
non-­‐Indigenous	  population,	  analysis	  of	  national	  data	  showed	  that	  in	  the	  period	  2006	  -­‐	  
2012	  diagnoses	  of	  infectious	  syphilis	  were	  mostly	  confined	  to	  men	  who	  have	  sex	  with	  
men5.	  Accordingly,	  in	  this	  same	  time	  period	  the	  rate	  of	  syphilis	  diagnosis	  was	  
substantially	  higher	  for	  men	  (9.0	  per	  100,000	  population)	  than	  for	  women	  (2.0	  per	  
100,000	  population)6.	  Given	  the	  link	  between	  syphilis	  infection	  and	  increased	  risk	  of	  
acquisition	  and	  transmission	  of	  HIV,	  considerable	  efforts	  are	  expended	  to	  address	  
syphilis	  in	  this	  community.	  	  
	  
Analysis	  of	  national	  surveillance	  data	  from	  2014	  indicated	  that	  the	  rate	  of	  infectious	  
syphilis	  detected	  in	  the	  Aboriginal	  and	  Torres	  Strait	  Islander	  population	  was	  four	  times	  
greater	  than	  that	  of	  the	  non-­‐Indigenous	  population	  7.	  Overall,	  rates	  of	  syphilis	  infection	  
were	  highest	  in	  remote	  and	  very	  remote	  areas,	  suggesting	  that	  control	  measures	  are	  
inadequately	  reaching	  these	  areas	  7.	  There	  is	  a	  real	  risk	  for	  cases	  of	  congenital	  syphilis	  
to	  occur	  in	  these	  communities,	  as	  not	  only	  are	  the	  rates	  of	  infectious	  syphilis	  high,	  but	  
women	  living	  in	  remote	  and	  rural	  areas	  can	  have	  greater	  difficulty	  accessing	  primary	  
and	  antenatal	  health	  care	  8.	  
	  
4.3   Outbreak	  description	  
	  
The	  outbreak	  of	  infectious	  syphilis	  amongst	  Aboriginal	  and	  Torres	  Strait	  Islander	  
people	  across	  northern	  Australia	  was	  first	  detected	  in	  January	  2011	  in	  the	  North	  West	  
Hospital	  and	  Health	  service	  region	  of	  Qld	  and	  officially	  declared	  in	  September	  of	  that	  
year	  9.	  In	  July	  2013,	  the	  Barkly	  and	  Alice	  regions	  of	  the	  NT	  also	  began	  to	  identify	  
imported	  cases	  of	  infectious	  syphilis	  associated	  with	  outbreak.	  By	  July	  2014	  there	  was	  
evidence	  for	  local	  transmission	  of	  outbreak	  associated	  infectious	  syphilis	  and	  the	  NT	  
officially	  declared	  the	  situation	  an	  outbreak.	  In	  June	  2014,	  following	  an	  exceptional	  
two-­‐year	  period	  with	  no	  infectious	  syphilis	  notifications,	  the	  Kimberley	  region	  of	  WA	  
also	  began	  identifying	  cases	  of	  infectious	  syphilis	  associated	  with	  the	  outbreak	  and	  
immediately	  declared	  an	  outbreak	  given	  the	  prior	  epidemiology	  of	  the	  infection	  in	  the	  
area.	  All	  jurisdictions	  responded	  rapidly	  and	  appropriately	  to	  the	  outbreak	  with	  public	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health	  measures	  according	  the	  Syphilis:	  CDNA	  National	  Guidelines	  for	  Public	  Health	  
Units	  10.	  
	  
By	  April	  2015	  there	  had	  been	  over	  500	  cases	  of	  outbreak	  associated	  infectious	  syphilis	  
across	  Qld,	  the	  NT	  and	  WA,	  and	  six	  cases	  of	  congenital	  syphilis	  also	  associated	  with	  the	  
outbreak;	  3	   in	   the	  NT	  and	  3	   in	  Qld.	  Outbreak	  cases	  were	  predominantly	  occurring	   in	  
Aboriginal	  and	  Torres	  Strait	   Islander	  persons	   living	   in	   remote	  and	  very	  remote	  areas,	  
were	  similarly	  distributed	  between	  males	  and	  females,	  and	  were	  mostly	  occurring	  in	  the	  
younger	   15-­‐29	   year	   age-­‐group.	   The	   age	   and	   sex	   distribution	   meant	   that	   a	   large	  
proportion	  of	  cases	  were	  women	  of	  child	  bearing	  age	  and	  there	  was	  real	  concern	  for	  the	  
potential	  for	  future	  cases	  of	  congenital	  syphilis	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  outbreak.	  	  
	  
There	  was	  an	  unquestionable	  need	  to	  effectively	  respond	  to	  the	  outbreak	  of	  infectious	  
syphilis	  across	  northern	  Australia,	  not	  only	  alleviate	  the	  burden	  of	  disease	  in	  the	  affected	  
community,	  but	  also	  to	  decrease	  the	  risk	   for	   further	  cases	  of	  congenital	  syphilis.	  The	  
MJSO	  was	  created	  as	  adjunct	  support	  to	  help	  co-­‐ordinate	  that	  response	  across	  all	  the	  
jurisdictions.	  
	  
	  
5   My	  role	  
In	  the	  role	  of	  secretariat	  I	  was	  responsible	  for:	  
•   Organizing,	  preparing	  agendas,	  and	  taking	  minutes	  for	  every	  meeting	  
•   Writing	  and/or	  creating	  group	  documents	  which	  included:	  
o   the	  terms	  of	  reference	  
o   epidemiological	  updates	  and	  situation	  reports	  to	  CDNA	  
o   communiques	  for	  regular	  distribution	  of	  outbreak	  data	  
o   templates	  for	  standardized	  reporting	  
o   the	  national/unified	  infectious	  syphilis	  outbreak	  case	  definition	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•   Setting	  up	  and	  performing	  secretariat	  duties	  for	  a	  sub-­‐committee	  to	  ensure	  
engagement	  of	  the	  Aboriginal	  and	  Torres	  Strait	  Islander	  Communities	  in	  the	  
outbreak	  response	  
•   Facilitating	  communication	  within	  the	  group	  by	  setting	  up	  online	  sharing	  
platforms	  
•   Disseminating	  data	  through	  oral	  presentations	  at	  national	  and	  local	  
conferences	  describing	  the	  outbreak	  epidemiology	  and	  the	  response	  to	  the	  
outbreak	  
	  
	  
6   Key	  developments	  in	  the	  MJSO	  
During	  my	  time	  as	  secretariat	  I	  noted	  six	  key	  administrative	  activities	  that	  allowed	  the	  
MJSO,	  a	  large	  group	  of	  people	  dealing	  with	  the	  needs	  of	  multiple	  jurisdictions	  on	  a	  very	  
sensitive	  topic,	  to	  function	  effectively	  and	  begin	  to	  meet	  its	  objectives.	  These	  activities	  
could	  be	  extrapolated	  or	  provide	  preliminary	  guidance	  to	  others	  when	  setting	  up	  large	  
multijurisdictional	  outbreak	  response	  groups.	  I	  outline	  the	  six	  key	  activities	  and	  provide	  
examples	  from	  my	  experience	  within	  the	  MJSO.	  
	  
6.1   Establish	  the	  terms	  of	  reference	  (TOR)	  early	  
The	   terms	   of	   reference	   clearly	   define	   the	   purpose,	   goals	   and	   objectives	   of	   a	   group.	  
Establishing	   these	   allows	   for	   more	   effective	   functioning	   as	   it	   provides	   focus	   and	  
direction	   to	   all	   activities	   the	   group	  engages	   in,	   helps	  prevent	  drifting	   in	  unnecessary	  
directions,	   and	   facilitates	  effective	  and	   timely	   communication.	  The	  TOR	  also	  outlines	  
how	  the	  group	  will	  operate,	  and	  this	  clear	  operational	  framework	  removes	  the	  need	  for	  
time	   consuming	   discussions	   on	   administrative	   matters	   such	   as	   membership	   and	  
quorum.	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Work	  on	  the	  terms	  of	  reference	  for	  the	  MJSO	  began	  early,	  after	  the	  second	  meeting.	  As	  
the	  document	  took	  shape,	  performing	  secretariat	  duties	  became	  considerable	  easier	  as	  
the	  operational	  framework	  was	  clear,	  and	  meeting	  discussion	  and	  activities	  were	  more	  
efficiently	   focused	   towards	   addressing	   the	   stated	   goals	   and	   objectives	   of	   the	   group.	  
From	  this	  experience	  the	  value	  of	  establishing	  the	  terms	  of	  reference	  for	  a	  group	  early	  
were	  clear	  and	  the	  earlier	  these	  are	  put	  in	  place	  the	  earlier	  there	  is	  clear	  direction	  and	  
focus	  for	  the	  group.	  	  
	  
I	  gained	  additional	  learnings	  from	  developing	  the	  TOR	  for	  the	  MJSO.	  A	  key	  consideration	  
in	  developing	   the	  TOR	  was	  defining	  membership.	   It	  was	   important	   to	  achieve	   strong	  
representation	   but	   maintain	   a	   total	   group	   size	   that	   was	   manageable	   to	   ensure	  
productive	  meetings.	  To	  that	  end	  we	  needed	  the	  best	  representation	  that	  could	  speak	  
for	  the	  most	  stakeholders.	  The	  public	  health	  systems	  addressing	  communicable	  disease	  
are	  not	  uniform	  across	  all	  states	  and	  therefore	  we	  could	  not	  use	  a	  blanket	  definition	  to	  
define	  membership.	  We	  consulted	  with	  each	  state	  to	  identify	  who	  the	  key	  stakeholders	  
at	  each	   level	  of	   the	  response	  were,	  and	  used	  this	   information	  to	  define	  membership	  
independently	  for	  each	  jurisdiction.	  We	  found	  that	  ideal	  membership	  included	  persons	  
interested	  enough	  in	  the	  topic	  to	  attend	  meetings	  regularly,	  but	  senior	  enough	  to	  be	  
able	  to	  make	  decisions.	  We	  also	  included	  representation	  from	  the	  federal	  government	  
and	   experts	   outside	   of	   government.	   The	   final	  membership	   definition	   can	   be	   seen	   in	  
Figure	  6-­‐1,	  and	  eliminated	  any	  confusion	  about	  who	  should	  have	  membership.	  Through	  
this	   process	   I	   learned	   that	   defining	   membership	   to	   a	   groups	   is	   not	   always	  
straightforward	  and	  requires	  careful	  consideration	  of	  the	  stakeholders	  involved	  and	  how	  
they	  may	  vary	  by	  regions.	  	  
	  
The	   TOR	   provided	   a	   final	   learning	  with	   respect	   to	   quorum.	   The	   quorum	  defines	   the	  
minimum	  membership	  that	  must	  present	  at	  a	  meeting	  for	  any	  decisions	  to	  be	  endorsed,	  
and	  should	  embody	  appropriate	  representation	  of	  all	  stakeholders.	  The	  quorum	  defined	  
for	  the	  MJSO	  was	  large	  (Figure	  6-­‐1),	  and	  may	  have	  been	  difficult	  to	  meet	  at	  all	  meetings.	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For	  this	  reason,	  CDNA	  when	  reviewing	  the	  TOR,	  advised	  that	  we	  include	  a	  clause	  that	  
provided	  the	  Chair	  with	  the	  discretion	  to	  allow	  the	  meeting	  to	  proceed	  if	  quorum	  was	  
not	  met	  but	  it	  was	  felt	  that	  the	  right	  representation	  was	  nonetheless	  present	  to	  address	  
the	  agenda	  topics.	  This	  clause	  was	  extremely	  useful	  and	  provided	  latitude	  to	  proceed	  
with	  appropriate	  activities	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  full	  quorum.	  	  
	  
6.2   Establish	  standardized	  reporting	  templates	  
	  
Establishing	  standardized	  reporting	  templates	  allows	  data	  from	  multiple	  sources	  to	  be	  
compared	  and	  interpreted.	  At	  the	  first	  MJSO	  meeting	  each	  affected	  jurisdiction	  reported	  
on	   their	   outbreak	   situation.	   The	   data	   were	   comprehensive	   but	   not	   reported	   in	   a	  
standardized	  manner	  and,	  therefore,	  were	  not	  comparable	  across	  jurisdictions.	  To	  allow	  
for	   comparisons	   across	   the	   jurisdictions,	   and	   over	   time,	   I	   was	   asked	   to	   develop	   a	  
reporting	   template	   under	   the	   oversight	   of	   a	   steering	   committee.	   The	   committee	  
included	  an	  expert	   in	   sexually	   transmitted	   infection	  surveillance	  and	  epidemiology,	  a	  
representative	   from	   the	   Commonwealth	   Department	   of	   Health	   and	   Ageing,	   a	   public	  
health	  physician	  and	  a	  sexual	  health	  physician.	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Figure	  6-­‐1	  Terms	  of	  Reference	  Version	  1	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1. Share information and data between jurisdictions within the MJSO 
2. Facilitate a coordinated public health response for outbreak control 
3. Facilitate a standardised reporting process across all jurisdictions 
against CDNA indicators and targets where possible  
4. Identify strategies to improve antenatal screening for syphilis for early 
detection of infection in pregnant women 
5. Identify actions required to address barriers to public health responses 
to contain the outbreak 
6. Disseminate approved information to external stakeholders 
7. Develop partnerships with government and non-government sectors to 
identify strategies for increasing community awareness and prevention 
of syphilis  
 
Objectives 1-5 link directly with the CDNA objective: 
‘To coordinate the investigation and control of multi-jurisdictional 
outbreaks of communicable disease’ 
 
Objectives 6-7 link directly with the CDNA objective: 
‘To engage and work with a range of national and international partners 
to prevent and control communicable diseases’  
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of cases, public health responses and CDNA indicators and targets. Ensure 
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stakeholders. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Multijurisdictional syphilis outbreak working group 
Terms of Reference: Version 1 
 
3 
Multijurisdictional Syphilis Outbreak 
Working Group (MJSO) 
 
                             Terms of Reference 
 
Membership 
Membership includes representatives from: 
 
The Commonwealth 
 
 
QLD Communicable Diseases Branch, Queensland Health 
Tropical Public Health Unit – (Queensland) 
Queensland Aboriginal and Islander Health Council (QAIHC) 
North West HHS (Queensland) 
 
NT Northern Territory Centre for Disease Control 
Aboriginal Medical Services Alliance Northern Territory 
(AMSANT) 
 
WA  Kimberly Population Health Unit 
Communicable Disease Control Directorate of Western Australia 
Kimberley Aboriginal Medical Services Council Inc (KAMSC) 
 
SA  Nganampa (Northern Territory and South Australia) 
South Australian Department of Health  
 
 
Expert Advisory Members 
 
Sexual health physician (chair) 
Indigenous sexual health expert 
STI surveillance expert 
 
CDNA  
 
Appointment of the Chair 
Dr Nathan Ryder was formally invited to chair the MJSO by Dr Vicki Krause 
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Meetings 
Meetings are to be held every month. Secretariat support is provided by the 
Communicable Disease Control Directorate of Western Australia (CDCD WA).  
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summary paper and situation reports from each of the affected jurisdictions. 
Situation reports will be presented in a standardised reporting template 
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Strait Islander people living in remote and rural areas of Northern Australia. 
The outbreak was first identified in the gulf region of Queensland in 2010 
followed by adjacent areas of the Northern Territory in 2013 and then onto the 
Kimberley region of Western Australia by mid-2014. As of March 2015 more 
than 500 outbreak-associated cases of infectious syphilis and seven cases of 
confirmed or probable congenital syphilis had been notified in Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander people in four affected Hospital and Health service 
areas of Queensland (North West, Torres and Cape, Cairns and Hinterland, 
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outbreak response across jurisdictions. The MJSO was formed in April 2015 
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x Effectively control the current syphilis outbreak in northern Australia  
x Zero annual occurrence of congenital syphilis among Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander people in Northern Australia by 2016 
 
Secondary goal  
x Improve syphilis screening in antenatal care  
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x Use standardised reporting on CDNA indicators and targets across all 
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Overall,	  there	  were	  three	  goals	  for	  the	  template.	  The	  goals	  were	  to:	  
•   collect	  the	  epidemiological	  data	  necessary	  to	  monitor	  the	  current	  situation	  and	  
trends	  over	  time	  
•   collect	  information	  on	  public	  health	  actions	  to	  facilitate	  discussion	  regarding	  how	  
the	  response	  could	  be	  optimised	  
•   collect	   information	   about	   barriers	   to	   the	   public	   health	   response	   to	   facilitate	  
discussion	   and	   sharing	   of	   ideas	   regarding	   how	   best	   to	   trouble	   shoot	   and	  
overcome	  them	  	  
	  
To	  achieve	  these	  goals	  we	  agreed	  that	  the	  template	  needed	  to	  collect	  the	  following:	  
1.   data	  reporting	  on	  the	  current	  epidemiology	  in	  the	  month	  from	  the	  last	  meeting	  
2.   data	  reporting	  the	  historical	  epidemiology	  from	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  outbreak	  
to	  the	  specified	  reporting	  period	  
3.   data	  reporting	  the	  performance	  of	  each	  jurisdiction	  against	  targets	  set-­‐out	  in	  
Syphilis:	  CDNA	  National	  Guidelines	  for	  Public	  Health	  Units	  10	  
4.   data	  reporting	  location	  of	  cases	  
5.   information	   describing	   the	   public	   health	   actions	   taken	   in	   the	   last	   reporting	  
period	  
6.   Information	  describing	  community	  engagement	  activities	  in	  the	  last	  reporting	  
period	  
7.   information	  describing	  any	  barriers	  to	  public	  health	  response	  that	  had	  occurred	  
or	  been	  identified	  in	  the	  last	  reporting	  period	  
	  
We	  were	   cognizant	   that	   the	   templates	   should	  not	   be	   too	  onerous	   to	   complete	   (and	  
thereby	  occupy	  time	  that	  would	  otherwise	  be	  spent	  actively	  responding	  to	  the	  outbreak)	  
yet	  still	  needed	  to	  be	  comprehensive	  enough	  to	  collect	  the	  minimal	  data	  necessary.	  For	  
instance,	  calculating	  the	  data	  at	  item	  3	  required	  a	  substantial	  amount	  of	  time,	  but	  was	  
important	  for	  assessing	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  response	  and	  where	  it	  could	  be	  improved.	  As	  
a	   solution,	   we	   created	   two	   templates.	   One	   ‘monthly’	   template,	   and	   a	   ‘quarterly’	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template	  to	  be	  used	   in	  place	  of	  the	  monthly	  template	  once	  every	  three	  months.	  The	  
monthly	   template	   addressed	   items	   1,2,4-­‐7	   and	   was	   moderately	   easy	   and	   quick	   to	  
complete.	   The	  quarterly	   template	  which	   collected	   the	   additional	   data	   of	   item	  3	  was	  
more	  time	  consuming.	  We	  felt	  that	  collecting	  data	  at	  item	  3	  on	  a	  three	  monthly	  basis	  
was	  adequate,	  and	  alleviated	  some	  of	  the	  pressure	  on	  the	  persons	  in	  charge	  of	  reporting	  
(the	  “reporters”).	  Additionally,	  in	  some	  jurisdictions,	  the	  data	  necessary	  at	  item	  3	  were	  
only	  available	  quarterly.	  The	  monthly	  template	  is	  provided	  in	  Figures	  6-­‐2.	  	  
	  
Once	  these	  templates	  were	  in	  place,	  the	  data	  presented	  at	  meetings	  became	  far	  more	  
meaningful	  as	  they	  allowed	  for	  comparisons	  across	  jurisdictions	  and	  over	  time.	  	  
	  
Another	  lesson	  learned	  in	  this	  process	  was	  the	  need	  to	  include	  in	  the	  reporting	  template	  
steering	  group	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  reporters	  who	  would	  be	  actively	  filling	  out	  the	  reports	  
and	   understood	   the	   availability	   of	   data.	  Once	   the	   templates	  were	   in	   use,	   it	   became	  
apparent	  that	  modifications	  were	  needed	  as	  a	  result	  of	  data	  not	  being	  available	  or	  time	  
constraints	  of	  those	  reporting.	  These	  modifications	  could	  have	  been	  avoided	  if	  reporters	  
had	  been	  included	  on	  the	  steering	  committee	  at	  the	  outset.	  
	  
6.3   Identify	  areas	  or	  issues	  that	  are	  best	  addressed	  out	  of	  session	  by	  specialized	  
groups	  or	  subcommittees	  	  
	  
In	  a	  large	  outbreak	  response	  group	  there	  are	  a	  broad	  set	  of	  skills	  and	  experiences	  
present.	  Often	  there	  will	  be	  agenda	  items	  or	  issues	  that	  don’t	  necessarily	  require	  the	  
input	  of	  all	  the	  members,	  but	  may	  be	  best	  addressed	  out	  of	  session	  by	  experts	  in	  that	  
particular	  field.	  In	  that	  sense,	  organising	  sub-­‐committees	  or	  sub-­‐groups	  to	  address	  
these	  specialized	  areas,	  which	  then	  report	  back	  to	  the	  larger	  group,	  can	  free	  up	  the	  
larger	  group	  to	  deal	  with	  agenda	  items	  that	  require	  full	  membership	  input.	  This	  is	  a	  
useful	  tool	  in	  efficient	  time	  management.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  MJSO,	  we	  set	  up	  two	  sub-­‐
committees	  to	  address	  specialist	  issues	  associated	  with	  responding	  to	  the	  outbreak:	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the	  Engaging	  Aboriginal	  and	  Torres	  Strait	  Islander	  Communities	  sub-­‐group	  (EAC),	  and	  
the	  Data	  Working	  Group	  (DWG).	  
	  
	  
	  
6.3.1   Engaging	  Aboriginal	  and	  Torres	  Strait	  Islander	  Communities	  sub-­‐committee	  
(EAC)	  
	  
From	  the	  outset,	  the	  MJSO	  recognised	  that	  a	  successful	  response	  to	  the	  outbreak	  would	  
not	   be	   possible	   without	   the	   affected	   communities,	   the	   Aboriginal	   and	   Torres	   Strait	  
Islander	   communities,	   being	   aware	   of	   the	   outbreak,	   and	   strongly	   engaged	   in	   the	  
response.	  The	  MJSO	  understood	  that	  this	  required	  specialist	  attention	  and	  agreed	  that	  
a	  separate	  subcommittee	  was	  needed	  with	  a	  specific	  aim	  to	  help	  increase	  awareness	  
and	  optimize	  engagement	  of	  the	  Aboriginal	  and	  Torres	  Strait	  Islander	  communities.	  At	  
the	  request	  of	  the	  MJSO	  I	  set	  up	  the	  Engaging	  Aboriginal	  and	  Torres	  Strait	  Islander	  sub-­‐
committee	  and	  the	  first	  meeting	  held	  August	  8,	  2015.	  
	  
Membership	  was	  primarily	  restricted	  to	  community	  leaders	  (or	  people	  who	  could	  act	  as	  
portals	  to	  the	  communities)	  and	  experts	  in	  Aboriginal	  Sexual	  Health.	  This	  membership	  
ensured	   that	   advice	   for	   improving	   community	   awareness	   and	   engagement	   in	   the	  
response	  was	  being	  provided	  by	  both	  experts	  in	  sexual	  health	  and	  experts	  in	  Aboriginal	  
and	   Torres	   Strait	   Islander	   community	   and	   culture.	   The	   Chair	   of	   the	   MJSO	   was	   also	  
nominated	  the	  Chair	  of	  the	  EAC	  to	  facilitate	  communication	  between	  the	  two	  groups.	  
The	  EAC	  met	  monthly,	  1-­‐2	  weeks	  prior	  to	  the	  MJSO	  meeting.	  	  At	  each	  meeting	  the	  group	  
reviewed	  the	  jurisdictional	  reports	  provided	  to	  the	  previous	  MJSO	  meeting	  to	  identify	  
where	   improvements	   in	   increasing	   the	   community	   awareness	   of	   the	   outbreak	   and	  
engagement	  in	  the	  response	  could	  be	  made.	  The	  EAC	  also	  addressed	  any	  other	  agenda	  
items	  submitted	  by	  their	  own	  members,	  or	  members	  of	  the	  MJSO,	  and	  provided	  a	  report	  
to	  each	  MJSO	  meeting	  describing	  their	  findings	  and	  advising	  on	  how	  the	  situation	  could	  
be	  improved	  if	  necessary.	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Figure	  6-­‐2	  Monthly	  reporting	  template	  
Multijurisdictional Syphilis Outbreak Monthly Report 
(Template) 
 
Date REPORTING PERIOD Jurisdiction/Region Author 
    
 
Background 
Brief overview of outbreak 
(please include information as to how it was defined as an outbreak, when the outbreak was declared and 
the initial public health response) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case definitions in use 
Cases are defined as per the CDNA surveillance case definition for infectious syphilis – less than 2 
years, at the time of notification. 
 
Outbreak cases are defined as per the MJSO outbreak case definition (below): 
Any person who is newly diagnosed with confirmed or probable infectious syphilis according to the 
CDNA national surveillance case definition for infectious syphilis,  
AND 
1.       is an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander person who resides in any of the following outbreak 
declared regions as defined and documented by that jurisdiction, at or after the dates      
indicated: 
          Qld 
             *     Torres Cape Hospital and Health Service area (from 1 December 2012); 
             *     Cairns and Hinterland Hospital and Health Service area (from 1 August 2013); 
             *     North West Hospital and Health Service area (from 1 January 2011); 
             *     Townsville Hospital and Health Service area (from 1 January 2014); 
          NT 
             *     Alice Springs or Barkly district (from 1 July 2013); 
             *     Katherine district (from 1 May 2014); 
             *     East Arnhem district (from 1 November 2015); 
          WA 
             *     Kimberley region, Western Australia (from 1 June 2014). 
OR 
2.    is a sexual contact of a confirmed outbreak case.     
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One	  agenda	  item	  submitted	  to	  the	  EAC	  was	  a	  request	  to	  develop	  a	  guide,	  or	  checklist,	  
for	   jurisdictions	   to	   use	   when	   engaging	   with	   Aboriginal	   and	   Torres	   Strait	   Islander	  
communities	  on	  issues	  of	  health,	  particularly	  sexual	  health.	  Engaging	  with	  communities	  
is	  not	  always	  straight	  forward.	  It	  is	  often	  best	  done	  by	  those	  who	  have	  had	  the	  time	  to	  
develop	  relationships	  with	  the	  communities	  and	  have	  experience	  in	  the	  area.	  With	  the	  
high	  staff	  turnover	  observed	  in	  remote	  primary	  health	  care,	  those	  people	  are	  not	  always	  
available	  and	  engagement	  activities	  may	  need	  to	  be	  performed	  by	  persons	  who	  are	  not	  
familiar	   with	   the	   community	   or	   experienced	   in	   community	   engagement.	   The	   EAC	  
recognized	   the	   issue	   and	  agreed	  with	   the	  need	   for	   a	   resource	   that	   could	  help	   guide	  
engagement	   with	   communities.	   As	   a	   result,	   we	   developed	   a	   checklist	   (Figure	   6-­‐3)	  
specifically	  addressing	  three	  key	  areas:	  how	  to	  approach	  and	  set-­‐up	  consultations	  with	  
the	   communities	   (basic	   principles	   of	  working	  with	   groups	   of	   people),	  who	   to	   talk	   to	  
within	  the	  community	  and	  outside	  of	  the	  community,	  and	  what	  language	  to	  use.	  The	  
checklist	  was	  made	  available	  to	  the	  MJSO	  members	  to	  distribute	  publically	  as	  needed.	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  Figure	  6-­‐3	  Checklist	  for	  engaging	  with	  Aboriginal	  and	  Torres	  Strait	  Islander	  communities	  
	  
Aboriginal*and*Torres*Strait*Island*community*engagement*sub6committee*
Checklist:*FINAL,*16*December*2015* 2*
then%enquire%of%the%community:%“does%the%community%see%this%as%a%priority%issue?”;%“what%is%your%
response?”%and%“can%we%have%suggestions%on%how%to%move%forward%from%here?”%%Directive%language,%such%
as%“you%need%to%increase%testing%by%allowing%us%to%screen”%is%unlikely%to%be%successful.%
%
Shame%or%stigma%and%low%sexual%health%literacy%are%often%raised%as%challenges%when%working%with%
communities.%%It%is%important%to%be%mindful%of%low%health%literacy%and%raise%issues%in%a%respectful%and%gender%
specific%way.%
%
Working%in%partnership%requires%a%genuine%commitment%to%reciprocity%and%respect.%Not%only%do%we%need%to%
embody%this%but%we%need%to%communicate%it%clearly%to%the%community.%%
Provide(the(right(information(
Set%the%context%for%your%community%or%health%service%by%providing%them%with%information%about%syphilis%
infection%and%the%outbreak.%By%the%end%of%your%meeting/session%you%aim%to%have%covered%the%following:(
•! The%outbreak%history%in%brief%
•! The%statistics%in%simple%form%highlighting%the%most%at%risk%groups%
•! Syphilis%I%how%it’s%contracted,%the%health%and%social%implications,%how%to%prevent%transmission,%how%
to%test,%treatment%and%importance%of%contact%tracing%
•! Inform%the%group%of%the%available%resources%you%have%to%support%a%community%response.%Ensure%
that%this%includes%you/your%organisation’s%limitations%
•! Discussion%on%what%the(community%want%to%do%about%it.%
Pitch%your%message%appropriately.%%If%dealing%with%a%nonIclinical%audience%and/or%people%with%English%as%a%
second%language,%deliver%a%clear%message%in%plain%language%and%without%jargon.%%E.g.%%“Syphilis%is%a%very%
serious%infection%that%used%to%be%common%in%some%places%but%which%we%haven’t%seen%for%a%while.%%Syphilis%
causes%serious%problems%to%pregnant%women%and%babies,%including%death%of%some%babies%before%they%are%
born.%%Unfortunately%in%the%past%year%syphilis%has%become%much%more%common%in%this%area%and%has%even%
caused%some%deaths%in%babies%before%they%were%born.%%The%new%infections%are%mostly%in%young%people%in%the%
Northern%Territory,%and%in%Queensland%and%Western%Australia.%%We%are%worried%because%some%cases%are%
appearing%in%new%communities%in%the%last%few%months.%%We%are%also%worried%because%in%communities%who%
are%not%testing,%syphilis%may%have%already%come%into%the%community%and%pregnant%women%and%babies%could%
be%at%risk.%%We%would%like%to%work%with%you%today%to%make%sure%people%in%this%community%have%the%chance%
to%understand%what%is%happening,%how%serious%it%is,%and%what%we%can%do%about%it.%%We%need%leaders%to%
encourage%people%to%have%a%test,%and%for%pregnant%women%to%have%all%their%checkIups.”%
(
Respectful(communication(suggestions(for(initial(discussions(with(communities(to(set(the(scene:(
•! I%may%come%to%you%today%as%a%specialist%in%sexual%health%with%knowledge%of%the%Syphilis%outbreak%but%
you%are%all%experts%about%your%community,%culture%and%people.%
•! I%value%the%previous%experiences%that%you%have%all%had%with%other%outbreaks%and%health%issues.%I%
would%like%to%hear%about%what%has%worked%and%hasn’t%worked%in%the%past%in%this%community.%
•! Your%ideas%and%opinions%about%the%outbreak%are%just%as%valid%and%valuable%as%mine%are%and%I%want%to%
hear%them.%We%can’t%respond%to%this%outbreak%appropriately%without%your%input.%
•! I%am%here%today%with%the%hopes%that%we%can%work%together%to%get%the%best%outcomes%for%this%
community.%
%
Key(questions(include:(
•! How%should%we%inform%the%wider%community?%(Give%examples%of%possible%ways%to%get%the%message%
out%there%e.g.%community%meetings,%posters%at%the%community%store,%clinic%and%other%prominent%
locations,%local%radio%station,%local%newspaper%and%newsletters,%online%“community%noticeboards”)%
•! What’s%the%best%way%to%get%the%target%group%screened%in%this%community?%(e.g.%youth%clinics,%men’s%
clinics,%testing%on%country%or%in%people’s%houses,%appropriate%times,%people,%places)%
•! Are%there%any%community%events%or%gatherings%coming%up%where%it%would%be%appropriate%to%include%
sexual%health%education/posters/info%and/or%testing?%
Aboriginal*and*Torres*Strait*Island*community*engagement*sub6committee*
Checklist:*FINAL,*16*December*2015* 4*
Checklist*for*Initial*Response*at*Health*Service*Level*
!
•! Health!service!management!and!lead!public!health!clinicians!are!aware.!
•! Let!them!know!of!key!communities!and!community!engagement!plans!and!communication!
channels.!
•! Appropriate!resources!provided!to!increase!community!and!clinician!awareness.!
•! Concrete!targets!discussed!(per!Interim!Guidelines!for!the!Public!Health!Management!of!Syphilis!
Outbreaks!in!Remote!Populations!in!Australia):!
o! Aim!for!all!antenatal!women!to!have!testing!at!first!antenatal!visit!and!per!guidelines!during!
remainder!of!pregnancy!and!birth!
o! Aim!for!100%!of!people!diagnosed!with!another!STI!to!have!syphilis!(and!HIV!testing)!
o! Aim!to!test!young!people!under!25!years!in!the!affected!population!for!syphilis!and!other!
common!STI!within!3!months!of!start!of!the!outbreak!response.!
•! Discuss!options!for!structurally!embedding!testing!into!current!clinic!process!(e.g.!templates!in!use,!
pathology!testing!buttons,!currently!accessed!protocol!summaries).!
•! Discuss!assisting!with!an!education!session!for!clinicians!about!the!outbreak!and!response.!
•! Discuss!health!service!involvement!in!a!community!awareness!campaign!(where!this!is!planned).!
Checklist*for*Initial*Response*in*an*Area*Bordering*the*Outbreak*
!
•! Health!service!management!and!lead!public!health!clinicians!aware.!
•! Appropriate!resources!provided!to!increase!community!and!clinician!awareness.!
•! Discuss!appropriate!levels!of!baseline!monitoring!(annual!test!for!all!sexually!active!young!people!
under!25!years!of!age),!testing!for!everyone!diagnosed!with!an!STI,!antenatal!testing.!
•! Discuss!options!to!structurally!embed!appropriate!testing!into!clinic!processes.!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Checklist*Version*Editing*History*
Version* Date* Prepared*by* Comments*
Version!1! 9!Oct!2015! J!Dupps! First!draft!presented!at!teleconference!
Version!2! 3!Nov!2015! James!Ward!
Amanda!Sibosado!
!
Version!AS!
comment!v2!
24!Nov!2015! S!Braithwaite! Edited!after!9!Nov!2015!teleconference,!circulated!to!MJSO!by!J!Dupps!24!Nov!
2015!
Version!3! 9!Dec!2015! A!Groos!&!!
S!Braithwaite!
Included!comments!from!new!EAC!members,!EAC!meeting!7!Dec!2015!and!MJSO!
feedback;!Added!version!control!and!re]formatted;!Circulated!to!EAC!9!Dec!for!
comment!
Version!4!! 16!Dec!2015! S!Braithwaite! Includes!comments!from!EAC!Group.!Final!version!for!use/trial!
!
!
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island community engagement sub-committee 
Checklist: FINAL, 16 December 2015 1 
Checklist to engage Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities in the 
syphilis outbreak response  
 
Introduction 
 
It is important to plan communication and community engagement activities with the most relevant 
structures and community service providers and leaders for each local situation. In some jurisdictions there 
are appropriate overarching bodies (e.g. NACCHO affiliates) who may be the most appropriate organisation 
to make a direct approach to a group of health services on this issue, or to organise a group meeting where 
you can raise this issue thereby saving considerable human resources.  Consider this prior to making the 
decision whether to directly contact individual communities. 
 
Community 
 
People and Organisations to Consider When Seeking to Engage the Community 
 
Not all communities have a standard structure. Find out who are the significant decision making bodies, 
advisory bodies and persons to engage with for each community. First and foremost, engage with the 
Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander staff in your respective organisation or community for support and 
information. They should have knowledge regarding the key people you need to speak with to secure 
meetings with the right boards, organisations and groups. If they don’t know, they will often know who to 
refer you to. 
 
State and regional organisations 
x State NACCHO affiliates 
Health services 
x AMS board and clinic staff  
Other community service providers 
x Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporations staff in the community 
x Senior schools  
x Councils 
x Youth groups 
x Men’s groups 
x Women’s groups 
Community leaders 
x Elders 
x Senior retired health workers in the community  
(these are people who will be respected in terms of their opinions on health matters and will be 
looked to for advice and to speak up on these issues) 
 
Any community has factions and you may know or learn about such factions in the communities you work 
with. It is important to understand these factions exist, but also to avoid getting involved or focussing your 
efforts to ensure the whole community benefits from efforts. If such groups exist in communities, it would 
be wise to meet separately within the community. It is important to ensure no group misses out on the 
opportunity to be consulted and contribute their thoughts on the outbreak response. 
 
Checklist and Considerations for Initial Community Engagement 
 
All communities are different yet the basic principles of working with any group apply. It is important to 
approach communities with respect, acknowledge that the community may have other issues they consider 
to be a bigger problem than the one you want to discuss, and to deliver key messages in such a way that 
gives the community ownership of the response. For instance, in the case of syphilis, describe the issue and 
Aboriginal*and*Torres*Strait*Island*community*engagement*sub6committee*
Checklist:*FINAL,*16*December*2015* 3*
•! How$would$you$like$to$be$kept$informed$of$how$the$outbreak$response$is$going?$Consider$assisting$
communities$to$establish$a$syphilis$committee.$
$
$
$
!
!
!
Health!Services!!
!
People!and!Organisations!to!Consider!When!Seeking!to!Engage!with!Health!Services!
!
Early$on$in$the$process,$consider$which$people$and$health$organisations$may$be$the$most$appropriate$
contact$to$liaise$with$regarding$the$syphilis$outbreak$in$the$communities$involved$in$the$outbreak.$$Some$
health$organisations$may$have$lead$practitioners$who$are$best$placed$to$inform$their$own$staff$about$the$
syphilis$outbreak$or$to$conduct$an$information$session$in$tandem$(eg.$lead$General$Practitioner,$public$
health$officer,$STI$coDordinator).$$Try$to$find$out$about$whether$the$organisation$has$such$positions$and$
contact$the$any$lead$practitioner$first$to$discuss$the$outbreak$situation$and$the$best$method$to$inform$all$
the$staff$in$the$organisation.$
$
$
Consider$who$you$will$need$to$communicate$with$and$how$often.$Potential$people$include:$
!
Staff$of$Aboriginal$and/or$Torres$Strait$Islander$medical$services$(eg.$Aboriginal$and/or$Torres$Strait$Islander$
health$workers,$general$nursing$staff,$general$practitioners,$sexual$health$workers,$women’s$health$nurses$
or$midwives)$
Staff$of$Primary$Health$Care$Clinics$
General$practitioners$including$district$medical$officers$
STI$coordinator$or$sexual$health$workers$
Generalist$health$workers$
Remote$health$$
Royal$Flying$Doctor$Service$
Outreach$workers$such$as$mobile$women’s$health$nurses$or$midwives$
$
!
Checklist!and!Consideration!for!Initial!Health!Service!Engagement!
$
Prior$to$planning$for$deeper$community$consultation,$consider$how$the$overall$region$of$your$responsibility$
will$be$approached$to$ensure$initial$delivery$of$a$minimum$key$message$to$health$services$that$will$allow$
immediate$commencement$of$public$health$action.$
$
•! Provide$the$right$information$(see$above).$Be$mindful$that$some$health$staff$may$be$unaware$of$
syphilis$and$uncomfortable$talking$about$sex.$
•! Ensure$you$have$adequate$capacity$to$commence$and$maintain$appropriate$contact$with$all$the$
organisations$targeted.$$Otherwise$it$may$be$better$to$begin$with$a$key$group$(e.g.$key$contact$in$
the$health$service,$health$service$Board$members,$key$Elders)$and$then$work$at$capacity$building$if$
those$key$local$members$are$able$to$access$resources$and$help$build$the$message$within$that$
community.$
•! Ensure$you$have$already$prepared$and$collated$culturally$appropriate$resources$and$key$messages$
appropriate$for$your$main$target$audiences$(i.e.$Elders,$managers$and$nonDmedical$audiences,$
public$health$officer$and$clinic$managers,$medical$staff,$actual$community$members,$youth).$
REMEMBER$
You$come$to$the$group$as$an$expert$in$your$health$field$but$the$community$
members$come$to$you$as$experts$in$their$culture$and$community$
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6.3.2   Data	  Working	  Group	  
After	   several	   meetings	   it	   became	   clear	   that	   there	   were	   epidemiological	   questions	  
associated	  with	   the	  outbreak	   that	   required	   specialist	   consideration.	  Again,	   the	  MJSO	  
believed	  it	  best	  to	  delegate	  these	  questions	  to	  a	  sub-­‐committee	  to	  be	  considered	  and	  
resolved	  out	  of	  session.	  To	  that	  end	  I	  assisted	  with	  setting	  up	  a	  Data	  Working	  Group	  
(DWG)	  of	  the	  MJSO,	  that	  was	  comprised	  of	  epidemiologists	  from	  each	  jurisdiction	  and	  
STI	  public	  health	  nurses	  active	  in	  the	  local	  response.	  The	  DWG	  was	  chaired	  by	  an	  expert	  
in	  surveillance	  of	  sexually	  transmitted	  infections.	  The	  first	  meeting	  was	  held	  December	  
15,	  2015	  and	  monthly	  thereafter.	  Initially,	  the	  MJSO	  requested	  the	  DWG	  to	  address	  the	  
following	  questions:	  
1.   What	   data	   are	   needed	   to	   monitor	   and	   determine	   whether	   the	   situation	   is	  
improving,	  deteriorating	  or	  remaining	  stable?	  
2.   What	  criteria	  would	  be	  used	  to	  determine	  the	  outbreak	  is	  over,	  and	  what	  data	  
are	  required	  to	  make	  that	  determination?	  
3.   At	  what	  point	  is	  the	  situation	  no	  longer	  an	  outbreak,	  but	  rather,	  has	  progressed	  
to	  high	  level	  endemicity?	  
	  
By	  April	  2015,	  significant	  progress	  had	  been	  made	  in	  identifying	  and	  accessing	  the	  data	  
required	  to	  answer	  the	  above	  questions.	  	  
	  
6.4   Establish	  the	  case	  definition	  early	  
	  
Establishing	  an	  outbreak	  case	  definition	  is	  essential.	  The	  definition	  clarifies	  and	  ensures	  
consistency	  in	  who	  is	  considered	  an	  outbreak	  case,	  which	  in	  turn	  allows	  interpretation	  
of	  data	  from	  multiple	  regions	  and	  promotes	  confidence	  in	  disseminating	  collated	  data.	  
January	  2016,	  I	  requested	  an	  ad-­‐hoc	  meeting	  of	  the	  DWG	  to	  establish	  a	  unified	  definition	  
for	  a	  case	  of	  infectious	  syphilis	  associated	  with	  the	  outbreak	  across	  northern	  Australia.	  
Until	  this	  time,	  jurisdictions	  were	  classifying	  and	  reporting	  outbreak	  cases	  of	  infectious	  
syphilis	  to	  the	  MJSO	  according	  to	  local	  outbreak	  case	  definitions.	  Whilst	  appropriate	  for	  
monitoring	  the	  outbreak	  at	  the	  local	  level,	  the	  small	  variations	  in	  case	  definitions	  across	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the	   jurisdictions,	   complicated	   monitoring	   efforts,	   dissemination	   of	   data,	   and	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  outbreak	  situation	  across	  northern	  Australia.	  However,	  there	  were	  
concerns	  that	  an	  outbreak	  case	  definition	  that	  was	  applicable	  across	  all	  three	  affected	  
jurisdictions	   would	   have	   lower	   case	   sensitivity	   than	   that	   of	   the	   local	   outbreak	   case	  
definitions	  where	  local	  peculiarities	   in	  outbreak	  epidemiology	  could	  be	  accounted	  for	  
and,	   the	  decreased	  sensitivity	  would	   impact	  on	   the	   local	  public	  health	   response.	  We	  
addressed	   the	   concerns	   by	   stipulating	   that	   the	   unified,	   or	   national	   outbreak	   case	  
definition,	  was	   solely	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	   reporting	   the	  outbreak	  epidemiology	   to	   the	  
MJSO	  and	  presenting	  the	  national	  picture,	  and	  that	  jurisdictions	  could	  retain	  their	  local	  
outbreak	  definitions	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  guiding	  the	  public	  health	  response.	  We	  arrived	  
at	  an	  outbreak	  case	  definition	  that	  was	  presented	  to	  the	  MJSO	  in	  February	  2016	  (Figure	  
6-­‐4)	  and	  endorsed.	  Additional	  to	  improved	  reporting	  and	  interpretation	  of	  the	  outbreak	  
situation,	   the	   unified	   case	   definition	   allowed	   for	   greater	   dissemination	   of	   data	  
describing	  the	  epidemiology	  of	  the	  outbreak	  across	  northern	  Australia	  to	  increase	  public	  
awareness	  of	  the	  outbreak.	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Figure	  6-­‐4	  Standardised	  national	  infectious	  syphilis	  outbreak	  case	  definition	  
	  
 
 
Standardised national infectious syphilis outbreak case definition. 
The data working group (DWG) of the MJSO held an ad hoc meeting, Monday 25 January, to discuss 
the method by which cases associated with the current outbreak of syphilis affecting northern 
Australia should be reported nationally. Key outcomes were to establish an agreed method of 
reporting cases across all the jurisdictions, and one that could convey the outbreak case counts and 
trends in a simple and comprehensible manner. As a result, the group agreed to create a 
standardised case definition for use when reporting the outbreak nationally, as opposed to the 
individual jurisdictional case definitions used for the local response. A case definition for this purpose 
is proposed below. 
 
 
 
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FOOTNOTE to reporters: 
If a case is identified as category 2 only (i.e does not fulfil category 1 as well), please report the 
following demographic data: 
            (a)   Aboriginal &/or Torres Strait Islander vs non Aboriginal &/or Torres Strait Islander 
            (b)   Resident or not resident in one of the defined outbreak areas specified in category 1 
 
Nationally, an infectious syphilis outbreak case is currently defined as: 
Any person who is newly diagnosed with confirmed or probable infectious syphilis according to 
the CDNA national surveillance case definition for infectious syphilis, 
AND 
 
1.       is an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander person who resides in any of the following outbreak 
          declared regions at or after the dates indicated: 
 
          Qld 
             *     Torres Cape Hospital and Health Service area (from 1 December 2012); 
             *     Cairns and Hinterland Hospital and Health Service area (from 1 August 2013); 
             *     North West Hospital and Health Service area (from 1 January 2011); 
             *     Townsville Hospital and Health Service area (from 1 January 2014); 
 
          NT 
             *     Alice Springs or Barkly district (from 1 July 2013); 
             *     Katherine district (from 1 May 2014); 
             *     East Arnhem district (from 1 November 2015); 
 
          WA 
             *     Kimberley region, Western Australia (from 1 June 2014). 
 
OR 
 
2.    is a sexual contact of a confirmed outbreak case.     
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6.5   Ensure	  that	  data	  are	  disseminated	  
One	  responsibility	  of	  outbreak	  response	  teams	  is	  to	  disseminate	  data.	  Ensuring	  that	  data	  
are	  available	  mean	  that	  the	  right	  people	  have	  the	  information	  needed	  for	  public	  health	  
action,	  governing	  bodies	  are	  aware	  of	   the	   situation,	  and	   incorrect	   information	   is	  not	  
distributed	  to	  the	  public.	  However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  consider	  who	  to	  disseminate	  data	  
to,	   and	   how	   to	   disseminate	   the	   data.	   Below	   is	   a	   description	   of	   how	   the	   MJSO	  
disseminated	  outbreak	  data.	  
	  
In	  the	  MJSO	  data	  were	  tailored	  to	  be	  received	  by	  three	  different	  groups:	  members	  of	  
the	  MJSO	  and	  affiliated	  sub-­‐committees;	  higher	  level	  committees	  within	  government;	  
and	  the	  general	  public.	  We	  used	  a	  number	  of	  methods	  to	  disseminate	  data.	  	  
	  
Within	  the	  MJSO,	  data	  and	  outbreak	  information	  sharing	  occurred	  through	  the	  monthly	  
and	   quarterly	   reports	   that	   accompanied	   each	  meeting.	   Additional	  material	   including	  
minutes,	  agendas,	   reports	   to	  higher	   level	  committees	  and	  any	  useful	   resources	  were	  
shared	  between	  members	  through	  a	  site	  on	  the	  secure	  government	  online	  collaboration	  
platform,	  GovDex	  (Figure	  6-­‐5).	  
	  
Within	  government,	  the	  MJSO	  provided	  an	  update	  to	  the	  parent	  group,	  CDNA,	  at	  each	  
face-­‐to-­‐face	  meeting	  describing	  the	  situation	  to	  date,	  public	  health	  actions	  and	  barriers	  
to	   the	   response.	   The	  MJSO	  also	   submitted	  agenda	  papers	  with	   recommendations	   to	  
higher	  level	  committees	  such	  as	  the	  Australian	  Health	  Protection	  Principal	  Committee	  
(AHPPC).	  
	  
To	  ensure	  that	  information	  was	  publically	  available	  at	  the	  request	  of	  the	  MJSO,	  I	  created	  
a	  short	  1.5	  page	  communique	  summarising	  outbreak	  data	  ‘to	  date’	  and	  activities	  of	  the	  
MJSO.	   The	   first	   communique	   was	   distributed	   May	   2016	   (Figure	   6-­‐6)	   and	   updated	  
monthly	   thereafter.	   Feedback	   indicated	   that	   the	   communique	   was	   well	   received.	  
Furthermore,	  a	  report	  detailing	  the	  outbreak	  from	  01	  January	  2011-­‐31	  December	  2015	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was	  published	  in	  the	  Communicable	  Disease	  Intelligence	  journal	  (CDI)	  by	  Amy	  Bright	  and	  
myself	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	  MJSO	   group	   (Appendix	   9-­‐1).	   The	   report	   in	   CDI	   was	   initially	  
produced	   to	   address	   a	   number	   of	  media	   reports	   that	   cited	   incorrect	   outbreak	   case	  
numbers	  and	  outbreak	  associated	  congenital	  cases	  by	  placing	  correct	  data	  in	  the	  public	  
domain.	  Between	   the	  CDI	   report	   and	  MJSO	   communiques,	   updated	  and	  official	   case	  
numbers	  were	  then	  freely	  available	  for	  accurate	  reporting.	  
	  
Lastly,	  I	  also	  presented	  the	  outbreak	  at	  a	  number	  of	  local	  and	  national	  conferences	  on	  
behalf	  of	  the	  MJSO.	  The	  oral	  presentations	  allowed	  for	  questions	  and	  discussions	  with	  
interested	  parties	  that	  may	  not	  have	  happened	  otherwise.	  A	  selection	  of	  presentation	  
abstracts	  can	  be	  found	  in	  appendices	  9-­‐2	  and	  9-­‐3.	  	  
	  
Overall,	  there	  are	  many	  methods	  by	  which	  data	  can	  be	  disseminated.	  The	  MJSO	  used	  a	  
range	  of	  media	  including,	  reports,	  online	  sharing	  platforms,	  publications,	  freely	  available	  
communiques	   and	   conference	   presentations.	   The	   dissemination	   of	   data	   meant	   that	  
members	   of	   the	  MJSO	  were	   comprehensively	   updated	   of	   the	   situation,	   appropriate	  
information	  was	  shared	  with	  higher	  governing	  bodies,	  and	  data	  were	  transparent	  to	  the	  
public	  limiting	  circulation	  of	  incorrect	  information.	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Figure	  6-­‐5	  GovDex	  site	  for	  sharing	  information	  within	  the	  MJSO	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Figure	  6-­‐6	  First	  communique	  (page	  1	  only)	  
α!Cases!defined!as!per!the!MJSO!syphilis!outbreak!case!definition:!!
Nationally,!an!infectious!syphilis!outbreak!case!is!defined!as:!any!person!who!is!newly!diagnosed!with!confirmed!or!probable!infectious!syphilis!according!to!
the!CDNA!national!surveillance!case!definition!for!infectious!syphilis,!AND,!is!an!Aboriginal!or!Torres!Strait!Islander!person!who!resides!in!any!of!the!
following!outbreak!declared!regions!as!defined!and!documented!by!that!jurisdiction,!at!or!after!the!dates!indicated:!Qld!E!Torres!and!Cape!Hospital!and!
Health!Service!area!(from!1!December!2012);!Cairns!and!Hinterland!Hospital!and!Health!Service!area!(from!1!August!2013);!North!West!Hospital!and!Health!
Service!area!(from!1!January!2011);!Townsville!Hospital!and!Health!Service!area!(from!1!January!2014);!NT!E!Alice!Springs!or!Barkly!district!(from!1!July!
2013);!Katherine!district!(from!1!May!2014);!East!Arnhem!district!(from!1!November!2015);!WA!E!Kimberley!region,!Western!Australia!(from!1!June!2014),!
OR,!!is!a!sexual!contact!of!a!confirmed!outbreak!case.!!!!!
β!Affected!regions!include!Torres!and!Cape,!Cairns!and!Hinterland,!North!West,!and!Townsville!Hospital!and!Health!Services!in!Queensland;!Alice!Springs,!
Barkly,!East!Arnhem!and!Katherine!regions!in!the!Northern!Territory,!and:!the!Kimberley!health!region!in!Western!Australia.!!
ᵞ!Please!note!that!all!data!are!provisional!and!subject!to!change!due!to!ongoing!case!investigation.!
!
!
!
MULTIJURISDICTIONAL.SYPHILIS.OUTBREAK.WORKING.GROUP.(MJSO)..
Meeting.Communique,.24.March.2016."
!!
This.communique.has.been.authorised.by.the.chair.of.the.MJSO,.Dr.Nathan.Ryder..
"
The"Multijurisdictional"Syphilis"Outbreak"Working"Group"(MJSO)"was"formed"by"the"Communicable"Diseases"
Network"of"Australia"(CDNA)"in"April"2015,"in"response"to"an"ongoing"outbreak"of"syphilis"among"Aboriginal"and"
Torres"Strait"Islander"people"living"largely"in"remote"and"rural"areas"of"northern"Australia."Increased"notifications"
associated"with"the"outbreak"in"northern"Australia"were"first"reported"in"January"2011"in"northwest"Queensland,"
followed"by"the"Northern"Territory"(NT)"in"July"2013,"and"the"Kimberley"region"of"Western"Australia"(WA)"in"June"
2014."This"communique"summarises"the"outbreak"epidemiological"data"as"of"29"February"2016"(current"status),"and"
the"activities"of"the"MJSO"from"01"October"2015"U"29"February"2016."
"
Current.status.
Outbreak"data"to"29"February"2016"are"summarised"in"Figure"1"and"Table"1"below."
"
Figure.1."Epidemic"curve"showing"outbreak"cases"of"infectious"syphilisα"notified"in"affected"regionsβ"of"Queensland,"
the"Northern"Territory"and"Western"Australia,"from"commencement"of"the"outbreak"in"each"jurisdiction"to"29"
February"2016ᵞ."
"
"...
Table.1..Characteristics"of"outbreak"cases"of"infectious"syphilis"notified"in"affected"regions"of"Queensland,"the"
Northern"Territory"and"Western"Australia,"to"29"February"2016ᵞ."
! North-Qld-(four-HHSsβ)- NT-(four-regions-β)- WA-(Kimberley-region)-
Situation!toEdate,!29!February!2016!
Outbreak!commencement!month/yr! January!2011! July!2013! June!2014!
Total!number!of!cases-α! 510- 277- 51-
Percent!cases!reported!in!15E29!year!age!
group! 72%! 79%! 80%!
%!Male!/!%!Female! 44%!/!56%! 50%!/!50%! 31%!/69%!
Congenital!cases,!confirmed!(probable)! 3!(1)! 1!(2)! 0!(0)!
!!!!Enumber!of!deaths!in!congenital!cases! 3! 0! 0!
Last!reporting!month,!1E29!Feb!2016!
Number!of!cases-α! 13- 8- 2-
Percent!cases!reported!in!15E29!year!age!
group! 54%! 50%! 50%!
%!Male!/!%!Female! 54%!/!46%! 50%!/!50%! 100%!/!0%!
.
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6.6   Develop	  a	  communication	  plan	  
	  
As	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  section	  6.5	  there	  was	  a	  lot	  of	  activity	  in	  disseminating	  data.	  Of	  course,	  
some	  data	  were	  more	  sensitive	  than	  other	  data	  and	  not	  suitable	  for	  general	  distribution.	  
For	   instance,	   information	  detailing	  specific	  barriers	   to	  the	  outbreak	  response	  may	  be	  
suitable	  for	  distribution	  within	  government,	  i.e	  in	  reports	  to	  CDNA	  or	  AHPPC,	  but	  not	  
appropriate	  for	  distribution	  to	  the	  general	  public.	  To	  prevent	  data	  being	  inappropriately	  
distributed	  the	  MJSO	  developed	  a	  communication	  plan.	  The	  plan	  outlined	  each	  item	  of	  
communication,	   the	   intended	   audience,	   method	   of	   dissemination,	   and	   the	   sign	   off	  
procedures	   required	   before	   dissemination.	   Not	   only	   did	   the	   communication	   plan	  
remove	  any	  confusion	  or	  ambiguity	  about	   the	  process	  a	   communication	   item	  should	  
pass	   through	   before	   dissemination	   and	   thereby	   mitigate	   the	   risk	   of	   disseminating	  
sensitive	   data	   to	   inappropriate	   recipients,	   it	   also	   provided	   a	   clear	   outline	   of	   what	  
communication	  activities	  were	  occurring	  and	  where	  there	  may	  be	  gaps	  in	  our	  strategy	  
to	  inform	  the	  various	  groups	  of	  the	  outbreak.	  The	  communication	  plan	  was	  exceptionally	  
useful	  and	  should	  be	  a	  fundamental	  component	  of	  any	  outbreak	  response	  team/group.	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7   Conclusion	  
	  
This	  report	  describes	  six	  key	  take	  home	  learnings	  that	  can	  assist	  a	  large	  
multijurisidictional	  outbreak	  working	  group	  to	  run	  efficiently.	  The	  take	  home	  learnings	  
are	  administrative	  and	  come	  from	  my	  experiences	  performing	  the	  secretariat	  duties	  
for	  a	  multijurisdictional	  syphilis	  outbreak	  working	  group	  that	  was	  formed	  in	  response	  
to	  a	  large	  outbreak	  of	  infectious	  syphilis	  across	  northern	  Australia.	  The	  six	  take	  home	  
messages	  are:	  
	  
1.   Develop	  the	  terms	  of	  reference	  early	  to	  provide	  a	  clear	  operational	  framework	  
and	  enable	  smooth	  functioning	  of	  the	  group	  
2.   Establish	  standardized	  reporting	  templates	  to	  ensure	  consistency	  in	  reporting	  
across	  jurisdictional	  boundaries	  
3.   Identify	  areas	  or	  issues	  that	  are	  best	  addressed	  out	  of	  session	  by	  specialized	  
groups	  or	  subcommittees	  for	  most	  efficient	  use	  of	  time	  and	  expertise	  
4.   Establish	  the	  outbreak	  case	  definition	  early	  to	  ensure	  clarity	  and	  consistency	  in	  
the	  cases	  reported	  as	  outbreak-­‐associated	  
5.   Ensure	  data	  are	  disseminated	  to	  keep	  stakeholders	  informed,	  including	  the	  
general	  public	  
6.   Develop	  a	  communication	  plan	  to	  make	  certain	  data	  are	  disseminated	  to	  the	  
appropriate	  audience	  according	  to	  level	  of	  confidentiality	  
	  
I	  ceased	  secretariat	  duties	  for	  the	  MJSO	  April	  2016.	  At	  that	  time	  the	  outbreak	  was	  
ongoing;	  by	  31	  May	  2016,	  there	  had	  been	  598	  cases	  in	  Qld,	  309	  cases	  in	  the	  NT	  and	  54	  
cases	  in	  WA.	  Secretariat	  duties	  were	  passed	  on	  to	  the	  Commonwealth	  and	  the	  work	  of	  
the	  MJSO	  continued.	  Through	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  MJSO	  there	  is	  greater	  awareness	  of	  
the	  outbreak	  and	  a	  more	  coordinated	  response	  to	  the	  outbreak.	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Short report
InfectIous and congenItal syphIlIs 
notIfIcatIons assocIated wIth an ongoIng 
outbreak In northern australIa
Amy Bright, Johanna Dups
Introduction
In January 2011, an increase of infectious syphilis 
notifications among young Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander people was identified in the North 
West region of Queensland. Subsequent increases 
in notifications were reported in the Northern 
Territory and Western Australia in July 2013 and 
June 2014 respectively, following sustained periods 
of low notification rates.1 In 2012, in response to 
increased notifications, the Western Australian 
Department of Health led and funded, with in-
kind contributions from the Northern Territory, 
Queensland and South Australia the development 
of the Interim Guidelines for the Public Health 
Management of Syphilis in Remote Populations in 
Australia (interim guidelines).
In April 2015, a Multijurisdictional Syphilis 
Outbreak Group (MJSO) of the Communicable 
Diseases Network Australia (CDNA) was formed 
in response to this on-going outbreak among young 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people living 
in remote areas of northern Australia. A subcom-
mittee of the MJSO was formed in May 2015 to 
ensure Aboriginal communities were engaged 
in the outbreak response. The MJSO, with rep-
resentatives from affected jurisdictions, sexual 
health physicians, experts in Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander sexual health and the Australian 
Government Department of Health, meets monthly 
with the objective of co-ordinating the public health 
response for outbreak control and preventing trans-
mission of syphilis from infected women to their 
babies, through rigorous antenatal testing and care.
All affected jurisdictions have responded to the 
outbreak in accordance with the 2015 National 
Guidelines for Syphilis2 and interim guidelines. 
The disease control interventions that have been 
implemented include: opportunistic and com-
munity screening/testing, particularly among 
young sexually active people aged less than 
35 years; immediate treatment of people who are 
symptomatic (e.g. genital ulceration), have tested 
positive for syphilis or are sexual contacts of cases; 
and antenatal screening for syphilis. Public health 
alerts, health protection and education and cam-
paigns, and active follow up of cases are also being 
conducted. This report provides a brief description 
of the epidemiology of the outbreak up to the end 
of 2015.
Methods
Cases of infectious and congenital syphilis, (as 
defined by the national CDNA surveillance case 
definitions3,4), were categorised as outbreak cases 
as defined by the MJSO outbreak case definition.
Any person newly diagnosed with confirmed 
or probable infectious syphilis according to the 
CDNA national surveillance case definition for 
infectious syphilis,
AND
1. is an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander per-
son who resides in any of the following outbreak 
declared regions at or after the dates indicated:
Queensland
• Torres Cape Hospital and Health Service area 
(from 1 December 2012);
• Cairns and Hinterland Hospital and Health 
Service area (from 1 August 2013);
• North West Hospital and Health Service area 
(from 1 January 2011);
• Townsville Hospital and Health Service area 
(from 1 January 2014);
Northern Territory
• Alice Springs or Barkly district (from 1 July 
2013);
Katherine district (from 1 May 2014);
• East Arnhem district (from 1 November 2015);
Western Australia
• Kimberley region (from 1 June 2014).
OR
2. is a sexual contact of a confirmed outbreak case.
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An outbreak of infectious syphilis in northern Australia: the epidemiology and 
public health response  
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Introduction: 
In April 2015, a Multijurisdictional Syphilis Outbreak Group (MJSO) of the 
Communicable Diseases Network Australia was formed in response to an increase 
in infectious syphilis notifications among young Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
people in northern Australia. We describe the epidemiology of the outbreak 2011-
2015, the public health response and the activities of the MJSO. 
 
Methods: 
Data were collated from update reports provided to the MJSO by affected 
jurisdictions. Cases of infectious syphilis were categorized as outbreak-associated 
based on an MJSO outbreak case definition. 
 
Results: 
Increased notifications associated with the outbreak were first reported in northwest 
Queensland (Qld) in January 2011, followed by the Northern Territory (NT) in July 
2013 and the Kimberley region of Western Australia (WA) in June 2014. Between 
January 2011 and December 2015, a total of 790 cases were reported in the 
outbreak. Of all cases, 45% were male, 75% were aged 15-29 years, and most 
resided in remote and outer regional areas. Seven congenital syphilis cases 
associated with the outbreak were reported; 2 were stillborn and 1 died in the 
neonatal period. Affected jurisdictions responded with public health actions 
according to national guidelines including: formation of local outbreak-response 
teams; increased testing; rigorous contact tracing and antenatal screening; and 
activities promoting safer sexual practices and outbreak awareness. The jurisdictions 
were supported by the activities of the MJSO who instituted standardised reporting, 
sought to engage Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities in the response, 
and facilitated data and resource sharing.  
 
Conclusion: 
The sustained wide spread nature of the outbreak across remote and outer regional 
areas, and mobility of the “at risk” population within and across jurisdictions have 
created challenges in outbreak control. However, the partnerships developed 
between the affected jurisdictions and other stakeholders through MJSO 
participation have been valuable in strengthening the overall public health response. 
 
Disclosure of Interest Statement: Nothing to declare. 
 
	   202	  
	  
	  
Appendix	  9-­‐3	  Accepted	  Abstract	  for	  Oral	  Presentation	  at	  Australian	  Society	  of	  Microbiology	  
Conference,	  2016	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Title: An outbreak of infectious syphilis in northern Australia, 2011-2015: the 
epidemiology and public health response.  
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Increased notifications of infectious syphilis among young Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander people of northern Australia were first reported in northwest Queensland (Qld) in 
January 2011, followed by the Northern Territory (NT) in July 2013 and the Kimberley region 
of Western Australia (WA) in June 2014.  In response to the increase, the Communicable 
Disease Network Australia formed a Multijurisdictional Syphilis Outbreak Group (MJSO) to 
facilitate co-ordination of the public health response. An outbreak case definition was 
developed and defined as any case of infectious syphilis in an Aboriginal or Torres Strait 
Islander person notified in an outbreak region, or any case of infectious syphilis that was a 
sexual contact of a confirmed outbreak case.  
 
Between January 2011 and December 2015, 790 cases of infectious syphilis were reported 
associated with the outbreak. Of all cases, 45% were male, 75% were aged 15-29 years, 
and most resided in remote and outer regional areas. Seven congenital syphilis cases 
associated with the outbreak were reported; 2 were stillborn and 1 died in the neonatal 
period. Controlling the outbreak is a public health priority, as elevated rates of infectious 
syphilis increase the risk of additional cases of congenital syphilis, and potentially contribute 
to HIV transmission given syphilis infection is associated with increased risk of HIV 
acquisition. The public health response to the outbreak includes empirical treatment of cases 
and contacts, increased opportunistic testing and community screening, timely and rigorous 
contact tracing, achieving recommended antenatal screening, and Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander community engagement. Laboratories provide quality diagnostic testing and 
technical expertise in interpretation of results which are integral to the outbreak response. 
Laboratories could further contribute to the response by providing more detailed and timely 
testing data for outbreak regions which would assist with interpretation of disease trends.  
 
In summary, the outbreak of infectious syphilis in northern Australia is a major public health 
concern requiring continued and coordinated public health responses across affected 
jurisdictions, and diagnostic support from laboratories. 
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1   Prologue	  
My	  role	  
In	   chapter	   5	   I	   discuss	  my	   participation	   in	   a	  multijurisidictional	   outbreak	   response	   group	  
responding	   to	   an	   outbreak	   of	   infectious	   syphilis	   across	   northern	   Australia.	   Through	  
participation	   in	   this	   group	   I	   gained	   an	   intimate	   knowledge	   of	   syphilis	   infection	   and	  
epidemiology,	  and	  the	  associated	  surveillance	  systems.	  Given	  this	  experience,	  supervisors	  
at	  the	  Communicable	  Disease	  Control	  Directorate	  (CDCD)	  suggested	  that	  I	  should	  evaluate	  
the	   syphilis	   surveillance	   system	   in	   Western	   Australia	   (WA).	   I	   agreed,	   and	   was	   the	   sole	  
investigator	  for	  this	  report.	  	  
In	   this	   role,	   I	   planned	   the	   evaluation	   and	   associated	   analyses,	   identified	   stakeholders,	  
designed	   and	   disseminated	   an	   online	   survey	   to	   gauge	   stakeholder	   views	   of	   the	   system,	  
performed	   face-­‐face-­‐face	   interviews,	   retrieved	   the	   necessary	   data	   and	   paper-­‐work	   for	  
analysis,	  performed	  all	  analyses,	  and	  wrote	  this	  report.	  
Lessons	  learnt	  
A	  major	  lesson	  learnt	  from	  this	  project	  was	  that	  evaluating	  a	  surveillance	  system	  is	  not	  as	  
intimidating	  as	  it	  seems,	  and	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  very	  rewarding	  activity.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  it	  was	  
easy,	  and	  it	  certainly	  took	  a	  long	  time	  to	  unearth	  all	  the	  information,	  but	  slowly	  a	  very	  clear	  
picture	   emerged.	   Using	   the	   CDC	   Updated	   Guidelines	   for	   Evaluating	   a	   Public	   Health	  
Surveillance	   Systems	   helped	   enormously,	   as	   it	   provided	   a	   systematic	   framework	   to	  
rigorously	  evaluate	  the	  surveillance	  system	  without	  becoming	  overwhelmed.	  I	  also	  learned	  
the	   importance	   of	   communication	   between	   the	   data	   custodians	   and	   the	   stakeholders,	  
including	   the	   need	   for	   dissemination	   of	   data	   in	   an	   accessible	   format.	   Overall,	   through	  
conducting	   this	   evaluation	   I	   have	  a	  much	  better	  understanding	  of	   surveillance	   systems,	   I	  
appreciate	  the	  need	  to	  balance	  the	  priorities	  placed	  on	  various	  attributes,	  and	  I	  am	  much	  
better	  informed	  about	  the	  underlying	  framework	  and	  the	  considerations	  to	  account	  for	  if	  I	  
need	  to	  design	  a	  surveillance	  system	  in	  the	  future.	  
Public	  health	  impact	  
I	  am	  scheduled	  to	  present	  the	  results	  of	  this	  evaluation	  to	  the	  CDCD	  and	  all	  stakeholders	  
involved,	   February	   2017.	   By	   presenting	   the	   results	   and	   allowing	   time	   for	   discussion	   we	  
believe	   it	   is	  more	   likely	   that	   the	   recommendations	  will	   be	   considered	   and	   implemented.	  
However,	  I	  realised,	  that	  simply	  the	  process	  of	  evaluating	  the	  system	  stimulated	  action.	  For	  
instance,	   I	  would	  often	  discuss	  my	  findings	  and	  results	  with	  epidemiologists	  at	  the	  CDCD,	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and	   these	  discussions	  would	   then	   lead	   to	   an	  outcome.	  One	  example	   is	   that	   of	   providing	  
testing	   data	   to	   health	   regions	   on	   a	   more	   frequent	   basis.	   I	   discussed	   this	   with	   the	  
epidemiologist	  at	  the	  CDCD,	  and	  subsequently	  the	  data	  analyst	  in	  charge	  of	  disseminating	  
the	  data.	  It	  was	  quickly	  confirmed	  that	  this	  was	  a	  possibility	  and	  actions	  were	  put	  in	  place	  
to	  realise	   the	  recommendation.	  Additionally,	   some	  recommendations	  were	  activities	   that	  
the	   CDCD	   had	   already	   identified	   as	   requiring	   attention.	   The	   evaluation	   helped	   to	   move	  
those	  activities	  up	  the	  priority	  list.	  The	  evaluation	  was	  only	  completed	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  
my	   MAE	   which	   was	   unfortunately	   too	   early	   to	   see	   if	   all	   recommendations	   would	   be	  
adopted.	   However,	   early	   action	   against	   a	   number	   of	   the	   recommendations	   suggest	   that	  
this	  evaluation	  will	  have	  a	  positive	  impact	  on	  infectious	  syphilis	  surveillance	  in	  WA.	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2   Abstract	  
	  
Background:	  Western	  Australia	  (WA)	  maintains	  a	  syphilis	  surveillance	  system	  as	  part	  of	  the	  
public	  health	  strategy	  to	  the	  disease.	  The	  system	  is	  composed	  of	  three	  arms:	  1)	  infectious	  
syphilis	   surveillance;	   2)	   surveillance	   of	   syphilis	   infections	   of	   greater	   than	   2	   years	   or	  
unknown	  duration;	   and	   3)	   congenital	   syphilis	   surveillance.	   The	   data	   are	   used	   to	  monitor	  
the	  epidemiology	  of	  the	  infection,	  to	  facilitate	  contact	  tracing	  through	  alerting	  population	  
health	   units	   of	   cases	   in	   their	   region,	   to	   help	   prevent	   congenital	   syphilis,	   and	   to	   provide	  
early	   detection	   of	   clusters	   and	   outbreaks	   to	   enable	   a	   rapid	   response	   and	   limit	   spread.	  	  
Despite	   the	   integral	   role	   of	   syphilis	   surveillance	   in	   the	   syphilis	   public	   health	   response	   in	  
WA,	  to	  our	  knowledge,	  the	  system,	  or	  any	  part	  thereof,	  has	  not	  been	  formally	  evaluated.	  In	  
this	   paper	  we	   report	   the	   findings	   of	   an	   evaluation	   of	   the	   infectious	   syphilis	   surveillance	  
system	  in	  WA	  (ISSWA).	  
Methods:	   ISSWA	  was	  evaluated	  according	  to	  the	  framework	  outlined	  in	  the	  CDC	  Updated	  
Guidelines	  for	  Evaluating	  Public	  Health	  Surveillance	  Systems.	  The	  operation	  of	  the	  system	  
was	   described,	   and	   performance	   against	   the	   objectives	   and	   attributes	   systematically	  
analysed.	   Data	  were	   collected	   from	   stakeholders	   using	   a	   self-­‐administered	   online	   survey	  
and	   face-­‐to-­‐face	   interviews	   to	   gather	   information	   on	   their	   views	  with	   respect	   to	   various	  
aspects	  of	  the	  system.	  
Results:	   Overall,	  we	   found	   that	   ISSWA	  was	   a	   useful	   system.	  Data	   from	   the	   system	  were	  
able	   to	   describe	   the	   epidemiology	  of	   infectious	   syphilis	   in	  WA,	   and	  were	  used	   to	   inform	  
screening	   activities,	   provide	   written	   communications	   (reports	   and	   published	   articles),	  
inform	  policy	  making	  and	  guide	  resource	  allocation.	  	  
Although	   there	   were	   no	   official	   objectives	   documented	   for	   ISSWA,	   the	   evaluation	  
established	   that	   the	   objectives	   proposed	   for	   syphilis	   surveillance	   in	   the	   CDNA	   National	  
Guidelines	   for	   Public	   Health	   units:	   Syphilis	   were	   appropriate	   for	   infectious	   syphilis	  
surveillance	   in	   WA,	   and	   therefore,	   we	   assessed	   the	   surveillance	   system	   against	   these	  
objectives.	  The	  four	  objectives	  outlined	  in	  that	  document	  are:	  
1.   Provide	   baseline	   data	   to	   enable	   detection	   of	   changes	   in	   disease	   trends	   including	  
evaluation	  of	  intervention	  strategies	  
2.   Enable	  timely	  detection	  and	  identification	  of	  cases	  of	  infectious	  syphilis	  to	  facilitate	  
rapid	  response	  to	  the	  management	  of	  cases	  and	  their	  contacts	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3.   Enable	  timely	  detection	  of	  clusters	  and	  outbreaks	   to	   facilitate	  early	   intervention	  to	  
control	  transmission	  
4.   Inform	  the	  prevention	  of	  congenital	  syphilis	  
ISSWA	   performed	   adequately	   against	   three	   of	   the	   four	   objectives,	   however,	  
recommendations	   for	   improvement	  were	   still	   identified.	   The	   system	   did	   not	   perform	   as	  
strongly	   against	   the	   fourth	   objective,	   to	   inform	   the	   prevention	   of	   congenital	   syphilis.	  
Although	  infectious	  syphilis	  surveillance	  itself	  helps	  to	  decrease	  the	  prevalence	  of	  syphilis	  
and	   thereby	   indirectly	   protects	   against	   congenital	   syphilis,	   additional	   data	   could	   be	  
collected	  to	  help	   inform	  prevention,	  such	  as	  pregnancy	  status	  of	   female	  cases,	  treatment	  
of	  cases,	  and	  linking	  codes	  that	  allow	  data	  from	  congenital	  cases	  to	  be	  linked	  with	  those	  of	  
their	  mother.	  	  
ISSWA	  was	  also	  found	  to	  be	  stable,	  simple,	  acceptable	  and	  sensitive.	  Although	  the	  system	  
had	  good	  data	  quality	  and	   representativeness,	  modifications	   such	  as	  electronic	   reporting	  
forms	   and	   better	   collection	   of	   data	   on	   sexual	   behaviour	   would	   improve	   performance	  
against	  these	  attributes.	  	  	  	  
Conclusions:	   Overall,	   ISSWA	   performed	   well	   against	   the	   attributes	   and	   adequately	  
addressed	  the	  objectives	  for	  syphilis	  surveillance	  outlined	  in	  the	  CDNA	  National	  Guidelines	  
for	   Public	   Health	   units:	   Syphilis.	   However,	   areas	   for	   improvement,	   particularly	   in	   data	  
quality,	  representativeness,	  and	  performance	  against	  the	  objective,	   inform	  the	  prevention	  
of	   congenital	   syphilis,	   were	   identified.	   Recommendations	   are	   made	   with	   the	   aim	   of	  
improving	  these	  aspects	  of	  the	  system.	  I	  believe	  that	  adoption	  of	  these	  recommendations	  
will	  enhance	  the	  performance	  of	  ISSWA,	  and	  ensure	  that	  it	  continues	  to	  function	  efficiently	  
and	  effectively	  with	  respect	  to	  its	  objectives.	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3   Introduction	  
Syphilis,	  caused	  by	  the	  spirochaete	  bacteria	  Treponema	  pallidum	  subspecies	  pallidum,	  is	  a	  
sexually	   transmitted	   infection	   that	   can	   result	   in	   severe	   clinical	   disease	   including	  
neurological	   and	   cardiovascular	  manifestations1.	   In	   pregnant	  women,	   infection	   can	   cross	  
the	   placenta	   leading	   to	  miscarriage,	   stillbirths	   and	   severe	   disease	   in	   babies	   delivered	   at	  
term	   2.	   Syphilis	   affects	   populations	  worldwide	   and	   in	  many	   developed	   countries	   is	  most	  
frequently	  found	  in	  the	  community	  of	  men-­‐who-­‐have-­‐sex-­‐with-­‐men	  (MSM)3,	  4.	  In	  Australia	  
the	   highest	   rates	   of	   syphilis	   infection	   are	   found	   in	   Aboriginal	   and	   Torres	   Strait	   Islander	  
people	   5,	   followed	  by	   the	  MSM	   community	   6.	   Syphilis	   infection	   is	   treated	  with	   antibiotic	  
therapy,	   most	   notably	   penicillin	   1.	   With	   treatment,	   progression	   of	   clinical	   disease	   is	  
prevented	   and	   potential	   for	   transmission	   is	   reduced.	   Accordingly,	   early	   treatment,	  
facilitated	  by	   screening	  programs	  and	  surveillance	   systems,	   is	   the	   strategy	  used	  by	  many	  
public	  health	  programs	  to	  reduce	  syphilis	  transmission	  and	  disease	  specific	  morbidity	  and	  
mortality.	  
Western	   Australia	   maintains	   a	   syphilis	   surveillance	   system	   as	   part	   of	   the	   public	   health	  
strategy	  to	  the	  disease.	  The	  system	  is	  composed	  of	  three	  arms:	  1)	  a	  system	  for	  notification	  
of	   syphilis	   infections	   less	   than	   two	  years	  duration	   (includes	  primary,	   secondary	  and	  early	  
latent	   infections,	  and	   is	  known	  as	   the	   Infectious	  syphilis	   surveillance	  system);	  2)	  a	  system	  
for	  notification	  of	  syphilis	  infections	  of	  unknown,	  or	  more	  than	  two	  years	  duration;	  and	  3)	  a	  
system	  for	  notification	  of	  syphilis	  infections	  in	  a	  child	  or	  fetus	  in	  utero	  (Congenital	  syphilis	  
surveillance	   system).	   As	   syphilis	   is	   a	   notifiable	   disease	   under	   the	   1911	   Health	   Act	   of	  
Western	  Australia7,	  medical	  practitioners,	  nurses	  and	  laboratories	  have	  the	  legal	  obligation	  
to	   report	  any	  diagnoses	  of	   syphilis	   to	   the	  Western	  Australian	  Department	  of	  Health.	  The	  
data	   are	   used	   to	   monitor	   the	   epidemiology	   of	   the	   infection,	   facilitate	   contact	   tracing	  
through	  alerting	  population	  health	  units	  of	   cases	   in	   their	   region,	  help	  prevent	   congenital	  
syphilis,	  and	  provide	  early	  detection	  of	  clusters	  and	  outbreaks	  to	  enable	  a	  rapid	  response	  
and	  limit	  spread.	  	  Periodic	  evaluations	  of	  surveillance	  systems	  are	  necessary	  to	  determine	  
whether	   they	   are	   meeting	   their	   purpose	   and	   objectives,	   are	   functioning	   effectively	   and	  
efficiently,	   and	   to	   identify	   improvements	   that	   can	   enhance	   the	   ability	   of	   the	   system	   to	  
meet	   its	  objectives.	  Despite	   the	   integral	   role	  of	   syphilis	   surveillance	   in	   the	   syphilis	  public	  
health	   response	   in	  WA,	   to	  our	  knowledge,	   the	  system,	  or	  any	  part	   thereof,	  has	  not	  been	  
formally	  evaluated.	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3.1   Public	  Health	  Importance	  
The	   public	   health	   importance	   of	   a	   communicable	   disease	   is	   the	   prime	   consideration	   for	  
justifying	   the	   considerable	   resources	   that	   are	   expended	   in	   establishing	   and	   operating	   a	  
system	   to	  maintain	  a	   condition	  under	   surveillance.	   Syphilis	   is	   a	   communicable	  disease	  of	  
unquestionable	  public	  health	  importance.	  
The	   CDC	   updated	   guidelines	   for	   evaluating	   public	   health	   surveillance	   systems	   outlines	  
parameters	  to	  measure	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  health	  related	  event	  8.	  Syphilis	  addresses	  many	  
of	  these	  parameters:	  it	  inequitably	  affects	  not	  only	  the	  Indigenous	  population	  but	  also	  the	  
MSM	   community	   within	   the	   non-­‐Indigenous	   population;	   infection	   with	   syphilis	   is	   both	  
treatable	  and	  preventable;	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  treatment	  the	  outcomes	  of	  syphilis	  infection	  
can	   be	   severe	   and	   lead	   to	   death;	   and	   lastly,	   syphilis	   infection	   increases	   risk	   of	   infection	  
with	  other	  pathogens,	  most	  notably	  human	  immunodeficiency	  virus	  (HIV).	  Based	  on	  these	  
parameters	  and	  supporting	  arguments	  presented	  below	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  syphilis	  is	  a	  disease	  
of	  high	  public	  health	   importance,	  and	  that	  measures	  to	  protect	  the	  public	  from	  infection,	  
including	  surveillance,	  are	  not	  only	  justified	  but	  a	  public	  expectation.	  
Syphilis	   inequitably	   affects	   the	   Indigenous	   population,	   particularly	   in	   rural	   and	   remote	  
areas.	  Analysis	  of	  national	  surveillance	  data	  from	  2014	  indicated	  that	  the	  rate	  of	  infectious	  
syphilis	  detected	  in	  the	  Indigenous	  population	  in	  Australia	  was	  four	  times	  greater	  than	  that	  
of	  the	  non-­‐Indigenous	  population	  5.	  In	  Western	  Australia	  specifically,	  the	  rate	  of	  infections	  
in	   the	   Indigenous	   community	   in	   2012	   was	   over	   3	   times	   that	   in	   the	   non-­‐Indigenous	  
community	  5,	  9.	  Figure	  3-­‐1	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  discrepancy	  between	  syphilis	  notification	  
rates	  between	  the	  Indigenous	  and	  the	  non-­‐Indigenous	  communities	  is	  a	  consistent	  finding	  
over	   the	  years.	  Overall,	   the	   rates	  of	   syphilis	   infection	   in	   the	   Indigenous	   communities	   are	  
highest	   in	   remote	   and	   very	   remote	   areas	   5	   suggesting	   that	   control	   measures	   are	  
inadequately	  reaching	  these	  regions	  and	  argue	  the	  need	  for	  surveillance	  to	  illuminate	  the	  
issues.	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Figure	   3-­‐1	   Age-­‐standardised	   rate	   of	   infectious	   syphilis	   diagnoses	   in	   Western	   Australia	  
between	  2010	  to	  2014	  by	  Aboriginal	  status	  and	  year	  (source:	  5,	  9)	  
	  
Within	  the	  non-­‐Indigenous	  population,	  infectious	  syphilis	  rates	  are	  highest	  in	  the	  ‘men	  who	  
have	  sex	  with	  men’	  (MSM)	  community.	  Analysis	  of	  national	  data	  shows	  that	  for	  the	  6	  year	  
period	   from	   2006	   to	   2012	   diagnoses	   of	   infectious	   syphilis	  were	   largely	   confined	   to	  men	  
who	   have	   sex	   with	   men10	   .	   Accordingly,	   in	   this	   same	   time	   period	   the	   rate	   of	   syphilis	  
diagnosis	  was	   substantially	  higher	   for	  men	   (9.0	  per	  100,000	  population)	   than	   for	  women	  
(2.0	   per	   100,000	   population)11.	   The	   inequitable	   effect	   on	   this	   population	   is	   a	   concern	   in	  
itself,	   but	   of	   added	   concern	   is	   the	   increased	   risk	   of	   HIV	   transmission	   associated	   with	  
syphilis	   infection	   12,	   13.	   The	  MSM	   community	   in	   Australia	   already	   has	   the	   highest	   rate	   of	  
newly	   diagnosed	   and	   acquired	  HIV	   infection	   10.	   An	   infection	   that	   puts	   the	   community	   at	  
even	  greater	  risk	  of	  HIV	  requires	  public	  health	  intervention.	  
Syphilis	   is	  both	   treatable	  and	  preventable.	  The	  causative	  agent	  of	   syphilis,	   the	  bacterium	  
Treponema	  pallidum	  subspecies	  pallidum,	  is	  highly	  susceptible	  to	  penicillin	  1	  and	  a	  number	  
of	   other	   anti-­‐microbial	   drugs	   (as	   reviewed	   in	   14).	   The	   protocol	   for	   confirmed	   infectious	  
syphilis	   treatment	   is	   a	   single	   intramuscular	   administration	   of	   long-­‐acting	   benzathine	  
penicillin,	  and	  for	  probable	  infectious	  syphilis,	  syphilis	  of	  more	  than	  two	  years	  duration,	  or	  
syphilis	   of	   unknown	   duration	   a	   course	   of	   three	   doses	   seven	   days	   apart	   is	   required	   1,	   15.	  
Although	  the	  latter	  treatment	  requires	  more	  doses,	  neither	  protocol	  is	  particularly	  onerous	  
promoting	  high	  compliance.	  Syphilis	  transmission	  can	  be	  prevented,	  or	  the	  risk	  reduced,	  by	  
safe	   sex	   practices	   and	   early	   treatment	   of	   infectious	   cases	   and	   contacts	   facilitated	   by	   a	  
surveillance	   system.	   These	   prevention	   measures	   are	   not	   unique	   to	   syphilis	   and	   are	  
promoted	   for	   a	   range	   of	   sexually	   transmissible	   infections.	   Given	   that	   syphilis	   is	   both	  
preventable	   and	   easily	   treatable,	   the	   potential	   for	   positive	   impact	   with	   public	   health	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intervention	   programs	   is	   real,	   and	   strongly	   supports	   the	   argument	   for	   the	   public	   health	  
importance	  of	  syphilis.	  	  	  
In	   the	   absence	   of	   treatment,	   syphilis	   infection	   leads	   to	   severe	   clinical	   outcomes.	   In	   the	  
early	  stages	  of	   infection,	  or	  primary	  syphilis,	  patients	  develop	  lesions	  called	  chancres	  that	  
resolve	  with	  time	  1.	  Lesions	  are	  often	  painless	  and	  frequently	  missed	  -­‐	  without	  treatment,	  
patients	   progress	   to	   secondary	   syphilis	   characterized	   by	   systemic	   symptoms	   and	   a	  
generalised	   skin	   rash	   1.	   Patients	   are	   highly	   infectious	   during	   the	   primary	   and	   secondary	  
stages	   6.	   The	   symptoms	  of	   secondary	   syphilis	   resolve	  with	   time	  and	  patients	   can	  enter	   a	  
latent	  period	  with	  no	  clinical	  signs	  that	  are	  defined	  as	  early	  and	  late	  latent.	  Approximately	  
30%	  will	  then	  develop	  the	  serious	  clinical	  symptoms	  of	  tertiary	  syphilis	  1,	  16.	  Tertiary	  syphilis	  
can	   affect	  many	   organ	   systems	   but	  most	   commonly	  manifests	   in	   the	   central	   nervous	   or	  
cardiovascular	  systems.	  Tertiary	  syphilis	   is	  debilitating	  and	  can	  be	  fatal.	  Possibly	  the	  most	  
severe	   outcome	   of	   untreated	   syphilis	   is	   congenital	   syphilis	   where	   infection	   in	   pregnant	  
women	   is	   transmitted	   to	   the	   fetus	   17.	   Approximately	   one	   third	   of	   these	   cases	   result	   in	  
miscarriage	  or	  stillbirth,	  and	  one	  third	  of	  babies	  taken	  to	  term	  will	  be	  born	  syphilitic	  with	  a	  
possible	   multitude	   of	   clinical	   symptoms	   including	   neurological	   abnormalities,	   deafness,	  
failure	  to	  thrive,	  dental	  abnormalities	  and	  craniofacial	  malformation	  18.	  Congenital	  syphilis	  
is	  preventable	  with	  antenatal	  screening	  and	  treatment	  during	  pregnancy19.	  	  
The	  most	   effective	  method	   to	   limit	   the	   clinical	   consequences	  of	   syphilis	   infection	   and	   to	  
reduce	   transmission	   is	   early	   treatment.	   However,	   this	   strategy	   can	   only	   be	   successful	   if	  
underpinned	   by	   an	   effective	   and	   efficient	   surveillance	   system.	   Systematic	   collection	   and	  
analysis	  of	  data	  documenting	   rates	  of	   infection,	   stage	  of	   syphilis	   at	  detection,	   congenital	  
syphilis	   and	   demographic/behavioural	   features	   of	   cases	   are	   absolutely	   necessary	   to	  
allocate	  resources,	  monitor	  the	  epidemiology	  of	  the	  disease	  and	  assess	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  
contact	   tracing	  activities	  and	   screening	  programs.	   In	   short,	   to	  effectively	  manage	   syphilis	  
we	  must	  keep	  it	  under	  surveillance.	  
In	  summary,	  syphilis	  is	  a	  disease	  of	  unquestionable	  public	  health	  importance,	  and	  effective	  
management	   and	   reduction	   of	   transmission,	   as	   well	   as	   disease	   specific	   morbidity	   and	  
mortality,	  requires	  an	  effective	  and	  efficient	  surveillance	  system.	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4   Aims	  of	  the	  evaluation	  
This	  evaluation	  aims	   to	  determine	  how	  well	   the	   infectious	   syphilis	   surveillance	   system	   in	  
Western	   Australian	   (ISSWA)	   meets	   its	   objectives,	   and	   to	   provide	   recommendations	   for	  
improvement	  if,	  and	  where,	  appropriate.	  The	  remaining	  two	  arms	  of	  the	  system,	  syphilis	  of	  
unknown	   or	   greater	   than	   2	   years	   duration	   and	   congenital	   syphilis,	   will	   be	   evaluated	  
elsewhere.	  
5   Methods	  
ISSWA	  was	  evaluated	  according	  to	  the	  framework	  outlined	  in	  the	  CDC	  Updated	  Guidelines	  
for	  Evaluating	  Public	  Health	  Surveillance	  Systems	  8.	  Several	  methods	  were	  used,	  which	  are	  
detailed	  below	  or	  more	  specifically	  in	  the	  text.	  	  	  
5.1   Data	  collection	  and	  analysis	  
Two	  main	  methods	  were	  used	  for	  data	  collection:	  stakeholder	  consultation	  and	  data	  
analysis.	  	  
5.1.1   Stakeholder	  consultations	  
Stakeholders	  were	  consulted	  by	  survey	  or	  interview.	  
5.1.1.1   Survey	  
Potential	   participants	   were	   identified	   and	   contacted	   by	   e-­‐mail	   to	   inform	   them	   of	   the	  
evaluation	   and	   that	   they	   had	   been	   selected	   to	   participate	   in	   a	   survey	   that	   would	   be	  
circulated	   in	   the	   coming	   fortnight.	   At	   this	   time,	   they	   were	   invited	   to	   nominate	   other	  
persons	  they	  felt	  should	  also	  be	  included	  in	  the	  survey	  based	  on	  the	  information	  provided.	  
The	   survey	   was	   developed	   in	   the	   online	   survey	   tool,	   ‘SurveyMonkey’,	   and	   specifically	  
addressed	   the	   topics	   of	   system	  objectives,	   usefulness,	   simplicity,	   flexibility,	   acceptability,	  
representativeness,	   stability,	   and	   data	   dissemination	   (Appendix	   9-­‐1).	   Participants	   were	  
asked	  both	  answer-­‐restricted	  and	  open	  answer	  questions.	  Participants	  were	  also	  provided	  
with	  the	  opportunity	  to	  provide	  general	  comments	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  survey.	  
5.1.1.2   Interview	  
Consultation	  interviews	  were	  performed	  with	  stakeholders	  from	  widely	  different	  areas	  in	  
the	  health	  sector,	  or	  with	  those	  stakeholders	  who	  may	  hold	  the	  same	  position	  but	  roles	  are	  
likely	  to	  vary,	  meaning	  that	  a	  survey	  may	  not	  capture	  the	  appropriate	  information.	  
Consultation	  interviews	  were	  semi-­‐structured	  and	  modified	  to	  capture	  information	  
relevant	  to	  the	  stakeholder’s	  role	  within	  the	  surveillance	  system.	  Notes	  were	  taken	  during	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the	  interview,	  and	  where	  participants	  agreed,	  the	  interview	  was	  recorded	  and	  later	  
transcribed.	  	  	  
5.1.2   Data	  analysis	  
Data	  were	   analysed	   for	   two	   purposes:	   1)	   to	   describe	   infectious	   syphilis	   in	  WA	   and	   2)	   to	  
audit	  the	  data	  for	  quality,	  accuracy	  and	  timeliness.	  
5.1.2.1  Data	  for	  description	  (DFD)	  
Data	  were	  extracted	   from	  WANIDD	  based	  on	  an	  optimal	  date	  of	  onset	   (ODOO)	  between	  
January	   2011	   and	   December	   2015.	   Extracted	   data	   were	   cleaned,	   recoded	   and	   analysed	  
using	  STATA	  v	  14.1.	  Figures	  were	  produced	  in	  Microsoft	  Excel.	  
5.1.2.2  Data	  for	  audit	  (DFA)	  
Data	  were	  extracted	  from	  WANNID	  based	  on	  a	  date	  of	  entry	  (DOE)	  between	  January	  2013	  
and	  December	  2015.	  It	  was	  necessary	  to	  extract	  by	  DOE	  to	  allow	  for	  calculations	  regarding	  
timeliness,	  and	  three	  years	  of	  data	  was	  felt	  to	  be	  adequate	  for	  auditing	  against	  the	  listed	  
attributes.	  Extracted	  data	  were	  cleaned,	  recoded	  and	  analysed	  using	  STATA	  v	  14.1.	  Figures	  
were	  also	  produced	  in	  STATA	  v	  14.1.	  	  
5.2   Stakeholder	  	  
Stakeholders	   associated	   with	   infectious	   syphilis	   were	   identified	   through	   describing	   the	  
system	  and	  consulting	  with	  people	  experienced	   in	   the	   system.	  Stakeholders,	   the	  method	  
used	  to	  collect	  data,	  and	  participation	  numbers	  are	  detailed	  in	  Table	  5-­‐1.	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Table	  5-­‐1	  Stakeholder	  details,	  method	  of	  consultation	  and	  participation	  in	  the	  evaluation	  
Method	   Stakeholder	   Number	  
contacted	  
Participated	   Comments	  
Survey	   Nurses	  and	  STI	  coordinators	  from	  
population	  health	  units	  involved	  
with	  the	  follow-­‐up	  of	  STI	  cases	  
14	   11	  	   There	  was	  
representation	  
from	  each	  health	  
regions	  
Interview	   Public	  health	  physicians	  at	  
population	  health	  units	  
7	   2	   Of	  the	  9	  
physicians	  that	  
participated,	  one	  
was	  based	  in	  the	  
metropolitan	  
region	  and	  the	  
other	  was	  based	  
in	  rural	  WA	  
	   Public	  health	  physician	  at	  the	  
state	  Communicable	  Disease	  
Control	  Directorate	  
1	   1	   	  
	   Specialist	  sexual	  health	  
physicians	  that	  see	  a	  high	  case	  
load	  of	  patients	  with	  sexually	  
transmitted	  infections	  
3	   3	   	  
	   Consultant	  microbiologist	  
working	  with	  the	  main	  diagnostic	  
laboratory	  handling	  syphilis	  
samples	  (PathWest)	  
1	   1	   	  
	   CDCD	  epidemiologist	   1	   1	   	  
	   WANIDD	  data	  manager	   1	   1	   	  
	   Representative	  of	  
Commonwealth	  Health	  
Protection	  Policy	  Branch	  charged	  
with	  analysing	  infectious	  syphilis	  
data	  from	  the	  national	  notifiable	  
disease	  surveillance	  system	  
1	   1	   	  
	   TOTAL	   29	   21	   	  
	  
	  
5.3   Assessment	  of	  surveillance	  system	  attributes	  
The	  main	  methods	  and	  any	  additional	  methods	  used	  to	  assess	  each	  attribute	  of	  the	  
surveillance	  system	  are	  summarised	  in	  Table	  5-­‐2.	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Table	  5-­‐2	  Details	  of	  the	  methods	  used	  to	  address	  each	  attribute	  of	  ISSWA	   	  
Attribute	   Method	  	   Additional	  methods	  
Surveillance	  system	  
description	  (Purpose,	  
objectives	  and	  
operations)	  
	  
Stakeholder	  consultations	   Literature	  review	  
Usefulness	   Data	  analysis	  (description)	  
Stakeholder	  consultations	  
	  
Simplicity	   Stakeholder	  consultations	   Review	  of	  the	  operation	  and	  
flow	  of	  data	  through	  system.	  
Acceptability	   Data	  analysis	  (audit)	  
Stakeholder	  consultations	  
Review	  of	  pertinent	  legislation	  
Flexibility	   Stakeholder	  consultations	   Review	  of	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  
system	  to	  respond	  to	  a	  change	  
Data	  quality	   Data	  analysis	  (audit)	  
Stakeholder	  consultations	  
Comparison	  of	  hard	  copy	  data	  
to	  data	  stored	  in	  WANIDD	  for	  
10%	  of	  all	  cases	  notified	  
between	  2013-­‐2015	  	  
Sensitivity	   Data	  analysis	  (description)	   Review	  of	  laboratory	  methods	  
Positive	  predictive	  
value	  
Data	  analysis	  (description)	   	  
Representativeness	   Data	  analysis	  (description)	  
Stakeholder	  consultations	  
	  
Timeliness	   Data	  analysis	  (audit)	   	  
Stability	   Stakeholder	  consultations	   Review	  of	  system	  operation	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6   Results	  
6.1   Surveillance	  system	  description	  
6.1.1   Purpose	  and	  objectives	  of	  infectious	  syphilis	  surveillance	  in	  WA	  
The	  specific	  purpose	  of	  infectious	  syphilis	  surveillance	  in	  WA	  is	  not	  officially	  documented.	  
This	   is	   likely	   a	   result	   of	   infectious	   syphilis	   surveillance	   functioning	   under	   the	   general	  
umbrella	   purpose	   for	   communicable	   disease	   surveillance	   in	   WA,	   namely	   communicable	  
disease	   surveillance	   is	   maintained	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   minimising	   disease	   transmission	  
through	  timely	  investigation	  and	  response	  to	  notified	  cases	  and	  identified	  outbreaks.	  	  
	  
Similar	   to	  purpose,	   the	  objectives	  of	   ISSWA	  are	  not	   formally	   documented	  or	   available	   in	  
the	  public	  domain.	  The	  Syphilis:	  CDNA	  National	  Guidelines	  for	  Public	  Health	  Units	  (Syphilis	  
SoNG)20	  outlines	  four	  clear	  objectives	  for	  syphilis	  surveillance:	  	  
	  
1.   Provide	  baseline	  data	  to	  enable	  detection	  of	  changes	  in	  disease	  trends	  including	  
evaluation	  of	  intervention	  strategies	  
2.   Enable	  timely	  detection	  and	  identification	  of	  cases	  of	  infectious	  syphilis	  to	  facilitate	  
rapid	  response	  to	  the	  management	  of	  cases	  and	  their	  contacts	  
3.   Enable	  timely	  detection	  of	  clusters	  and	  outbreaks	  to	  facilitate	  early	  intervention	  to	  
control	  transmission	  
4.   Inform	  the	  prevention	  of	  congenital	  syphilis	  
We	   explored	   the	   possibility	   of	   using	   the	   four	   objectives	   outlined	   above	   for	   infectious	  
syphilis	   surveillance	   in	  WA.	   Stakeholder	   consultations	   indicated	   that	   the	   objectives	  were	  
appropriate	  for	  ISSWA.	  Additionally,	  all	  interviewees	  and	  55%	  (6/11)	  of	  survey	  participants	  
felt	  the	  system	  effectively	  operated	  under	  these	  objectives	  already.	  The	  remaining	  45%	  felt	  
that	  the	  system	  ‘somewhat’	  operated	  under	  these	  objectives.	  	  
6.1.2   Operation	  of	  infectious	  syphilis	  surveillance	  in	  WA	  
6.1.2.1   The	  population	  under	  surveillance.	  
The	  intended	  population	  under	  surveillance	  is	  the	  entire	  population	  of	  Western	  Australia.	  
Western	   Australia	   has	   a	   population	   of	   approximately	   2.5	  million21.	   Over	   75%	   live	   in	   the	  
capital	   city,	  Perth,	  approximately	  3.8%	   identify	  as	  Aboriginal,	   and	   the	  median	  age	   is	  36.1	  
years	   21,	   22.	   The	   state	   is	   split	   into	   nine	   health	   regions	   defined	   by	   geographical	   borders	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(Figure	   6-­‐1).	   Two	   health	   regions,	   North	  Metropolitan	   and	   South	  Metropolitan	   cover	   the	  
Perth	   metropolitan	   region,	   and	   the	   remaining	   seven	   cover	   the	   regional	   areas.	   Major	  
demographic	   details	   for	   each	   region	   are	   summarised	   in	   Table	   6-­‐1	   and	   Figure	   6-­‐1,	   and	  
demonstrate	   the	   considerable	   differences	   between	   regions	   particularly	   with	   respect	   to	  
population	  density	  and	  the	  proportion	  Aboriginal.	  The	  public	  health	  needs	  of	  each	  region	  
are	  coordinated	  by	  a	  local	  and	  central	  population	  health	  unit.	  	  
Table	  6-­‐1	  Relevant	  demographic	  details	  of	  health	  regions	  in	  WA	  (source	  Rates	  Calculator23)	  
Health	  region	  
Demographic	  
Population	   Median	  age	  group	   %	  Male	   %	  Aboriginal	  
South	  Metro	   867,371	   30-­‐34	   49.9	   1.8	  
North	  Metro	   969,100	   40-­‐44	   49.8	   1.4	  
Wheatbelt	   75,117	   30-­‐34	   51.3	   5.1	  
Goldfields	   57,296	   35-­‐39	   52.5	   10.4	  
Kimberley	   37,673	   35-­‐39	   52.6	   43.5	  
Midwest	   65,230	   30-­‐34	   51.1	   11.6	  
Great	  
Southern	  
59,072	   35-­‐39	   49.6	   3.8	  
Pilbara	   62,736	   35-­‐39	   61.0	   12.7	  
South	  West	   158,615	   40-­‐44	   49.5	   2.1	  
	  
6.1.2.2   Infectious	  syphilis	  surveillance	  system	  
ISSWA	   operates	   within	   the	   overall	   surveillance	   system	   for	   communicable	   disease,	   the	  
Western	  Australian	  Notifiable	  Infectious	  Diseases	  Database	  (WANIDD).	  WANIDD	  has	  been	  
in	  operation	  since	  1990,	  collecting	  surveillance	  data	  for	  all	  notifiable	  diseases	  in	  WA,	  and	  is	  
managed	   at	   the	   central	   Communicable	   Disease	   Control	   Directorate	   of	   the	   State	  
Department	  of	  Health	  (CDCD).	  Epidemiologists	  at	  CDCD	  have	  overview	  of	  all	  data,	  whereas,	  
for	  individual	  health	  regions,	  only	  local	  data	  are	  accessible.	  	  
Notification	  data	  are	  collected	  by	  the	  diagnosing	  physician	  using	  a	  generic	  paper	  reporting	  
form,	   the	   core	   form	   (Appendix	   9-­‐2),	   that	   is	   faxed	   to	   the	   local	   population	   health	   unit	   for	  
entry	   into	   WANIDD	   and	   public	   health	   follow-­‐up.	   In	   2007	   enhanced	   surveillance	   for	  
infectious	  syphilis	  was	  introduced,	  requiring	  the	  collection	  of	  data	  additional	  to	  that	  on	  the	  
generic	   form	   (Appendix	  9-­‐3).	   These	  enhanced	  data	  are	  also	   collected	  using	  a	  paper	   form	  
and	  manually	  entered	  into	  WANIDD.	  The	  enhanced	  form	  can	  be	  completed	  as	  well	  as,	  or	  in	  
place	  of,	  the	  core	  notification	  form.	  The	  additional	  data	  include	  questions	  relating	  to	  place	  
of	   syphilis	   acquisition,	  mode	   of	   acquisition,	   exposure	   type	   (MSM,	   heterosexual	   etc)	   and	  
methods	  used	  to	  meet	  the	  person	  from	  whom	  infection	  was	  acquired.	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Figure	  6-­‐1	  Population	  density	  map	  by	  health	  region	  (2015)	  in	  WA	  (source	  detailed	  in	  	  
figure)	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6.1.2.3   Flow	  of	  information	  through	  the	  system	  
The	  typical	  flow	  of	  information	  in	  the	  infectious	  syphilis	  notification	  pathway	  is	  presented	  
in	  Figure	  6-­‐2.	  Small	  variations	  exist	  between	  this	  pathway	  and	  that	  of	  the	  Kimberley,	  and	  
North	  and	  South	  Metropolitan	  health	  regions.	  These	  differences	  are	  described	  in	  the	  text	  
and	  illustrated	  in	  flow	  diagrams	  found	  in	  Appendices	  9-­‐4	  and	  9-­‐5.	  	  
Reporting	  of	  syphilis	  cases	  begins	  at	  the	   level	  of	  primary	  health	  care.	  A	  case	  of	   infectious	  
syphilis	   either	   presents	   to	   their	   primary	   health	   care	   provider	   or	   is	   investigated	   during	  
screening	  activities.	  Samples	  are	  collected	  and	  sent	  to	  the	  laboratory	  for	  infectious	  syphilis	  
testing.	   Positive	   results	   are	   reported	   to	   the	  diagnosing	  physician	  who	   then	  determines	   if	  
the	  case	  meets	  the	  case	  definition	  for	  infectious	  syphilis	  (Figure	  6-­‐2),	  and	  notifies	  the	  local	  
population	  health	  unit	  who	  confirm	  the	  diagnosis	  and	  enter	  the	  data	  into	  WANIDD.	  For	  the	  
North	   and	   South	  Metropolitan	   areas,	   notifications	   from	   doctors	   are	   sent	   directly	   to	   the	  
CDCD	   for	   entry	   into	  WANIDD.	   In	   this	   case,	   the	   CDCD	   rather	   than	   the	   diagnosing	   doctor	  
notifies	  the	  population	  health	  units	  of	  the	  case	  (Appendix	  9-­‐4).	  	  
As	  well	  as	  reporting	  back	  to	  the	  diagnosing	  doctor,	  cases	  with	  laboratory	  results	  consistent	  
with	  infectious	  syphilis	  are	  automatically	  and	  electronically	  entered	  into	  WANIDD,	  meaning	  
that	   local	  population	  health	  units	  can	  become	  aware	  of	  a	  case	   through	  WANIDD	  prior	   to	  
notification	   from	   the	  doctor.	   They	  will	   then	   contact	   the	  doctor	   to	   confirm	   the	  diagnosis.	  
The	  Kimberley	  Population	  Health	  (KPHU)	  unit	  is	  slightly	  different	  in	  that	  laboratory	  results	  
are	   reported	   to	   KPHU	   directly,	   abrogating	   the	   need	   for	  WANIDD	   to	   update	   them	   of	   the	  
results	   (Appendix	   9-­‐5).	   Laboratory	   notification	  only	   reports	   a	   positive	   case,	   but	   does	   not	  
include	  the	  actual	  laboratory	  test	  results,	  these	  must	  be	  collected	  manually.	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Figure	  6-­‐2	  Flow	  of	  information	  through	  the	  infectious	  syphilis	  surveillance	  system	  in	  WA	  
1.   Person	  with	  syphilis	  visits	  a	  primary	  health	  care	  provider	  (sexual	  health	  clinic,	  general	  practice	  etc)	  or	  is	  
sampled	  as	  part	  of	  a	  screening	  program	  
2.   Samples	  are	  sent	  to	  the	  laboratory	  for	  analysis	  
3.   Positive	  laboratory	  results	  are	  notified	  directly	  to	  WANIDD	  and	  the	  submitting	  doctor	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Negative	  laboratory	  results	  are	  notified	  to	  the	  submitting	  doctor	  and	  case	  is	  discarded	  from	  the	  surveillance	  
system	  
4.   WANIDD	  -­‐	  sends	  de-­‐identified	  data	  to	  the	  national	  notifiable	  diseases	  surveillance	  system	  (NNDSS)	  
5.   The	  appropriate	  population	  health	  unit	  is	  notified	  of	  the	  case	  either	  through	  WANIDD	  or	  directly	  from	  the	  
diagnosing	  	  doctor	  	  
6.   The	  appropriate	  population	  health	  unit	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐	  contacts	  the	  diagnosing	  doctor	  to	  collect	  enhanced	  case	  data	  and	  uploads	  data	  to	  WANIDD	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐	  	  offers	  support	  to	  doctor	  for	  contact	  tracing	  
7.   Contacts	  of	  the	  original	  case	  identified	  through	  contact	  tracing	  visit	  a	  primary	  health	  care	  provider	  for	  
sampling	  
8.   CDCD	  epidemiologists	  extract	  and	  summarise	  data	  on	  an	  annual	  and	  quarterly	  basis	  
9.   Reports	  are	  disseminated	  to	  stakeholders	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Once	  notified	  of	  an	   infectious	  syphilis	  case,	   the	  population	  health	  unit	   initiates	  enhanced	  
surveillance.	  An	  enhanced	  surveillance	   form	   is	  either	  posted	  to	   the	  diagnosing	  doctor	   for	  
completion,	  or	  the	  population	  health	  unit	  contacts	  the	  diagnosing	  doctor	  by	  telephone	  to	  
complete	   the	   form	   together.	   Once	   completed,	   the	   enhanced	   data	   are	   entered	   into	  
WANIDD.	  
De-­‐identified	   data	   are	   sent	   daily	   to	   the	   central	   National	   Notifiable	   Diseases	   Surveillance	  
System	  (NNDSS)	  managed	  within	  the	  Commonwealth	  Department	  of	  Health.	  
6.1.3   Dissemination	  of	  data	  	  
Local	  data	  can	  be	  extracted	  from	  WANIDD	  by	  the	  respective	  population	  health	  unit	  at	  any	  
time,	  and	  analysed	  to	  inform	  public	  health	  action.	  Population	  health	  units	  cannot	  see	  data	  
for	  other	  health	  regions	  within	  WA.	  
Systematic	   dissemination	   of	   state-­‐wide	   data	   are	   provided	   by	   the	   CDCD	   in	   the	   form	   of	  
weekly,	  quarterly	  and	  annual	   reports	   (all	  available	  publically	  online)	  and	  presentations	  at	  
Quarterly	   Forums	   that	   are	   open	   to	   the	   public	   and	   held	   quarterly.	   	   The	  weekly	   report	   is	  
available	  to	  all	  health	  regions	  and	  summarises	  notification	  data	  across	  the	  state	  by	  health	  
region,	  for	  the	  previous	  two	  months.	  These	  reports	  provide	  notification	  numbers	  only,	  and	  
include	  no	  demographic	  information.	  More	  detailed	  data	  are	  provided	  in	  the	  quarterly	  and	  
annual	  reports,	  and	  at	  the	  Quarterly	  Forums.	  These	  formats	  describe	  syphilis	  notifications	  
statewide,	  and	   include	  breakdowns	  by	  health	   region,	  age	  and	  sex.	  Selected	  data	  are	  also	  
available	   in	   a	   real-­‐time	   format	  on	   the	  HealthyWA	  website	   (hereafter	   referred	   to	   as	   real-­‐
time	   data),	   a	   platform	   for	   communicating	   health	   information	   to	   the	   public.	   These	   data	  
include	  break	  down	  by	  gender,	  but	  not	  health	  region.	  
Additional	  data	  can	  be	  provided	  ad-­‐hoc	  on	  an	  as-­‐needed	  basis.	  This	  is	  particularly	  the	  case	  
during	  outbreaks.	  Data	  are	  also	  available	   for	   research	  applications	  where	  ethics	  approval	  
has	  been	  sought	  and	  granted.	  	  	  
When	  appropriate	  stakeholders	  were	  consulted	  about	  the	  adequacy	  of	  data	  dissemination	  
methods	   described	   above,	   67%	   of	   survey	   participants	   (4/6)	   and	   only	   29%	   (2/7)	   of	  
interviewees	   questioned	   indicated	   that	   dissemination	   was	   adequate.	   There	   was	   a	  
perceived	  need	  for	  better	  dissemination	  of	  data,	  particularly	  to	  General	  Practitioners,	  that	  
was	   brief,	   visual,	   and	  provided	   at	   clinically	   relevant	   intervals	   (monthly	   or	   quarterly).	   The	  
‘DiseaseWAtch’	   newsletter	   format	   was	   frequently	   mentioned,	   however,	   the	   online	   real-­‐
time	  data	  could	  address	  this	  need,	  especially	  if	  data	  were	  aggregated	  by	  population	  health	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region.	  The	  real-­‐time	  data	  may	  not	  have	  been	  considered	  for	  this	  purpose	  by	  stakeholders	  
given	  that	  few	  were	  aware	  the	  site	  existed	  (3/8	  survey	  participants	  and	  1/7	  interviewees),	  
and	   navigation	   to	   the	   site	   is	   difficult.	   All	   stakeholders	   were	   aware	   of	   the	   other	   data	  
sources.	  
Nationwide	  data	  are	  also	  available	  online	  and	  provided	  by	  the	  National	  Notifiable	  Diseases	  
Surveillance	   System	   (NNDSS).	   Just	   over	  half	   of	   survey	  participants	   (5/8)	  were	   aware	   that	  
these	  data	  were	  available.	  
6.2   Evaluation	  
6.2.1   Usefulness	  
The	  usefulness	  of	   infectious	  syphilis	  surveillance	   in	  WA	  was	  assessed	   in	  two	  parts.	  First,	   I	  
explored	   the	   ability	   of	   the	  data	   collected	  by	   the	   system	   to	  describe	   the	  epidemiology	  of	  
infectious	  syphilis	  in	  Australia.	  Second,	  I	  assessed	  how	  well	  the	  system	  met	  the	  objectives	  
outlined	  in	  the	  national	  syphilis	  guidelines.	  	  
Epidemiology	  
There	   were	   545	   notifications	   for	   infectious	   syphilis	   in	   the	   5-­‐year	   period,	   2011	   to	   2015	  
(Figure	   6-­‐3).	   The	   majority	   of	   cases	   occurred	   in	   the	   non-­‐Aboriginal	   population	   (97%),	  
although	  age	   standardised	   rates	  of	   infectious	   syphilis	   indicate	   that	   the	  annulised	   rates	   in	  
the	  Aboriginal	  population	  were	  between	  3-­‐11	  times	  higher	  than	  that	  of	  the	  non-­‐Aboriginal	  
population	  (Figure	  6-­‐4).	  	  
	  
Figure	  6-­‐3	  Notifications	  of	  infectious	  syphilis	  in	  WA,	  2011-­‐2015,	  by	  Aboriginal	  status	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Figure	  6-­‐4	  Age-­‐standardised	  rate	  of	  infectious	  syphilis	  notifications	  per	  100,000	  population	  	  
in	  WA,	  2011-­‐2015,	  by	  Aboriginal	  status	  
	  
The	   epidemiology	   differed	   between	   non-­‐Aboriginal	   and	   Aboriginal	   cases.	   In	   the	   non-­‐
Aboriginal	   population,	   cases	   were	   predominantly	   male,	   whereas	   Aboriginal	   cases	   were	  
more	   similarly	   distributed	   between	   males	   and	   females	   (Figure	   6-­‐5).	   Accordingly,	   the	  
greatest	   proportion	   of	   non-­‐Aboriginal	   cases	   reported	   MSM	   exposure,	   whereas	   for	  
Aboriginal	  cases	  heterosexual	  exposure	  was	  most	  commonly	  reported	  (Figure	  6-­‐6).	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Figure	  6-­‐5	  Notifications	  of	  infectious	  syphilis	  in	  WA,	  by	  Aboriginal	  status	  and	  sex,	  2011-­‐2015	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Figure	  6-­‐6	  Proportion	  of	  notifications	  of	  infectious	  syphilis	  in	  Aboriginal	  and	  non-­‐Aboriginal	  
cases	  by	  route	  of	  exposure,	  2011-­‐2015	  
	  
Although	   the	   greatest	   proportion	   of	   notifications	   for	   both	   Aboriginal	   and	   non-­‐Aboriginal	  
cases	  occurred	  in	  the	  20-­‐29	  year	  age	  group	  (Figure	  6-­‐7),	  on	  the	  whole	  non-­‐Aboriginal	  cases	  
were	  older	  with	  over	  68%	  being	  over	  the	  age	  of	  29	  compared	  with	  only	  34%	  of	  Aboriginal	  
cases.	   	   Infectious	  syphilis	  notification	  rates	  were	  also	  highest	   in	  the	  20-­‐29	  year	  age	  group	  
for	  both	  Aboriginal	  and	  non-­‐Aboriginal	  cases,	  although	  the	  rate	  remained	  elevated	  for	  the	  
30-­‐39	  and	  40-­‐49	  year	  age	  group	  for	  non-­‐Aboriginal	  cases,	  but	  decreased	  in	  Aboriginal	  cases	  
(Figure	  6-­‐8).	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Figure	  6-­‐7	  Notifications	  of	  infectious	  syphilis	  by	  age	  group	  and	  Aboriginal	  status,	  2011-­‐2015	  
	  
	  
Figure	  6-­‐8	  Average	  annual	  infectious	  syphilis	  notification	  rate	  per	  100,000	  population,	  
2011-­‐2015,	  by	  age	  group	  
	  
The	  average	  annual	  notification	  rate	  per	  100,000	  population	  from	  2011-­‐2015	  was	  higher	  in	  
rural	  areas	  than	  metropolitan	  areas	  for	  Aboriginal	  cases,	  whilst	  the	  opposite	  was	  true	  for	  
non-­‐Aboriginal	  cases	  (Figure	  6-­‐9).	  Overall,	  average	  notification	  rates	  were	  3	  times	  higher	  in	  
the	  Aboriginal	  population	  living	  in	  metropolitan	  areas	  than	  the	  non-­‐Aboriginal	  population,	  
and	  126	  times	  higher	  in	  rural	  areas.	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Figure	  6-­‐9	  Average	  annual	  syphilis	  notification	  rate	  per	  100,000	  population,	  2011-­‐2015,	  by	  
Aboriginal	  status	  and	  area	  of	  residence	  	  
	  
Notification	  trends	  
The	  epidemic	  curve	  of	  Aboriginal	  cases	  (Figure	  6-­‐10)	  demonstrates	  increased	  notifications	  
in	   the	   last	   quarter	   of	   2014	   and	   the	   first	   quarter	   of	   2015.	   In	   this	   period,	   the	   number	   of	  
notifications	  was	  more	  than	  3	  times	  higher	  than	  the	  6	  monthly	  mean	  for	  the	  previous	  four	  
equivalent	   periods	   (16	   vs	   5	   notifications).	   The	   number	   of	   cases	   continued	   to	   rise	   in	   the	  
following	   two	   quarters	   and	   then	   declined	   somewhat	   in	   the	   last	   quarter	   of	   2015	   but	  
remained	   considerably	   elevated.	   The	   rise	   in	   cases	   reflected	   an	   outbreak	   of	   infectious	  
syphilis	   amongst	   Aboriginal	   people	   in	   the	   Kimberley	   region	   of	  WA	  which	   commenced	   in	  
northwest	  Queensland	  in	  2011,	  spread	  to	  the	  northern	  Territory	  in	  2013,	  and	  then	  to	  the	  
Kimberley	  region	  in	  mid-­‐201424.	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Figure	  6-­‐10	  Notifications	  of	  infectious	  syphilis	  in	  Aboriginal	  persons	  in	  WA,	  2011-­‐2015	  
	  
Amongst	   the	  non-­‐Aboriginal	  population,	  a	  greater	   than	  expected	  number	  of	  notifications	  
were	  observed	  in	  the	  last	  two	  quarters	  of	  2015	  (Figure	  6-­‐11).	  The	  number	  of	  notifications	  
in	  this	  period	  were	  more	  than	  2	  times	  higher	  than	  the	  average	  number	  of	  notifications	  for	  
the	  previous	   four	   six-­‐month	  periods	   (80	  vs	  40	  notifications).	  The	   increase	   in	  notifications	  
reflects	  an	  outbreak	  of	   infectious	  syphilis	   in	   the	  Perth	  metropolitan	   region.	  The	  outbreak	  
appears	  to	  be	  primarily	  driven	  by	  males,	  although	  the	  number	  of	  female	  notifications	  in	  the	  
3rd	  and	  4th	  quarter	  of	  2015	  suggests	  the	  beginnings	  of	  an	  upward	  trend	  (Figure	  6-­‐5).	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Figure	  6-­‐11	  Notifications	  of	  infectious	  syphilis	  in	  non-­‐Aboriginal	  persons	  in	  WA,	  2011-­‐2015	  
	  
The	   above	   analysis	   demonstrates	   that	   data	   from	   the	   surveillance	   system	   are	   able	   to	  
describe	   infectious	   syphilis	   in	   WA	   by	   person,	   time	   and	   place.	   Additionally,	   stakeholder	  
survey	  and	  interviews	  indicated	  that	  in	  their	  experience	  these	  data	  were	  useful	  for	  public	  
health	   action,	   in	   that	   they	   were	   used	   to	   inform	   screening	   activities,	   provide	   written	  
communications	  (reports	  and	  published	  articles),	  inform	  policy	  making	  and	  guide	  resource	  
allocation.	  
	  
How	  well	  does	  the	  system	  perform	  against	  the	  objectives?	  
The	  performance	  of	  infectious	  syphilis	  surveillance	  against	  the	  four	  objectives	  proposed	  in	  
4.1.1	  were	  analysed	  in	  turn.	  	  
1.   Provide	   baseline	   data	   to	   enable	   detection	   of	   changes	   in	   disease	   trends	   including	  
evaluation	  of	  intervention	  strategies	  
The	  infectious	  syphilis	  surveillance	  system	  provides	  baseline	  data	  that	  enable	  detection	  of	  
changes	  in	  disease	  trends.	  Core	  data	  on	  demographic	  details	  and	  enhanced	  data	  on	  details	  
of	   high	   risk	   behaviours	   are	   collected	   for	   each	   case	   in	   a	   consistent	   and	   timely	   manner.	  
Statewide	   data	   are	   analysed	   and	   reported	   quarterly	   and	   annually	   by	   the	   CDCD.	   The	  
analyses	   include	  descriptions	  of	   trends	  over	   time	  and	  are	  broken	  down	  by	   region,	  at	   risk	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populations,	   and	   selected	   risk	   behaviours.	   These	   data	   are	   appropriate	   for	   highlighting	  
changes	   in	   disease	   trends	   and	   informing	   control	   strategies.	   For	   instance,	   the	   data	  
successfully	  describe	  the	  differing	  epidemiology	  of	  infectious	  syphilis	  in	  Aboriginal	  and	  non-­‐
Aboriginal	  populations,	  and	  inform	  appropriately	  different	  control	  strategies.	  
	  
All	   stakeholders	   surveyed	   and	   interviewees	   questioned	   felt	   that	   the	   data	   from	   the	  
infectious	  surveillance	  system	  met	  Objective	  1.	  However,	   two	   limitations	  were	   identified.	  
There	  was	   comment	   that	   newer	  or	   evolving	   risk	   factors,	   such	   as	   the	   changing	  ways	   that	  
people	   are	   shopping	   for	   sex	   with	   dating	   applications	   or	   Apps,	   are	   not	   captured	   in	   the	  
system	   through	  enhanced	   surveillance	  and	   therefore,	   cannot	  be	  monitored.	  Additionally,	  
when	   data	   are	   analysed	   by	   public	   health	   providers	   for	   their	   region,	   there	   is	   difficulty	  
interpreting	   local	   trends	   due	   to	   lack	   of	   access	   to	   testing	   numbers.	   Addressing	   these	  
limitations	  will	  enhance	  performance	  of	  the	  system	  against	  Objective	  1.	  	  	  	  
	  
2.   Enable	   timely	   detection	   and	   identification	   of	   cases	   of	   infectious	   syphilis	   to	   facilitate	  
rapid	  response	  to	  the	  management	  of	  cases	  and	  their	  contacts	  
The	   infectious	   syphilis	   surveillance	   system	   enables	   timely	   detection	   and	   identification	   of	  
infectious	   syphilis	   cases	   and	   facilitates	   a	   rapid	   response	   to	   their	   management.	   Positive	  
cases	   are	   notified	   to	   the	   surveillance	   system	   within	   a	   median	   of	   seven	   days	   from	  
presenting	   to	   a	   primary	   health	   care	   provider	   or	   being	   screened	   (see	   section	   4.2.2.7	   –	  
Timeliness).	   Notifications	   include	   core	   data	   that	   allow	   the	   population	   health	   units	   to	  
contact	  the	  diagnosing	  physician	  to	  facilitate	  case	  management.	  Nine	  of	  ten	  stakeholders	  
surveyed,	   and	   five	   of	   six	   interviewees	   questioned	   agreed	   that	   the	   surveillance	   system	  
achieved	   objective	   2	   as	   it	   pertained	   to	   cases.	   However,	   the	   need	   to	   manually	   collect	  
laboratory	   results,	   history	   of	   prior	   infection,	   and	   history	   of	   prior	   treatment	   affected	   the	  
timeliness	  and	  acceptability	  of	   the	   system,	  and	   impacted	  on	   its	  performance	  against	   this	  
objective.	  For	  instance,	  laboratory	  testing	  results,	  e.g.	  serology	  titres,	  are	  not	  electronically	  
uploaded	  to	  WANIDD	  with	  laboratory	  notifications	  and	  must	  be	  collected	  manually.	  These	  
data	  are	  needed	  to	  determine	  if	  cases	  are	  confirmed	  or	  probable	  and	  to	  inform	  treatment	  
options.	   Similarly,	   history	   of	   previous	   testing	   and	   treatment	   are	   not	   always	   available	   in	  
WANIDD.	  These	  data	  are	  needed	  to	  establish	  the	  case	  status	  and	  stage	  of	  infection.	  Some	  
regions	  get	  around	  the	  issue	  with	  a	  separate	  syphilis	  register	  that	  records	  all	  cases	  in	  a	  line	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listing	  with	  additional	   information	   to	  WANIDD	   including	   treatments,	  previous	   test	   results	  
and	  history	  of	  previous	  syphilis	  infections.	  
There	  was	  less	  agreement	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  system	  facilitated	  the	  response	  to	  contacts	  of	  
cases.	   Seventy	   percent	   of	   survey	   participants	   (7/10)	   and	   four	   of	   six	   interviewees	   agreed	  
that	  it	  did.	  Two	  of	  the	  survey	  participants	  who	  indicated	  that	  the	  system	  did	  not	  facilitate	  
the	   response	   to	   contacts,	   commented	   that	   a	   separate	   syphilis	   register	   for	   their	   region	  
(described	   above)	   was	  more	   useful	   for	   this	   purpose,	   and	   other	   interviewees,	   from	   non-­‐
metropolitan	  areas,	  were	  interested	  in	  the	  utility	  of	  a	  register	  to	  facilitate	  contact	  tracing	  in	  
their	   regions	   as	   well.	   The	   Northern	   Territory	  maintains	   a	   syphilis	   register	   statewide	   and	  
believes	  that	  it	  greatly	  facilitates	  contact	  tracing	  (personal	  communication	  Remote	  Sexual	  
Health	  Program	  Manager,	  NT	  Department	  of	  Health).	  	  
Furthermore,	  stakeholder	   interviews	   indicated	  concern	  at	  the	   lack	  of	  knowledge	  amongst	  
general	  practitioners	  on	  the	  need	  to	  not	  only	  test,	  but	  to	  presumptively	  treat	  patients	  who	  
present	   as	   sexual	   contacts	  of	   infectious	   syphilis	   cases.	   If	   contacts	   are	   informed	  by	  public	  
health	  nurses	  or	  physicians	  they	  are	  reminded	  of	  the	  need	  to	  be	  both	  tested	  and	  treated	  
and	   can	   inform	   their	   physician.	   However,	   where	   cases	   choose	   to	   notify	   contacts	  
themselves,	   they	   may	   not	   inform	   the	   contact	   that	   they	   need	   to	   be	   treated	   as	   well	   as	  
tested.	   It	  was	  noted	  that	   the	  enhanced	  form	  does	  not	   include	  an	  opportunity	   to	   indicate	  
how	  contacts	  were	  notified.	  This	  information	  is	  captured	  in	  the	  core	  notification	  form,	  but	  
where	  laboratory	  notification	  occurs,	  this	  form	  will	  not	  always	  be	  used.	  It	  may	  be	  possible	  
to	   include	   a	   question	   on	   the	   enhanced	   surveillance	   form	   about	   the	   method	   of	   contact	  
notification,	  along	  with	  a	  note	  that	  if	  the	  case	  informs	  their	  own	  contacts	  they	  must	  explain	  
that	  the	  contact	  needs	  both	  testing	  and	  treatment.	  This	  will	  allow	  consistent	  collection	  of	  
information	   about	   the	  method	   of	   contact	   notification	   and	   provide	   indirect	   education	   of	  
both	  doctors	  and	  cases	  of	  proper	  management	  of	  contacts.	  	  
3.   Enable	   timely	   detection	   of	   clusters	   and	   outbreaks	   to	   facilitate	   early	   intervention	   to	  
control	  transmission	  
Infectious	   syphilis	   surveillance	   in	  WA	   has	   the	   capacity	   to	   successfully	   identify	   outbreaks	  
and	  clusters	  in	  a	  timely	  manner.	  Core	  data	  are	  available	  for	  cases	  rapidly,	  within	  a	  median	  
of	   7	   days	   from	   having	   a	   specimen	   collected	   (see	   4.2.2.7),	   and	   allow	   for	   identification	   of	  
clustering	  by	   time,	   location	  and	  other	  demographic	   variables	   such	  as	  age	  and	   sex.	   These	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data	  provide	  the	  foundations	  for	  facilitating	  early	   intervention	  and	  designing	  programs	  to	  
control	  transmission.	  	  
At	  the	  local	  level,	  all	  eight	  interviewees	  questioned	  and	  six	  of	  nine	  survey	  participants	  felt	  
that	   the	   surveillance	   system	  met	   this	  objective,	   three	   survey	  participants	  did	  not.	  Of	   the	  
three	   that	   did	   not,	   one	   belonged	   to	   a	   PHU	   that	   received	   notifications	   directly	   from	   the	  
laboratory	   and	   could	   identify	   an	   increase	   in	   cases	   directly	   from	   this	   source.	  Another	   felt	  
that	  whilst	   the	   system	  helped	   identify	  outbreaks	   locally	   it	  was	   limited	   in	   that	  population	  
health	  units	  could	  not	  see	  cases	  occurring	  in	  surrounding	  regions.	  The	  survey	  also	  indicated	  
that	  population	  health	  units	  felt	  they	  may	  become	  aware	  of	  an	  outbreak	  occurring	  prior	  to	  
it	  being	  recorded	  in	  WANIDD	  through	  doctor	  notifications.	  However,	  notifications	  are	  sent	  
to	   PHUs	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   infectious	   syphilis	   surveillance	   system,	   and	   therefore,	   PHUs	  
becoming	   aware	   of	   outbreaks	   earlier	   than	   they	   become	   apparent	   on	  WANIDD	   is	   not	   in	  
spite	  of	  the	  surveillance	  system,	  but	  because	  of	  the	  surveillance	  system.	  	  
At	   the	   state	   level,	   data	   for	   all	   the	  population	  health	   regions	  are	   reviewed	  weekly	  by	   the	  
CDCD	   surveillance	   team.	   This	   activity	   can	   highlight	   outbreaks	   or	   clusters	   across	   health	  
regions	  that	  may	  not	  be	  apparent	  to	  those	  on	  the	  ground	  where	  data	  access	  is	  restricted	  to	  
their	  region.	  Data	  from	  the	  system	  alerted	  CDCD	  epidemiologists	  to	  the	  ongoing	  outbreak	  
of	   infectious	   syphilis	   in	   the	  Kimberley	   region	   that	  began	   in	   July	  2014,	  and	  another	   in	   the	  
metropolitan	  region	  that	  began	  in	  early	  2015	  (Figure	  6-­‐9	  and	  6-­‐10).	  Weekly	  review	  of	  the	  
data	   is	   limited	  by	  assessment	  of	   crude	   increases	   in	  numbers	  only,	  however,	  a	   systematic	  
and	   thorough	   analysis	   of	   the	   data	   is	   performed	   every	   quarter	   which,	   given	   the	   long	  
incubation	   period	   of	   the	   infection,	   is	   adequate	   to	   detect	   smaller	   clusters	   occurring	   in	  
subpopulations	  not	  immediately	  apparent	  in	  the	  weekly	  analyses.	  
The	   system	  may	   not	   be	   equally	   sensitive	   to	   detecting	   widely	   distributed	   clusters	   where	  
epidemiological	  links	  are	  difficult	  to	  establish.	  This	  may	  be	  addressed	  in	  the	  future	  with	  the	  
use	   of	   molecular	   techniques	   to	   link	   cases	   by	   organism	   strain,	   such	   as	   whole	   genome	  
sequencing	  of	  the	  bacterium	  from	  patient	  specimens.	  Until	  recently,	  such	  techniques	  have	  
been	  hampered	  by	   the	  difficulty	   in	  culturing	   the	  organism	  Treponema	  pallidum,	  however	  
newer	  methods	  of	  sequencing	  uncultured	  bacteria	  from	  clinical	  samples	  are	  promising	  25.	  
Adoption	  of	  new	  laboratory	  techniques	  for	  diagnostic	  purposes	  often	  take	  time,	  and	  whilst	  
it	  is	  important	  to	  stay	  abreast	  of	  developments	  and	  opportunities	  to	  adopt	  this	  technology	  
in	  the	  future,	  the	  current	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  system	  to	  detect	  outbreaks	  based	  on	  absolute	  
notification	  numbers	  and	  epidemiological/demographic	  data	  is	  sufficient.	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4.   Inform	  the	  prevention	  of	  congenital	  syphilis	  
Over	  80%	  (6/7)	  of	  interviewees	  questioned	  and	  60%	  (6/10)	  of	  survey	  participants	  felt	  that	  
the	  surveillance	  system	  met	  objective	  four.	  The	  mainstay	  for	  preventing	  cases	  of	  congenital	  
syphilis	  is	  early	  diagnosis	  and	  treatment	  of	  infection	  in	  pregnant	  women,	  yet	  reducing	  the	  
prevalence	  of	  infection	  in	  the	  community	  is	  also	  important	  in	  decreasing	  the	  potential	  for	  a	  
mother	  to	  become	  infected26.	  The	  infectious	  syphilis	  surveillance	  system	  contributes	  to	  the	  
prevention	  of	   syphilis	   infection	   in	  pregnant	  women	  by	  helping	   to	  keep	   the	  prevalence	  of	  
infectious	   syphilis	   in	   the	   community	   low,	   and	   providing	   data	   to	   help	   target	   safe	   sex	  
messaging	   and	   STI	   controls	   programs.	   The	   system	   may	   perform	   better	   against	   this	  
objective	   if	   it	   collected	   pregnancy	   status	   for	   all	   notifications	   in	   females,	   and	   treatment	  
data.	   This	   information	  would	   allow	   better	   understanding	   of	   the	   epidemiology	   of	   syphilis	  
infection	   in	   pregnant	   women	   to	   inform	   prevention	   programs,	   and	   ensure	   that	   pregnant	  
cases	  are	  treated	  correctly.	  
In	  WA,	   congenital	   syphilis	   surveillance	   and	   infectious	   syphilis	   surveillance	   are	   integrated	  
within	  WANIDD	  meaning	   that	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   link	   a	   case	   of	   congenital	   syphilis	   with	   its	  
mother.	   Data	   that	   are	   uploaded	   to	   the	   national	   surveillance	   system,	   NNDSS,	   no	   longer	  
contain	   the	   detail	   to	   allow	   linking	   of	   congenital	   cases	  with	   their	  mothers.	   A	   stakeholder	  
from	  the	  Commonwealth	  Department	  of	  Health	   indicated	   their	  need	   for	   this	  data,	  which	  
could	  be	  simply	  addressed	  by	  creating	  a	  code	  linking	  congenital	  cases	  to	  their	  mothers.	  
	  
6.2.2   Attributes	  
6.2.2.1   Simplicity	  
For	  the	  purpose	  of	  assessing	  simplicity,	  infectious	  syphilis	  surveillance	  in	  WA	  can	  be	  crudely	  
considered	   in	   three	  parts:	  collecting	  the	  data,	  managing	  the	  data,	  and	  accessing	  the	  data	  
for	  public	  health	  action.	  The	  latter	  two	  are	  simple,	  whereas	  the	  former,	  collecting	  the	  data,	  
is	  more	  difficult.	  
Collecting	  the	  data	  
Collecting	  data	  for	  infectious	  syphilis	  surveillance	  appears	  complicated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  
confirmed	  and	  probable	  case	  definitions	  are	  not	  straightforward	  and	  can	  require	  data	  from	  
several	  sources	  (Appendix	  9-­‐6).	  The	  confirmed	  case	  definition	  often	  requires	  interpretation	  
of	   laboratory	   results	   within	   the	   context	   of	   historical	   results	   and	   treatment,	   along	   with	  
clinical	  data.	  The	  probable	  case	  definition	  includes	  five	  possible	  combinations	  of	  evidence,	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where	  evidence	  types	  can	  be	  laboratory,	  clinical,	  and	  epidemiological	  (such	  as	  contact	  with	  
a	   confirmed	   case).	   Despite	   a	   complicated	   case	   definition,	   over	   half	   (57%)	   of	   survey	  
participants	   felt	   that	   applying	   the	   definitions	   were	   easy,	   and	   two	   explained	   that	   whilst	  
difficult	  initially,	  it	  became	  easier	  with	  practise	  and	  as	  they	  became	  more	  familiar	  with	  case	  
definitions.	  The	  remainder	  felt	  that	  applying	  the	  case	  definition	  was	  difficult	  (29%),	  or	  were	  
neutral	  (14%).	  	  
Another	   difficulty	   with	   the	   collection	   of	   data	   is	   the	   amount	   and	   type	   of	   data	   that	   are	  
needed.	   Additional	   to	   core	   notification	   data,	   infectious	   syphilis	   surveillance	   requires	   the	  
collection	   of	   enhanced	   data.	   The	   extra	   questions	   require	   additional	   time,	   and	   can	   be	  
difficult	   to	   collect	   due	   the	   sensitive	   nature	   of	   what	   they	   are	   asking,	   such	   as	   sexual	  
orientation	  and	  mode	  of	   transmission.	  Not	  only	  may	  the	  case	  be	  reluctant	   to	  divulge	  the	  
information,	  but	  the	  person	  following	  up	  the	  case,	  often	  general	  practitioners,	  may	  also	  be	  
uncomfortable	   interviewing	   the	   case	   on	   such	   matters	   and	   require	   additional	   help	   from	  
someone	   with	   experience.	   Stakeholder	   consultations	   indicate	   that	   it	   takes,	   on	   average,	  
between	  1-­‐5	  hours	  to	  collect	  all	  the	  data	  necessary	  to	  complete	  the	  notification	  of	  a	  case.	  	  	  
Managing	  the	  data	  
Once	   data	   are	   collected,	   entering	   and	  managing	   the	   data	   within	  WANIDD	   is	   simple.	   On	  
average	   it	   takes	   10-­‐15	   minutes	   to	   enter	   data	   for	   each	   case	   into	   WANIDD,	   and	  
approximately	  half	  an	  hour	  to	  train	  a	  person	  in	  this	  activity.	  Six	  of	  seven	  survey	  participants	  
described	   data	   entry	   as	   easy	   or	   very	   easy.	   The	   seventh	   described	   it	   as	   difficult,	   but	  
commented	   that	   the	  difficulty	   lay	   in	  assigning	   stage	  of	   infection	   rather	   than	   in	  physically	  
entering	  the	  data.	  
Accessing	  the	  data	  
Accessing	   the	  data	   for	   public	   health	   action	   is	   also	   simple.	  Data	   can	  be	   extracted	  directly	  
from	  WANIDD	   into	  MicroSoft	  Excel,	   ready	   for	  analysis	  or	   further	  export	   to	  other	  analysis	  
software	  packages	  such	  as	  STATA	  or	  SAS.	  	  
6.2.2.2   Data	  quality	  
	  
Missing	  data	  
Only	  9	  of	  a	  total	  72	  fields	  were	  missing	  more	  than	  10%	  data	  (see	  Table	  6-­‐2),	  demonstrating	  
excellent	  completeness.	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The	   greatest	   amount	   of	   data	   were	   missing	   from	   the	   fields	   ‘Outbreak	   number’	   and	  
‘Outbreak	   name’,	   which	   are	   populated	   by	   epidemiologists	   at	   the	   CDCD.	   These	   data	   are	  
necessary	   to	   monitor	   outbreaks	   at	   the	   local	   and	   national	   level.	   Some	   missing	   data	   are	  
expected	  as	  not	  all	  cases	  will	  be	  part	  of	  an	  outbreak.	  To	  determine	  if	  more	  than	  expected	  
data	  were	  missing,	  I	  cross-­‐tabulated	  outbreak	  numbers	  against	  all	  cases	  reported	  from	  the	  
Kimberley	   health	   region	   between	   January	   2013-­‐December	   2015.	   Due	   to	   an	   ongoing	  
outbreak	  of	  infectious	  syphilis	  in	  this	  region	  since	  June	  2014	  and	  no	  cases	  in	  the	  two	  years	  
prior,	  all	  cases	  in	  the	  audit	  period	  were	  outbreak	  cases	  and	  expected	  to	  have	  an	  outbreak	  
number.	   Contrary	   to	   expectation,	   cross-­‐tabulation	   showed	   that	   no	   cases	   had	   been	  
assigned	  an	  outbreak	  number	  or	  name.	  Discussion	  with	  members	  at	  the	  CDCD	  highlighted	  
a	   reluctance	   to	   use	   this	   field	   based	   on	   a	   lack	   of	   consensus	   on	   how	   to	   assign	   outbreak	  
numbers.	  The	  prime	  concern	  was	   that	  only	  one	  outbreak	  number	  could	  be	  assigned	   to	  a	  
case.	  However,	   a	   case	  may	  be	  part	   of	   a	   smaller	   cluster	  within	   a	   larger	  outbreak	  and	   the	  
question	  stood,	  should	  the	  number	  be	  assigned	  for	  the	  small	  cluster	  or	  the	  larger	  outbreak,	  
both	  of	  which	   carry	   valuable	   information.	  A	   sensible	   solution	   is	   to	  provide	   two	   fields	   for	  
assigning	  outbreak	  numbers,	   should	   it	  be	  necessary	   to	  assign	  a	  case	   to	  a	   larger	  outbreak	  
and	   to	   a	   cluster	  within	   that	  outbreak.	  Clear	  parameters	  defining	  how	   to	   assign	  outbreak	  
numbers	  are	  also	  needed.	  	  
Data	   reporting	   the	   ‘date	  an	  enhanced	   form	  was	  sent’	  and	   the	   ‘date	  of	  onset’,	  were	  both	  
missing	  large	  numbers	  of	  observations	  (64%	  and	  37%	  respectively).	  The	  date	  an	  enhanced	  
form	  was	  sent,	  also	  captures	  the	  date	  the	  form	  was	  actioned,	  and	  has	  practical	  uses	  (allows	  
for	   monitoring	   of	   whether	   follow-­‐up	   has	   occurred)	   and	   administrative	   uses	   (allows	   for	  
calculations	  of	  the	  timeliness	  with	  which	  data	  are	  collected	  from	  cases).	  These	  data	  are	  not	  
collected	  on	  the	  surveillance	  form	  which	  may	  contribute	  to	  poor	  completeness.	  The	  issue	  
could	  be	  simply	  addressed	  by	  including	  the	  date	  that	  the	  form	  was	  sent	  or	  actioned	  on	  the	  
enhanced	  data	  form	  itself.	  	  
It	  is	  not	  always	  possible	  to	  calculate	  date	  of	  onset,	  particularly	  for	  secondary	  or	  early	  latent	  
cases	  (who	  are	  asymptomatic).	  Accordingly,	  over	  80%	  of	  missing	  data	  for	  this	  variable	  were	  
from	  cases	  with	  secondary	  or	  early	  latent	  infectious	  syphilis.	  Furthermore,	  in	  the	  enhanced	  
form	  if	  a	  case	  presented	  for	  reasons	  other	  than	  being	  symptomatic	  (as	  a	  contact,	  or	  during	  
a	   screen	   for	   example)	   there	  was	   no	   opportunity	   to	   record	   the	   onset	   date.	   Providing	   an	  
option	   to	   report	   an	   onset	   date	   that	   is	   not	   associated	  with	  mode	   of	   presentation	   on	   the	  
enhanced	  surveillance	  form	  may	  improve	  completeness	  for	  this	  variable.	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Table	  6-­‐2	  Details	  of	  variables	  with	  more	  than	  10%	  missing	  data	  
Field	   Missing	  (%)	   Comment	  
Address	  Y/N	  
/Priority	  level	  
Date	  of	  onset	   37	  
Depending	  on	  the	  stage	  of	  
infection	  this	  can	  be	  difficult	  to	  
calculate	  
Yes	  
Low	  priority	  
Date	  of	  notification	   21	  
Will	  only	  be	  provided	  if	  a	  core	  
notification	  form	  is	  completed,	  
missing	  data	  expected	  
No	  
Doctors	  address	   25	   Information	  can	  be	  acquired	  from	  existing	  data	  in	  database	   No	  
Doctor’s	  phone	  number	   16	   Information	  can	  be	  acquired	  from	  existing	  data	  in	  database	   No	  
Laboratory	  pathology	  ID	  
number	   45	  
Information	  can	  be	  acquired	  from	  
existing	  data	  in	  database	   No	  
Outbreak	  number	   96	   Assigned	  by	  data	  managers	  at	  CDCD	  
Yes	  
Moderate	  
priority	  
Outbreak	  name	   96	   Assigned	  by	  data	  managers	  at	  CDCD	  
Yes	  
Moderate	  
priority	  
Enhanced	  data	  form	  sent	   64	   Useful	  to	  help	  track	  follow-­‐up	  times	  
Yes	  
Low	  priority	  
Description	  where	  
infection	  was	  acquired	   25	   Likely	  an	  artefact	  of	  small	  numbers	   No	  
	  
Accuracy	  
Comparison	   of	   data	   stored	   in	  WANIDD	   to	   information	   collected	   on	   the	   hard	   copy	   forms	  
showed	   high	   concordance	   and	   accuracy	   (Figure	   6-­‐12).	   Nine	   of	   the	   thirteen	   data	   fields	  
investigated	  were	  100%	  concordant	  between	  the	  stored	  data	  and	  hard	  copies.	  There	  was	  
over	  94%	  concordance	   in	  three	  of	   the	  remaining	   four	  data	   fields	   (stage	  of	   infection,	  date	  
enhanced	   data	  were	   received,	   and	   from	  whom	   infection	  was	   acquired).	   Data	   in	   the	   last	  
data	   field,	   country	   of	   birth	   were	   over	   91%	   concordant	   with	   the	   hard	   copy	   information.	  
Some	   level	   of	   human	   error	   is	   unavoidable	  when	  manually	   transcribing	   data	   from	   a	   hard	  
copy	  format	  into	  a	  data	  collection	  system.	  This	  may	  be	  improved	  by	  electronic,	  rather	  than	  
paper	  based	  collection	  of	  data,	  which	  would	  also	  improve	  the	  timeliness	  and	  acceptability	  
of	  the	  system.	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Figure	  6-­‐12	  Concordance	  of	  data	  stored	   in	  WANIDD	  to	   the	  associated	  hard	  copy	  data	   for	  
10%	  of	  cases	  notified	  for	  infectious	  syphilis	  in	  WA,	  2013	  -­‐	  2015.	  
	  
For	   the	   data	   field	   ‘stage	   of	   infection’,	   discordant	   data	   may	   not	   always	   be	   the	   result	   of	  
transcription	  errors.	  Determining	  stage	  of	  infection	  is	  not	  always	  straightforward	  and	  cases	  
can	   be	   incorrectly	   assigned.	   During	   the	   data	   audit	   two	   cases	  were	   idenitified	  where	   the	  
stage	   of	   infection	   in	   the	   hard	   copy	   did	   not	   match	   that	   in	   the	   data	   base.	   Further	  
investigation	  revealed	  that	  one	  was	  the	  result	  of	  a	  transcription	  error,	  whereas	  the	  other	  
was	  not.	  For	  the	   latter	  case	  the	  stage	  of	   infection	  stored	  on	  the	  hard	  copy	  was	   incorrect.	  
The	   error	   had	   been	   identified	   on	   review	   of	   the	   case	   at	   the	   time,	   and	   corrected	   in	   the	  
database	   explaining	   the	   discordant	   data.	   In	   summary,	   although	   it	   can	   be	   difficult	   to	  
correctly	  assign	  cases	  to	  stage	  of	  infection,	  case	  review	  by	  CDCD	  epidemiologists	  mean	  that	  
on	  the	  whole	  few	  inaccuracies	  occur.	  
To	   further	   investigate	   data	   accuracy	   I	   compared	  data	   from	   two	   similar	   fields	   in	   the	   core	  
notification	  form	  and	  the	  enhanced	  notification	  form.	  The	  two	  fields	  were:	  ‘How	  the	  case	  
was	  identified’	  from	  the	  core	  notification	  data;	  and	  ‘Why	  did	  the	  patient	  present	  to	  you?’	  
from	  the	  enhanced	  data	  form.	  Table	  6-­‐3	  outlines	  the	  similar	  answer	  options	  for	  these	  two	  
variables.	   In	  the	  variable	  ‘Why	  did	  the	  patient	  present	  to	  you’,	  multiple	  answers	  could	  be	  
selected	  and	  if	  any	  of	  the	  selected	  answers	  agreed	  with	  that	  in	  the	  variable	  ‘How	  the	  case	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was	  identified’,	  it	  was	  considered	  a	  match.	  In	  total	  over	  90%	  of	  the	  observations	  matched,	  
indicating	  good	  accuracy.	  	  
Table	  6-­‐3	  Answer	  options	  for	  two	  similar	  fields,	  ‘How	  the	  case	  was	  identified?’	  and	  ‘Why	  
did	  the	  patient	  present	  to	  you?’,	  in	  the	  core	  and	  enhanced	  data	  surveillance	  forms	  
	   How	  the	  case	  was	  identified	   Why	  did	  the	  patient	  present	  to	  you?	  
Answer	  option	  1	   Clinical	  presentation	   Symptomatic	  
Answer	  option	  2	   Screening	   Routine	  screen	  
Answer	  option	  3	   Contact	  tracing	   Named	  as	  a	  contact	  
Answer	  option	  4	   	   Other	  
	  
Lastly	  I	  looked	  at	  the	  data	  field	  ‘date	  of	  onset’	  for	  accuracy.	  When	  I	  compared	  the	  median	  
time	   since	   symptoms	   began	   (time	   from	   date	   of	   onset	   to	   diagnosis)	   against	   the	   stage	   of	  
infection,	   it	   became	   apparent	   that	   date	   of	   onset	   is	   not	   clearly	   defined.	   For	   instance,	   for	  
secondary	  cases,	   is	  the	  date	  of	  onset	  the	  date	  that	  primary	   lesions	  were	  detected	  or,	  the	  
date	   that	   secondary	   lesions	   were	   detected?	   Analysis	   of	   data	   report	   a	  median	   of	   6	   days	  
since	   symptoms	   began	   for	   secondary	   cases,	   which	   is	   consistent	   with	   the	   time	   since	  
secondary	  symptoms	  were	  detected	   rather	   than	  primary.	  However,	   the	   range	  extends	   to	  
131	  days,	  a	  time	  frame	  which	  could	  account	  for	  the	  time	  since	  primary	  or	  secondary	  lesions	  
were	  first	  detected.	  There	  is	  a	  similar	  problem	  for	  cases	  of	  early	  latent	  syphilis.	  It	  could	  be	  
beneficial	  to	  clarify	  this.	  
In	   summary,	   the	   data	   quality	   of	   the	   infectious	   syphilis	   surveillance	   system	   is	   high.	   Data	  
completeness	  was	  very	  good	  and	  could	  be	  improved	  with	  the	  addition	  of	  a	  field	  to	  report	  
the	   date	   the	   enhanced	   form	   is	   received,	   and	   a	   second	   option	   for	   assigning	   an	   outbreak	  
number.	   Clear	   parameters	   need	   to	   be	   established	   for	   assigning	   both	   primary	   and	  
secondary	   outbreak	   numbers.	   Data	   accuracy	   could	   be	   improved	   through	   provision	   of	  
electronic	  versions	  of	  both	  the	  core	  and	  enhanced	  surveillance	  forms	  that	  can	  be	  filled	  out	  
and	  submitted	  online	  removing	  the	  possibility	  for	  transcription	  errors.	  
6.2.2.3   Sensitivity	  
The	  sensitivity	  of	  ISSWA	  can	  be	  considered	  on	  two	  levels:	  first,	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  system	  to	  
detect	   outbreaks;	   and	   second,	   the	   proportion	   of	   all	   infectious	   syphilis	   cases	   that	   are	  
successfully	  identified	  and	  captured	  in	  the	  surveillance	  system.	  	  
6.2.2.3.1   Ability	  to	  detect	  outbreaks	  
Outbreak	   detection	   is	   an	   objective	   of	   infectious	   syphilis	   surveillance,	   and,	   as	   detailed	  
previously,	  the	  system	  meets	  the	  objective	  well.	  Consultation	  with	  sexual	  health	  physicians	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who	  handle	  high	  caseloads	  of	   infectious	  syphilis	  cases	  felt	  outbreak	  detection	  was	  timely,	  
and	  could	  highlight	  trends	  and	  increases	  in	  sub-­‐populations	  before	  they	  became	  apparent	  
on	  the	  ground.	  In	  the	  last	  two	  years	  the	  system	  has	  successfully	  detected	  and/or	  described	  
two	  ongoing	  outbreaks;	  one	  in	  the	  Kimberley	  region,	  and	  another	  in	  metropolitan	  Perth.	  In	  
summary,	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  system	  with	  respect	  to	  outbreak	  detection	  is	  high.	  
6.2.2.3.2   	  The	  proportion	  of	  all	  infectious	  syphilis	  cases	  that	  are	  successfully	  identified	  
and	  captured	  in	  the	  surveillance	  system	  
	  
The	  proportion	  of	  infectious	  syphilis	  cases	  that	  are	  successfully	  captured	  in	  the	  surveillance	  
system	   is	   dependent	   on	   multiple	   components	   including	   the	   sensitivity	   of	   the	   case	  
definition,	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  laboratory	  tests,	  and	  the	  number	  of	  positive	  cases	  that	  are	  
identified.	  	  
Sensitivity	  of	  the	  case	  definition	  
The	  case	  definition	  for	  ISSWA	  is	  based	  on	  the	  CDNA	  national	  surveillance	  case	  definition	  for	  
infectious	   syphilis	   (Appendix	   9-­‐6)	   27	   and	   includes	   confirmed	   and	   probable	   cases	   of	  
infection.	   Prior	   to	   July	   2015	   only	   confirmed	   cases	   of	   infectious	   syphilis	   were	   reportable,	  
whereas	   from	   1	   July	   2015	   probable	   cases	   also	   became	   reportable.	   High	   caseload	   sexual	  
health	   physicians	   (n=3)	   estimated	   that	   since	   the	   change	   to	   include	   probable	   cases,	  
between	  95-­‐100%	  of	  cases	  treated	  for	  infectious	  syphilis	  based	  on	  their	  clinical	  experience	  
met	  the	  case	  definition	  and	  were	  captured	  in	  the	  surveillance	  system.	  Prior	  to	  this	  change	  
the	  sensitivity	  was	   lower.	  For	  example,	   surveillance	  data	   shows	   that	   in	   the	  1	  year	  period	  
since	  addition	  of	  the	  probable	  case	  definition	  (1	  July	  2015	  –	  30	  June	  2016),	  there	  were	  45	  
notifications	  of	  probable	  infectious	  syphilis	  from	  a	  total	  of	  261	  notifications,	  indicating	  that	  
21%	  more	  cases	  were	  captured	  by	  including	  probable	  cases	  of	  infection.	  Overall,	  with	  the	  
inclusion	  of	  probable	  cases	  of	   infectious	  syphilis,	  the	  case	  definition	  for	   ISSWA	  has	  a	  high	  
level	  of	  sensitivity.	  
Sensitivity	  of	  the	  laboratory	  tests	  
The	   sensitivity	   of	   the	   laboratory	   tests	   used	   to	   determine	   if	   a	   patient	   meets	   the	   case	  
definition	   influences	   the	   overall	   sensitivity	   of	   the	   surveillance	   system.	   Of	   all	   545	   cases	  
notified	   between	   2011	   and	   2015,	   the	   majority	   of	   samples	   were	   analysed	   at	   PathWest	  
laboratories	   (n=357,	   66%),	   followed	   by	   Royal	   Perth	   Hospital	   (n=90,	   17%)	   and	   Western	  
Diagnostic	   Pathology	   (n=67,	   12%).	   PathWest	   laboratories	   initially	   screen	   samples	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submitted	   for	   infectious	   syphilis	   using	   a	   chemiluminescent	   microparticle	   immunoassay	  
(CMIA).	   Positive	   samples	   are	   then	   assayed	   using	   the	   non-­‐treponemal	   test,	   Rapid	   Plasma	  
Reagin	   (RPR),	   with	   or	   without	   testing	   for	   treponemal	   specific	   antibodies	   by	   T.	  
pallidum	  particle	   agglutination	   (TPPA)	   and/or	   IgM	   enzyme	   immunoassay	   (EIA)	   depending	  
on	   previous	   history	   of	   infection.	   The	   sensitivity	   of	   these	   tests	   according	   to	   the	  
manufacturer	  and	  the	  Public	  Health	  Laboratory	  Network	  (PHLN)28	  (Table	  6-­‐4)	  are	  excellent	  
with	  exception	  of	  the	  RPR,	  particularly	  in	  instances	  of	  primary	  syphilis.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  
a	   considerable	   problem	   given	   that	   RPR	   is	   always	   run	   in	   sequence	   with	   another	   test,	  
meaning	   that	   collectively	   the	   sensitivity	   is	   high.	   Nonetheless,	   there	   is	   potential	   for	   false	  
negatives.	   Early	   in	   infection	   detectable	   antibodies	   may	   not	   have	   developed,	   yielding	  
negative	  results	  by	  serology.	  This	  issue	  can	  be	  overcome	  by	  performing	  repeat	  serology	  in	  
high	   risk	   cases	  or	  analysing	   samples	   from	   lesions	  of	  primary	   syphilis	  with	  assays	   that	  are	  
sensitive	   earlier	   in	   infection	   such	   as	   direct	   polymerase	   chain	   reaction	   (PCR)29.	   However,	  
one	   issue	   raised	   during	   consultations	   with	   respect	   to	   PCR	   was	   the	   fact	   that	   syphilitic	  
lesions:	  
“can	  have	  atypical	  presentations	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  herpes,	  and	  unless	  an	  ulcer	  is	  described	  
in	  the	  pathology	  submission	  form,	  PCR	  for	  syphilis	  may	  not	  be	  performed”,	  high	  case	  load	  
sexual	  health	  specialist.	  
	  
Table	  6-­‐4	  Sensitivity	  of	  laboratory	  assays	  for	  infectious	  syphilis	  employed	  at	  PathWest	  
Test	   Sensitivity	  Manufacturer	   PHLN28	  
EIA	   100%	   >99%	  
TPPA	   100%	   >99%	  
RPR	  
92.3%	  
Primary	  86%	  
Secondary	  100%	  
Latent	  98%	  
IgM	  EIA	   100%	   	  
	  
Possibly,	   the	   largest	   issue	  affecting	   the	  sensitivity	  of	   infectious	  syphilis	   surveillance	   is	   the	  
proportion	  of	  positive	  syphilis	   cases	   that	  are	  not	   identified.	  This	  may	  occur	  as	  a	   result	  of	  
the	  treating	  doctor	  not	  recognising	  the	  condition	  and	  failing	  to	  collect	  samples,	  or	  positive	  
cases	   simply	   not	   presenting	   to	   primary	   health	   care.	   Currently,	   the	   magnitude	   of	   this	  
proportion	  cannot	  be	  accurately	  calculated	  as	  the	  absolute	  prevalence	  of	  infectious	  syphilis	  
in	  the	  state	  is	  unknown.	  However,	  we	  can	  obtain	  a	  rough	  estimate	  by	  using	  data	  collected	  
in	  another	  separate	  surveillance	  system	  for	  cases	  of	  syphilis	  of	  more	  than	  2	  years	  duration.	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Cases	   captured	   in	   this	   surveillance	   system	   were	   missed	   in	   their	   infectious	   period.	   By	  
calculating	  the	  proportion	  of	  all	  syphilis	  cases	  (infectious	  and	  greater	  than	  2	  years	  duration)	  
that	  were	  captured	  in	  the	  surveillance	  system	  as	  infectious	  syphilis	  cases	  we	  will	  arrive	  at	  a	  
rough	  estimate	  of	   the	  maximum	  sensitivity	   of	   the	   system.	   	  Using	   this	   logic,	   from	  01	   July	  
2015	   (since	  probable	   cases	  were	   included	   in	   the	   infectious	   syphilis	   case	  definition)	   to	  30	  
June	  2016,	  there	  were	  336	  notifications	  in	  total,	  of	  which	  77%	  (n=260)	  were	  for	  infectious	  
syphilis	  and	   the	   remainder	  were	  syphilis	   cases	  of	  more	   than	  2	  years	  duration,	   suggesting	  
that	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  system	  cannot	  be	  more	  than	  77%.	  In	  reality,	  it	  will	  be	  less,	  as	  this	  
calculation	  does	  not	  account	  for	  those	  cases	  that	  remain	  undiagnosed.	  	  
The	   proportion	   of	   positive	   cases	   presenting	   to	   primary	   health	   care	   can	   be	   improved	  
through	   education	   and	  messaging	   describing	   the	   symptoms	   of	   syphilis	   infection	   and	   the	  
need	   for	   testing	   and	   treatment.	   Similarly,	   decreasing	   the	   risk	   of	   syphilis	   infections	   being	  
mis-­‐	   or	   undiagnosed	   by	   the	   diagnosing	   physician	   can	   be	   improved	   through	   continuing	  
education	   sessions	   to	   remind	   physicians	   of	   the	   signs	   and	   symptoms	   of	   syphilis	   and	  
highlighting	  at	  risk	  populations	  where	  syphilis	  may	  carry	  higher	  clinical	  suspicion.	  However,	  
such	   activities	   belong	   to	   the	   realm	   of	   public	   health	   action	   and	   are	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	  
infectious	  syphilis	  surveillance	  activities.	  	  
Overall,	   the	  sensitivity	  of	   ISSWA	  is	  adequate.	  Although	  the	  case	  definition	  and	   laboratory	  
testing	  methods	   have	   high	   sensitivity,	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   a	   sizeable	   proportion	   of	   cases	   are	  
simply	  not	  being	  identified,	  be	  it	  through	  missed	  diagnosis	  in	  the	  clinics	  or	  failing	  to	  present	  
to	  primary	  health	  care.	  Nonetheless,	   the	  current	  sensitivity	   is	  sufficient	   for	   the	  system	  to	  
meet	  its	  objectives.	  	  
	  
6.2.2.4   Positive	  Predictive	  Value	  
The	  positive	  predictive	  value	  is	  the	  proportion	  of	  cases	  captured	  in	  the	  surveillance	  system	  
that	   truly	   have	   the	   disease.	   All	   notifications	   for	   syphilis	   (infectious	   syphilis	   or	   syphilis	   of	  
unknown	  duration)	  are	  initially	  classified	  as	  infectious.	  This	  is	  a	  deliberate	  action	  taken	  by	  
the	  central	  CDCD	  to	  ensure	  that	  all	  cases	  with	  laboratory	  evidence	  of	  syphilis	  infection	  are	  
followed	  up	  by	  the	  local	  population	  health	  unit.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  positive	  predictive	  value	  is	  
initially	   low	   (Table	   6-­‐5	   -­‐	   Initial).	   However,	   following	   initial	   screening,	   the	   proportion	   of	  
cases	  that	  are	  subsequently	  identified	  to	  be	  not	  true	  cases	  and	  removed	  from	  the	  system	  is	  
low	   (Table	   6-­‐5	   -­‐	   Subsequent),	   demonstrating	   high	   subsequent	   PPV.	   These	   data	   were	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reinforced	  by	  results	  from	  consultation	  with	  high	  case	  load	  sexual	  health	  physicians	  (n=3),	  
who	  indicated	  that	  on	  the	  whole,	  the	  PPV	  was	  very	  good.	  
Table	  6-­‐5	  Positive	  predictive	  value	  before	  (initial)	  and	  after	  (subsequent)	  removing	  cases	  of	  
syphilis	  >2	  years	  duration	  (non-­‐infectious)	  
Year	  
Initial	   	   Subsequent	  
Infectious	  
syphilis	  
Syphilis	  >2	  
years	  duration	   Total	  	  
PPV*	  
%	   	  
Infectious	  
syphilis	   Deleted	   Total	  
PPV*	  
%	  
2014/2015	   109	   67	   176	   62	   	   108	   1	   109	   99	  
2015/2016	   264	   76	   340	   72	   	   260	   4	   264	   98	  
*calculated:	  100x	  (Infectious	  syphilis/Total)	  
	  
6.2.2.5   Stability	  
The	   infectious	  syphilis	  surveillance	  system	  in	  WA	  is	  stable.	  Participation	  from	  the	  primary	  
health	  sector	  is	  reliable	  as	  there	  is	  a	  legal	  requirement	  for	  cases	  of	  infectious	  syphilis	  to	  be	  
notified7.	  The	  database	  used	  to	  capture	  the	  surveillance	  data,	  WANIDD,	  is	  the	  mainstay	  for	  
almost	  all	  communicable	  disease	  surveillance	  in	  WA	  and	  therefore	  has	  dedicated	  funding.	  
It	  is	  adequately	  resourced	  with	  equipment	  and	  staff,	  and	  is	  operationally	  stable	  with	  fewer	  
than	  five	  outages	  per	  year	  that	  last	  no	  longer	  than	  one	  day.	  Stakeholder	  interviews	  agreed	  
that	  overall	   the	  system	  was	  stable,	  and	  100%	  of	  survey	  participants	   indicated	  the	  system	  
had	  moderate	  to	  excellent	  stability.	  
6.2.2.6   Flexibility	  
The	  flexibility	  of	  a	  surveillance	  system	  is	  its	  ability	  to	  adapt	  to	  changing	  information	  needs	  
or	  operating	  conditions	  with	   little	  additional	   time,	  personnel	  or	  allocated	  funds.	   It	   is	  best	  
assessed	  retrospectively	  through	  observation	  of	   its	  ability	  to	  respond	  to	  a	  new	  demand.	   I	  
found	  that	  the	  flexibility	  of	  the	  infectious	  syphilis	  surveillance	  system	  in	  WA	  varied	  by	  the	  
demands	  placed	  upon	  it.	  
During	   the	   evaluation	   period,	   the	   national	   case	   definition	   for	   infectious	   syphilis	   was	  
modified	   to	   include	   probable	   cases.	   Investigations	   revealed	   that,	   on	   the	   ground,	   this	  
change	  did	  not	  impact	  on	  the	  time	  or	  personnel	  needed	  to	  notify	  cases.	  Furthermore,	  the	  
modification	   to	  WANIDD	   to	   accommodate	   the	   additional	   information,	   essentially	   adding	  
one	  selection	  box,	  was	  simple	  and	  quick	  to	   implement	  by	  the	  data	  manager,	  and	  did	  not	  
require	  extra	  funds	  or	  personnel.	  	  
However,	   the	  above	  modifications	   to	  WANIDD	  were	  simple.	  More	  complex	  modifications	  
such	  as	  adding	  a	  new	  text	  field	  or	  a	  new	  tab,	  can	  only	  be	  performed	  by	  the	  programmer.	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The	   time	   taken	   to	   implement	   the	   changes	   is	   then	   dependent	   on	   the	   availability	   of	   the	  
programmer	  and	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  changes.	  	  
The	   surveillance	   system	   lacks	   the	   flexibility	   to	   easily	   accommodate	   data	   from	   other	  
sources.	   For	   instance,	   I	   explored	   the	  possibility	  of	   including	  detailed	   laboratory	   results	   in	  
the	   electronic	   data	   that	   are	   automatically	   uploaded	   to	   WANIDD	   from	   the	   PathWest	  
laboratory	   information	   management	   system	   (Ultra).	   The	   two	   databases	   are	   not	   well	  
integrated	   and	  data	   are	   stored	   in	   different	   formats.	   It	   became	  apparent	   that	   the	   lack	   of	  
integration	  and	  different	  data	  formats	  meant	  that	  implementing	  this	  type	  of	  change	  would	  
take	   considerable	   time	  and	  human	   resources.	   In	   this	   particular	   situation,	   the	   issue	  has	   a	  
resolution.	  PathWest	  laboratories	  are	  in	  the	  process	  of	  replacing	  Ultra	  with	  a	  new	  program,	  
and	  there	   is	   the	  potential	   for	  data	  managers	  at	  WANIDD	  to	  be	   involved	   in	   its	  design	  and	  
thereby	  include	  features	  that	  facilitate	  easier	  exchange	  of	  data	  between	  the	  systems	  in	  the	  
future.	   It	   is	   foreseeable	   that	   data	   needs	   from	   laboratories	   will	   constantly	   evolve	   and	  
therefore,	  any	  system	  that	  facilitates	  data	  exchange	  should	  be	  a	  priority.	  
I	   also	   explored	   a	   hypothetical	   situation	  where	   notifications	   increased	  by	   fourfold	   for	   a	   6	  
month	  period.	  Stakeholder	  consultations	  indicated	  that	  WANIDD	  had	  the	  capacity	  to	  cope	  
with	   such	   an	   increase,	   as	   did	   the	   laboratory.	   However,	   at	   the	   level	   of	   notifying	   and	  
following	  up	  cases,	  there	  would	  be	  an	   increased	  need	  for	  human	  resources,	  which	  would	  
require	   additional	   funds.	   There	   do	   not	   appear	   to	   be	   mechanisms	   in	   place	   to	   rapidly	  
increase	   human	   resourcing	   in	   the	   event	   of	   a	   surge	   in	   cases.	   A	   surge	   capacity	   plan	  may	  
assist	  in	  improving	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  system	  to	  cope	  with	  increased	  case	  numbers.	  
6.2.2.7   Timeliness	  
There	  are	  two	  measures	  of	  timeliness	  that	  are	  important	  in	  infectious	  syphilis	  surveillance:	  
time	  to	  case	  notification	  (“case	  notified”)	  and	  time	  to	  complete	  data	  collected	  (“complete	  
data”).	   They	   exist	   on	   the	   same	   continuum	   (Figure	   6-­‐12).	   Time	   to	   notification	   is	   the	   time	  
taken	   for	   a	   positive	   case	   of	   infectious	   syphilis	   to	   be	   identified	   and	   notified	   to	   the	  
surveillance	   system.	   At	   this	   stage	   data	   may	   be	   limited	   but	   include	   the	   necessary	  
information	   to	   begin	   public	   health	   follow-­‐up.	   Given	   that	   infectious	   syphilis	   is	   highly	  
transmissible,	  time	  to	  notification	  is	  particularly	  important	  for	  achieving	  objectives	  2	  and	  3,	  
and	  should	  be	  achieved	  as	  quickly	  as	  possible.	  Time	  to	  complete	  data	  collected,	  is	  the	  time	  
taken	   to	   collect	   the	   enhanced	   data	   once	   a	   case	   is	   notified.	   These	   data	   are	   necessary	   to	  
address	  objectives	  1	  and	  4	  of	  the	  surveillance	  system,	  but	  have	  less	  urgency.	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6.2.2.7.1   Time	  to	  notification	  
The	  median	  time	  to	  notification	  was	  7	  days,	  with	  a	  range	  of	  0-­‐94	  days	  (Figure	  6-­‐13).	  Over	  
90%	  of	  cases	  were	  notified	  within	  15	  days	  of	  specimen	  collection.	  	  
The	   steps	   to	   notification	   include	   specimen	   collection,	   transport	   to	   laboratory,	   laboratory	  
analysis,	  reporting	  results	  and	  notifying	  to	  WANIDD.	  There	  was	  concern	  that	  the	  time	  taken	  
for	  transport	  to	  the	   laboratory	  may	  be	  affected	  by	   location.	  The	  vast	  majority	  of	  samples	  
are	  processed	  at	  the	  government	  laboratory	  PathWest	  in	  the	  Perth	  metropolitan	  area	  and	  
samples	   collected	   in	   non-­‐metropolitan	   regions,	   the	   Kimberley	   region	   for	   instance,	   could	  
take	  more	  time	  to	  reach	  the	  laboratory.	  The	  data	  indicated	  that	  the	  median	  time	  taken	  to	  
reach	   the	   step	   of	   reporting	   results,	   which	   includes	   the	   transportation	   step,	   were	   either	  
equal	  or	  only	  slightly	  longer	  for	  the	  non-­‐metropolitan	  regions	  (Appendix	  Table	  9-­‐7)	  and	  not	  
of	   significant	   concern.	   Interview	   with	   PathWest	   (the	   predominant	   laboratory	   analysing	  
samples)	   indicated	   that	   the	   average	   time	   from	   receipt	   of	   samples	   to	   completed	   analysis	  
and	   a	   report	   generated	   was	   2-­‐3	   days,	   and	   this	   could	   not	   be	   made	   shorter	   without	  
significant	   cost	   and	   human	   resources.	  Once	   analysed	   and	   a	   report	   generated,	   data	   from	  
PathWest	  are	  automatically	  uploaded	  to	  WANIDD	  that	  night,	  and	  within	  1-­‐2	  days	  from	  the	  
other	   laboratories	   analysing	   the	   remaining	   samples.	  Naturally,	   the	   goal	   is	   to	   achieve	   the	  
shortest	  time	  to	  notification	  possible;	  however,	   the	  above	  analysis	  of	   time	  to	  notification	  
did	   not	   identify	   any	   areas	   where	   this	   timeframe	   could	   be	   significantly	   and	   feasibly	  
shortened.	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Figure	  6-­‐13	  Timeliness	  of	  data	  collection.	  
A.	  Timeline	  demonstrating	  timeframes	  as	  a	  case	  progresses	  through	  the	  surveillance	  system	  from	  
contracting	  syphilis	  through	  to	  complete	  data	  collected.	  B.	  Histogram	  describing	  the	  number	  of	  
notifications	  by	  days	  taken	  to	  become	  notified.	  C.	  Histogram	  describing	  number	  of	  notifications	  by	  
days	  taken	  for	  complete	  data	  to	  be	  collected	  
	  
The	   incongruities	   between	   date	   of	   onset	   data	   and	   known	   pathogenesis	   of	   syphilis	   (see	  
4.2.2.2)	  meant	   that	  we	  could	  not	  directly	  measure	   the	   time	   taken	   from	  disease	  onset	   to	  
presenting	  at	  the	  clinic	  for	  sample	  collection	  (time	  to	  presentation).	  Time	  to	  presentation,	  
indicated	  by	  a	  question	  mark	  in	  Figure	  6-­‐13A,	  is	  the	  first	  step	  in	  the	  pathway	  to	  notifying	  a	  
case	  of	  infection.	  However,	  the	  stage	  of	  syphilis	  determined	  at	  diagnosis	  can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  
rough	   measure	   of	   time	   to	   presentation.	   On	   average	   clinical	   signs	   of	   primary	   syphilis	  
develop	   2-­‐3	   weeks	   following	   exposure	   and	   clinical	   signs	   of	   secondary	   syphilis	   develop	  
approximately	  6	  weeks	  to	  3	  months	  after	  exposure	  18.	  Thus,	  time	  to	  presentation	  in	  cases	  
with	  secondary	  syphilis	  may	  be	  anywhere	  between	  3	  weeks	  and	  2	  months	  since	  onset	  of	  
primary	   syphilis,	  during	  which	   time	  cases	  are	  highly	   infectious.	  Similarly,	   cases	  enter	   into	  
early	   latent	   syphilis	   once	   secondary	   symptoms	   resolve,	  meaning	   that	   cases	   diagnosed	   at	  
early	   latent	  syphilis	  may	  be	  months	  from	  onset	  of	   infection.	  During	  the	  evaluation	  period	  
36%	  of	  notifications	  had	  primary	  stage,	  27%	  had	  secondary	  stage,	  and	  37%	  had	  early	  latent	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infectious	   syphilis.	   From	   these	   data	   it	   is	   apparent	   that	   over	   60%	   of	   notifications	   likely	  
presented	  more	   than	   3	  weeks	   after	   onset	   of	   infectious	   syphilis.	   In	   these	   cases	   the	   total	  
median	  time	  from	  onset	  to	  notification,	  would	  then	  be	  four	  weeks	  or	  more.	  To	  address	  the	  
issue	  of	  late	  presentation	  and	  subsequently	  improve	  the	  timeliness	  of	  the	  system,	  requires	  
cases	  to	  recognise	  their	  symptoms	  and	  seek	  health	  care	  earlier.	  This	  could	  be	  achieved	  by	  
concerted	  education	  campaigns	  to	  increase	  awareness	  of	  the	  disease	  and	  the	  need	  to	  seek	  
health	  care	  for	  treatment	  in	  the	  community.	  	  
6.2.2.7.2   Time	  to	  complete	  data	  
The	   complete	   data	   are	   necessary	   to	   achieve	  objective	   1	   and	   components	   of	   objective	   4,	  
but	   as	   objectives	   1	   and	   4	   are	   concerned	   with	   identifying	   and	   responding	   to	   disease	  
patterns	  over	  time,	  there	  is	  only	  moderate	  urgency	  for	  these	  data.	  
The	  median	  time	  to	  complete	  data	  collection	  for	  each	  case	  was	  14	  days	  with	  a	  range	  of	  1-­‐
239	   days	   (Figure	   6-­‐12	   A.).	   However,	   Figure	   6-­‐12C	   demonstrates	   that	   75%	   of	   cases	   had	  
complete	  data	  collected	  within	  22	  days	  and	  over	  90%	  within	  55	  days.	  	  Collecting	  complete	  
data	   requires	   the	   population	   health	   unit	   handling	   the	   case	   to	   collect	   the	   enhanced	   data	  
from	  the	  diagnosing	  physician	  and	  send	  the	  completed	  enhanced	  data	  form	  to	  the	  CDCD	  to	  
enter	   into	  WANIDD.	   The	  median	   time	   taken	   to	   initiate	   enhanced	   data	   collection	   after	   a	  
case	  was	  notified	  on	  WANIDD	  was	  0	  days	  (or	  the	  same	  day),	  and	  enhanced	  data	  collection	  
for	  over	  95%	  of	  cases	  was	  initiated	  within	  5	  days.	  Therefore,	   it	   is	  clear	  that	  the	  process	  is	  
initiated	  rapidly	  and	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  time	  taken	  to	  complete	  data	  collection	  is	   in	  attaining	  
the	   enhanced	   data	   itself.	   There	   are	   a	   number	   of	   factors	   that	   can	   make	   enhanced	   data	  
collection	   difficult	   and	   less	   timely:	   the	   data	   are	   sensitive	   and	   physicians	   may	   feel	  
uncomfortable	  interviewing	  cases;	   it	  can	  take	  time	  to	  develop	  the	  relationships	  necessary	  
for	   the	   case	   to	   feel	   comfortable	   sharing	   the	   information;	   and	   cases	   may	   be	   difficult	   to	  
contact.	   These	   barriers	   may	   be	   addressed	   with	   improved	   training	   of	   physicians	   in	  
interviewing	  cases	  on	  sensitive	  topics,	  or	  having	  a	  person	  experienced	  in	  case	  interviewing	  
on	   hand	   to	   collect	   the	   data.	   Overcoming	   these	   barriers	   may	   improve	   the	   timeliness	   of	  
collecting	  the	  enhanced	  data	  and	  subsequently	  completing	  data	  collection	  for	  every	  case.	  
Overall,	  whilst	   it	  may	  be	  possible	  to	   improve	  the	  timeliness	  of	  complete	  data	  collection,	   I	  
believe	   the	   current	   timeliness	   is	   adequate	   to	   fulfil	   objectives	   1	   and	   4	   of	   the	   surveillance	  
system.	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6.2.2.8   Representativeness	  
The	   representativeness	   of	   a	   surveillance	   system	   refers	   to	   how	   well	   it	   reflects	   the	  
characteristics	   of	   the	   affected	   population	   by	   person,	   place	   and	   time.	  We	   first	   compared	  
how	  well	   our	  data	   reflected	   the	  national	   trends	   for	   the	   two	  major	  high	   risk	  populations,	  
Aboriginal	   and	   non-­‐Aboriginal	   MSM,	   by	   comparing	   rates	   and	   absolute	   notifications	   in	  
national	   data	   to	   that	   of	  WA	   in	   2014.	   To	   ensure	   sufficient	   case	   numbers	   for	   meaningful	  
trends,	   we	   calculated	   and	   compared	   average	   rates	   between	   2011-­‐2015	   for	   Aboriginal	  
notifications.	   We	   then	   sought	   stakeholder	   opinions	   on	   the	   representativeness	   of	   the	  
system.	  
Figure	   6-­‐14	   shows	   the	   age-­‐standardised	   rate	   of	   infectious	   syphilis	   in	   the	   Aboriginal	   (and	  
Torres	   Strait	   Islander)	   population	   in	   Western	   Australia	   and	   nationally.	   Although	  
occasionally	  there	  were	  large	  differences	  in	  the	  rates	  between	  WA	  and	  nationally,	  overall	  
the	  trends	  were	  similar.	  The	  larger	  fluctuations	  in	  WA	  rates	  are	  likely	  a	  result	  of	  the	  small	  
case	  numbers.	   Figure	  6-­‐15	  demonstrates	   that	   the	  average	  notification	   rate	   for	   infectious	  
syphilis	  in	  Aboriginal	  people	  between	  2011-­‐2015	  by	  age	  group,	  was	  similar	  to	  the	  national	  
notification	  rates	  reported	  for	  2014.	  Although	  overall	  distribution	  of	  cases	  between	  males	  
and	   females	  were	   reasonably	   similar	   both	   in	  WA	   (F=	  58%)	   and	  nationally	   (F=48%),	   there	  
were	   slightly	   more	   women	   than	   males	   notified	   in	   WA.	   This	   may	   be	   a	   result	   of	   greater	  
health	  seeking	  behaviours	  and	  testing	  in	  women	  than	  men,	  as	  has	  been	  observed	  for	  this	  
population	  in	  other	  areas	  of	  Australia	  30,	  but	  cannot	  be	  assessed,	  as	  currently,	  testing	  data	  
for	  syphilis	  cannot	  be	  aggregated	  by	  Aboriginal	  status	   in	  WA.	  Average	  annual	  notification	  
rates	   were	   higher	   in	   Aboriginals	   with	   a	   rural	   residence	   as	   opposed	   to	   a	   metropolitan	  
residence	  (Figure	  6-­‐9),	  a	  trend	  that	  is	  consistent	  with	  what	  is	  found	  nationally	  6.	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Figure	  6-­‐14	  Age-­‐standardised	  rate	  of	  infectious	  syphilis	  notifications	  per	  100,000	  
population	  in	  WA	  and	  nationally	  (source:	  The	  Kirby	  Institute,	  Sexually	  Transmissible	  Infections,	  
2016	  31)	  
	  
	  
Figure	  6-­‐15	  Average	  notification	  rate	  in	  Aboriginal	  persons	  in	  WA	  (2011-­‐2015)	  and	  national	  
notification	  rate	  for	  2014,	  by	  age-­‐group	  (source:	  The	  Kirby	  Institute,	  Bloodborne	  viral	  and	  
sexually	  transmissible	  infections	  in	  Aboriginal	  and	  Torres	  Strait	  Islander	  People:	  Annual	  Surveillance	  
Report	  20155,	  and	  ABS	  Catalogue	  32380do001_2011)	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It	  was	  not	  possible	  to	  compare	  national	  rates	  of	  syphilis	   infection	  in	  MSM	  to	  those	  in	  WA	  
due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  appropriate	  and	  current	  denominator	  data	  (or	  estimates).	  The	  most	  recent	  
estimates	  found	  were	  reported	  in	  2008	  based	  on	  2007	  data	  32.	  In	  both	  WA	  and	  nationally	  
the	   majority	   (over	   90%)	   of	   non-­‐Aboriginal	   cases	   were	   male,	   which	   was	   consistent	   with	  
MSM	   exposure	   and	   accorded	   with	   the	   higher	   notification	   rates	   in	   males	   than	   females	  
(Figures	   6-­‐16	   and	   6-­‐17).	   	   Similar	   to	   what	   was	   found	   nationally	   in	   2014,	   the	   notification	  
rates	   in	  WA	  were	  highest	   in	   the	  30-­‐39	   year	   age	  group,	   followed	  by	   the	  20-­‐29	  and	  40-­‐49	  
year	  age	  groups	  (Figure	  6-­‐18).	  Although	  cases	  were	  asked	  the	  gender	  of	  the	  partner	  from	  
whom	   they	   acquired	   infection	  on	   the	  enhanced	   surveillance	   form,	   the	  question	  may	  not	  
always	   have	   been	   answered	   truthfully	   and	   therefore	   the	   number	   of	  MSM	   cases	  may	   be	  
under-­‐represented.	   Analysis	   of	   data	   demonstrated	   that	   of	   those	   cases	   that	   reported	  
acquiring	   infection	   from	  a	  partner	  of	   the	  opposite	  sex,	  over	  70%	  were	  male.	   	  These	  data	  
are	   not	   entirely	   consistent	  with	   heterosexual	   exposure	   and	   suggest	   that	   a	   proportion	   of	  
males	  are	  incorrectly	  reporting	  against	  this	  field.	  	  	  
	   	  
Figure	  6-­‐16	  Proportion	  of	  notifications	  of	  infectious	  syphilis	  in	  non-­‐Aboriginal	  people	  in	  WA	  
and	  nationally	  in	  2014,	  by	  gender	  (source:	  The	  Kirby	  Institute,	  Bloodborne	  viral	  and	  sexually	  
transmissible	  infections	  in	  Aboriginal	  and	  Torres	  Strait	  Islander	  People:	  Annual	  report	  2015	  5)	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Figure	  6-­‐17	  Notifications	  of	  infectious	  syphilis	  per	  100,000	  non-­‐Aboriginal	  population	  in	  
WA	  and	  nationally	  in	  2014,	  by	  gender	  (source:	  The	  Kirby	  Institute,	  Bloodbourne	  viral	  and	  sexually	  
transmissible	  infections	  in	  Aboriginal	  and	  Torres	  Strait	  Islander	  People:	  Annual	  Surveillance	  Report	  
20155,	  ABS	  Catalogues	  32380do001_2011;	  32220a9)	  
	  
	  
Figure	  6-­‐18	  Notifications	  per	  100,000	  population	  in	  non-­‐Aboriginal	  persons	  in	  WA	  and	  
nationally	  in	  2014,	  by	  age-­‐group	  (source:	  The	  Kirby	  Institute,	  Bloodbourne	  viral	  and	  sexually	  
transmissible	  infections	  in	  Aboriginal	  and	  Torres	  Strait	  Islander	  People:	  Annual	  Surveillance	  Report	  
20155,	  ABS	  Catalogues	  32380do001_2011;	  32220a9)	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Overall,	  consultation	  with	  stakeholders	  indicated	  that	  the	  representativeness	  of	  the	  system	  
was	   moderate	   to	   good.	   In	   the	   survey	   50%	   (4/8)	   of	   participants	   indicated	   that	   the	  
representativeness	   of	   the	   system	  was	  moderate	   and	   the	   remainder	   reported	   that	   it	  was	  
good	   or	   excellent.	   These	   data	   were	   supported	   by	   the	   responses	   of	   two	   public	   health	  
physicians	   who	   also	   thought	   the	   representativeness	   was	   moderate	   (1/2)	   or	   good	   (1/2).	  
Additionally,	   we	   specifically	   asked	   sexual	   health	   specialist	   physicians	   to	   review	   data	  
described	   in	   the	   state	  annual	  and	  quarterly	   reports	  and	   in	   their	  experience,	   feedback	  on	  
the	   adequacy	   with	   which	   these	   reports	   described	   infectious	   syphilis	   over	   time,	   and	   the	  
distribution	   within	   the	   population	   by	   place	   and	   person.	   Two	   of	   three	   sexual	   specialist	  
physicians	   responded.	   Both	   strongly	   agreed	   that	   the	   reports	   adequately	   described	  
infectious	  syphilis	  over	  time,	  whereas	  for	  describing	  the	  distribution	  by	  place	  and	  person,	  
one	   strongly	   agreed	   and	   the	   other	   only	   agreed.	   Although	   the	   system	   performed	  
moderately	   to	   well	   with	   respect	   to	   representativeness	   there	   were	   areas	   of	   concern	  
highlighted	  in	  both	  the	  survey	  and	  during	  interviews.	  
There	  was	  concern	   that	   the	   system	  may	  not	  be	  adequately	   capturing	  men	  who	  have	  sex	  
with	   women	   and	   men,	   yet	   identify	   as	   heterosexual	   rather	   than	   bisexual.	   Stakeholders	  
reported	  that	   in	  their	  experience	  they	  are	  seeing	  more	  male	  cases	   in	  heterosexual	   (often	  
marital)	  relationships,	  who	  also	  have	  sex	  with	  men.	  The	  concern	  is	  that	  these	  cases	  are	  less	  
likely	  to	  receive	  the	  messaging	  targeted	  at	  MSM	  around	  STI	  risk,	  the	  need	  for	  testing,	  and	  
safe	   sex,	   and	  may	   increase	   the	   risk	   of	   infection	   in	   pregnant	   women	   possibly	   leading	   to	  
cases	   of	   congenital	   syphilis.	   Currently,	   ISSWA	   does	   not	   capture	   information	   on	   bisexual	  
behaviour	   well;	   information	   that	   is	   needed	   to	   better	   understand	   the	   trends	   in	   this	  
population	  and	  how	  to	  deliver	  public	  health	  action	  to	  reduce	  transmission	  risk.	  
Stakeholders	  also	  described	  changing	  trends	  in	  how	  people	  are	  ‘shopping	  for’	  or	  accessing	  
sex.	   Increasingly,	   people	   are	   using	   smart	   phone	   applications	   or	   Apps	   to	   meet	   sexual	  
partners,	   yet	   the	   surveillance	   system	   does	   not	   capture	   this	   information.	   Understanding	  
how	  people	  access	  sex	  is	   important	  not	  only	  to	  help	  identify	  outbreaks,	  but	  also	  to	  direct	  
and	  inform	  prevention	  efforts,	  such	  as	  which	  platforms	  to	  use	  for	  safe	  sex	  messaging.	  
Infectious	  syphilis	  surveillance	  in	  WA	  is	  able	  to	  describe	  high	  risk	  populations,	  and	  data	  are	  
consistent	   with	   that	   reported	   nationally.	   Overall,	   stakeholders	   believe	   that	   the	  
representativeness	  of	  the	  system	  is	  moderate	  to	  good,	  and	  could	  be	  improved	  with	  better	  
collection	  of	  data	  on	  bisexual	  behaviour	  and	  the	  methods	  with	  which	  cases	  are	  ‘shopping	  
for	  sex’.	  	  
	   255	  
6.2.2.9   Acceptability	  
The	   infectious	   syphilis	   surveillance	   system	   has	   high	   acceptability	   given	   that	   syphilis	   is	   a	  
notifiable	   disease	   and	   under	   the	   1911	   Health	   Act	   of	   Western	   Australia	   7	   medical	  
practitioners,	  nurses	  and	  laboratories	  have	  the	  legal	  obligation	  to	  report	  any	  diagnoses	  of	  
syphilis	  to	  the	  Western	  Australian	  Department	  of	  Health.	  This	  was	  supported	  by	  the	  results	  
of	   stakeholder	   consultations	   where	   infectious	   syphilis	   surveillance	   was	   considered	  
extremely	   important	   and	   acceptability	   was	   rated	   highly.	   Nevertheless,	   acceptability	   will	  
benefit	   by	   addressing	   some	   of	   the	   issues	   highlighted	   in	   previous	   sections	   such	   as	   data	  
dissemination	   and	   provision	   of	   electronic	   reporting	   forms	   that	   can	   be	   filled	   out	   and	  
submitted	  online.	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7   Conclusions	  and	  recommendations	  
	  
The	   aim	   of	   this	   evaluation	  was	   to	   determine	   how	  well	   infectious	   syphilis	   surveillance	   in	  
Western	  Australia	   (ISSWA)	  met	   its	  objectives	  and	  performed	  against	  evaluable	  attributes.	  
Although	  there	  are	  no	  official	  objectives	  documented	  for	  ISSWA,	  the	  evaluation	  established	  
that	   the	  objectives	  proposed	  for	  syphilis	  surveillance	   in	   the	  CDNA	  National	  Guidelines	   for	  
Public	  Health	  Units:	  Syphilis	  were	  appropriate	  for	  infectious	  syphilis	  surveillance	  in	  WA,	  and	  
therefore,	  we	  assessed	  the	  surveillance	  system	  against	  these	  objectives.	  Officially	  adopting	  
these	  objectives	  for	  ISSWA	  would	  allow	  the	  system	  to	  move	  forward	  with	  clear	  direction	  in	  
the	  future.	  
Overall,	   ISSWA	   performed	   adequately	   against	   three	   of	   the	   four	   objectives,	   however,	  
recommendations	  for	  improvement	  were	  identified	  and	  are	  discussed	  below.	  
Objective	   1.	   Provide	   baseline	   data	   to	   enable	   detection	   of	   changes	   in	   disease	   trends	  
including	  evaluation	  of	  intervention	  strategies.	  
The	   system	   successfully	   provides	   baseline	   data	   that	   can	   differentiate	   the	   epidemiology	  
between	   the	   two	   high	   risk	   groups,	   Aboriginal	   and	  MSM,	   and	   detect	   changes	   in	   disease	  
trends	  over	  time.	  However,	  the	  changing	  ways	  that	  people	  are	  shopping	  for	  sex	  with	  dating	  
applications	   or	  Apps,	   are	   not	   captured	   in	   the	   system	   through	  enhanced	   surveillance	   and	  
therefore,	   cannot	   be	   monitored.	   Additionally,	   when	   data	   are	   analysed	   by	   public	   health	  
providers	  for	  their	  region,	  there	  is	  difficulty	  interpreting	  local	  trends	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  access	  
to	  overall	   testing	  numbers.	  Addressing	  these	   limitations	  will	  enhance	  the	  performance	  of	  
the	  system	  against	  Objective	  1.	  	  	  	  
Recommendations	  
1.   Collect	  data	  on	  how	  cases	  are	  ‘shopping’	  for	  sex,	  eg.	  use	  of	  Apps	  
2.   Systematically	  provide	  testing	  data	  to	  health	  regions	  to	  facilitate	  interpretation	  of	  
notification	  data	  
	  
Objective	   2.	   Enable	   timely	   detection	   and	   identification	   of	   cases	   of	   infectious	   syphilis	   to	  
facilitate	  rapid	  response	  to	  the	  management	  of	  cases	  and	  their	  contacts	  
The	   operation	   of	   the	   system	   enables	   timely	   identification	   of	   cases	   to	   population	   health	  
units	   which	   facilitates	   public	   health	   follow-­‐up,	   however,	   the	   need	   to	   manually	   collect	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laboratory	  results	  and	  additional	  information	  to	  establish	  infection	  stage	  or	  case	  status	  (eg.	  
treatment	  history	  and	  prior	  infection	  history)	  affects	  the	  timeliness	  and	  acceptability	  of	  the	  
system	  and	  impacted	  on	  its	  performance	  against	  this	  objective.	  The	  ability	  of	  the	  system	  to	  
facilitate	  rapid	  responses	  to	  the	  management	  of	  contacts	  was	  less	  certain	  and	  it	  was	  noted	  
that	  a	  syphilis	  register	  had	  been	  found	  useful	  in	  other	  states	  for	  this	  purpose.	  Additionally,	  
there	  was	   concern	   that	  a	   lack	  of	   knowledge	  existed	  of	   the	   recommendation	   to	   test	  AND	  
presumptively	  treat	  sexual	  contacts	  of	  cases.	  This	  concern	  may	  be	  addressed	  by	  including	  a	  
question	   on	   the	   enhanced	   surveillance	   form	   about	   the	   method	   of	   contact	   notification,	  
along	   with	   a	   note	   that	   highlights	   the	   recommendation	   for	   testing	   and	   presumptive	  
treatment	  of	  contacts.	  
Recommendations:	  
3.   Organise	  automatic	  electronic	  upload	  of	  laboratory	  results	  (eg.	  serology	  titres)	  to	  
WANIDD	  
4.   Collect	  treatment	  information	  for	  cases	  
5.   Explore	  the	  utility	  of	  a	  syphilis	  register	  either	  statewide	  or	  restricted	  to	  the	  non-­‐
metropolitan	  regions	  
6.   Collect	  data	  in	  the	  enhanced	  notification	  form	  on	  how	  contacts	  are	  notified	  	  
7.   Include	  a	  note	  reminding	  of	  the	  recommendation	  for	  testing	  AND	  presumptive	  
treatment	  for	  sexual	  contacts	  of	  cases	  
Objective	   3.	   Enable	   timely	   detection	   of	   clusters	   and	   outbreaks	   to	   facilitate	   early	  
intervention	  to	  control	  transmission	  
The	   system	   has	   the	   capacity	   to	   detect	   and	   facilitate	   responses	   to	   outbreaks	   in	   a	   timely	  
manner,	   and	   has	   done	   so	   successfully	   on	   two	   occasions	   in	   the	   last	   two	   years.	   However,	  
addressing	   the	   data	   dissemination	   issues	   highlighted	   above	   would	   further	   enhance	   the	  
ability	  of	  the	  system	  to	  meet	  objective	  3.	  
The	   system	  did	   not	   perform	  as	  well	   against	   the	  Objective	   4,	   to	   inform	   the	   prevention	   of	  
congenital	   syphilis.	   Although	   infectious	   syphilis	   surveillance	   itself	   helps	   to	   decrease	   the	  
prevalence	  of	  infectious	  syphilis	  and	  thereby	  indirectly	  protects	  against	  congenital	  syphilis,	  
additional	  data	  could	  be	  collected	  to	  help	  inform	  prevention,	  such	  as	  pregnancy	  status	  of	  
female	  cases,	  treatment	  of	  cases,	  and	  linking	  codes	  that	  allow	  data	  from	  congenital	  cases	  
stored	   in	   the	   congenital	   syphilis	   surveillance	   system,	   to	   be	   linked	  with	   the	   data	   of	   their	  
mother	  stored	  in	  the	  infectious	  syphilis	  surveillance	  system.	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Recommendations:	  
8.   Collect	  pregnancy	  status	  of	  any	  female	  cases	  
	  
9.   Create	  a	  linking	  key	  to	  link	  any	  cases	  of	  congenital	  syphilis	  with	  their	  mother	  
	  
10.  Collect	   treatment	   information	   for	   the	   mother	   to	   ensure	   it	   is	   appropriate	   for	   a	  
pregnant	  case	  
	  
An	   integral	   part	   of	   any	   surveillance	   system	   is	   dissemination	   of	   data	   from	   the	   system	   for	  
public	  health	  action.	  There	  was	  some	  feeling	  amongst	  stakeholders	  that	  data	  dissemination	  
from	  ISSWA	  was	  not	  adequate.	  Investigation	  of	  the	  system	  revealed	  that	  data	  are	  provided	  
through	   multiple	   mediums,	   however,	   many	   stakeholders	   were	   unaware	   of	   these	   data	  
sources.	   It	   appears	   that	  a	   lack	  of	  awareness	  of	  where	   to	   find	   the	  data	  may	  be	   the	   issue,	  
rather	   than	  data	  not	  being	  available.	  Advertising	  and	  providing	  easy	  access	   to	   these	  data	  
sources,	   particularly	   the	   HealthyWA	   real-­‐time	   (online)	   site	   with	   a	   break-­‐down	   by	   health	  
regions,	  would	  rectify	  the	  situation.	  
Recommendations:	  
11.  Advertise	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  HealthyWA	  real-­‐time	  online	  data	  site	  
	  
12.   Improve	  accessibility	  to	  the	  real-­‐time	  data	  on	  the	  HealthyWA	  site	  	  
	  
13.   Include	  break-­‐down	  of	  real-­‐time	  data	  on	  HealthyWA	  online	  site	  by	  health	  region	  
	  
On	  the	  whole,	  the	  infectious	  syphilis	  surveillance	  system	  was	  found	  to	  be	  useful.	  Data	  from	  
the	  system	  were	  able	  to	  describe	  the	  epidemiology	  of	  infectious	  syphilis	  in	  WA,	  and	  were	  
used	  in	  many	  applications.	  The	  system	  was	  also	  found	  to	  be	  stable,	  simple,	  acceptable	  and	  
sensitive.	  However,	   the	   evaluation	   identified	   areas	   for	   improvement	   in	   data	   quality,	   and	  
representativeness.	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Data	  quality	  	  
Overall,	   the	   data	   quality	   of	   the	   infectious	   syphilis	   surveillance	   system	   was	   high.	   Data	  
completeness	  was	  very	  good,	  but	  could	  be	  improved	  with	  the	  addition	  of	  a	  field	  to	  report	  
the	   date	   the	   enhanced	   form	   was	   received,	   a	   second	   option	   for	   assigning	   an	   outbreak	  
number,	  and	  modification	   to	   the	  Date	  of	  Onset	  Field	  so	   that	   it	   is	  not	  associated	  with	   the	  
mode	  of	  presentation.	  Clear	  parameters	  need	  to	  be	  established	  for	  assigning	  both	  primary	  
and	   secondary	   outbreak	   numbers,	   which	   would	   allow	   more	   accurate	   monitoring	   of	  
outbreaks.	   I	   also	   identified	   that	   electronic	   versions	   of	   both	   the	   core	   and	   enhanced	  
surveillance	   forms	   that	   can	   be	   filled	   out	   and	   submitted	   online	   would	   decrease	   the	  
possibility	  for	  transcription	  errors,	  and	  improve	  data	  accuracy	  and	  timeliness.	  
Recommendations	  
14.   Include	  a	  field	  on	  the	  enhanced	  reporting	  form	  to	  report	  when	  the	  form	  was	  sent	  
or	  actioned	  
	  
15.   Create	  an	  additional	  field	  in	  WANIDD	  to	  assign	  a	  secondary	  outbreak	  number	  to	  
cases	  	  
	  
16.   Establish	  clear	  guidelines	  for	  assigning	  primary	  and	  secondary	  outbreak	  numbers	  to	  
cases	  
	  
17.   Modify	  Date	  of	  onset	  on	  the	  enhanced	  form	  so	  that	  it	  is	  not	  associated	  with	  the	  
mode	  of	  presentation	  
	  
18.   Create	  electronic	  versions	  of	  both	  the	  core	  and	  enhanced	  data	  forms,	  that	  can	  be	  
filled	  out	  and	  submitted	  online	  
	  
	  
Representativeness	  
Infectious	  syphilis	  surveillance	  in	  WA	  is	  able	  to	  describe	  high	  risk	  populations,	  and	  the	  data	  
are	   consistent	   with	   that	   reported	   nationally.	   Overall,	   stakeholders	   believed	   that	   the	  
representativeness	   of	   the	   system	   was	   moderate	   to	   good,	   but	   could	   be	   improved	   with	  
better	   collection	   of	   data	   on	   bisexual	   behaviour	   and	   the	   methods	   with	   which	   cases	   are	  
‘shopping	  for	  sex’	  (as	  for	  objective	  1).	  	  
Recommendations	  
19.   Collect	  data	  on	  sexual	  behaviour	  (particularly	  bisexuality)	  
	  
20.   Collect	  data	  on	  how	  cases	  are	  ‘shopping’	  for	  sex,	  eg.	  use	  of	  Apps	  (see	  Objective	  1)	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In	   conclusion,	   I	   evaluated	   the	   performance	   of	   ISSWA	   against	   the	   four	   objectives	   for	  
infectious	  syphilis	   surveillance	  outlined	   in	   the	  CDNA	  National	  Guidelines	   for	  Public	  Health	  
Units:	  Syphilis	  20	  and	  against	  the	  attributes	  of	  a	  public	  health	  surveillance	  system	  detailed	  in	  
the	   CDC	  Updated	   Guidelines	   for	   Evaluating	   Public	   Health	   Surveillance	   Systems8.	   Overall,	  
ISSWA	  performed	  well,	  however,	  areas	  for	  improvement	  were	  identified	  and	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
these	   findings,	   the	   evaluation	   provides	   a	   number	   of	   recommendations	   which	   aim	   to	  
address	   these	   areas	   (outlined	   above	   and	   summarised	   in	   Table	   7-­‐1).	   An	   example	   of	   how	  
relevant	   modifications	   could	   be	   incorporated	   into	   the	   enhanced	   surveillance	   form	   are	  
provided	  in	  Appendix	  9-­‐8.	  I	  believe	  that	  adoption	  of	  these	  recommendations	  will	  enhance	  
the	   performance	   of	   ISSWA,	   and	   ensure	   that	   it	   continues	   to	   function	   efficiently	   and	  
effectively	  with	  respect	  to	  its	  objectives.	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Table	  7-­‐1	  	  Summary	  of	  recommendations	  for	  the	  Infectious	  Syphilis	  Surveillance	  System	  in	  
Western	  Australia	  
Objective/Attribute/	  
Topic	  
Recommendation	   Priority	  
Objective	  1	   1.   Systematically	  and	  frequently	  provide	  testing	  
data	  to	  population	  health	  regions	  to	  facilitate	  
interpretation	  of	  notification	  data	  
2.   Collect	  data	  on	  how	  cases	  are	  ‘shopping’	  for	  sex,	  
eg.	  use	  of	  Apps	  
***	  
	  
	  
***	  
	  
Objective	  2	   3.   Organise	  automatic	  electronic	  upload	  of	  
laboratory	  results	  (eg.	  serology	  titres)	  to	  WANIDD	  
4.   Explore	  the	  utility	  of	  a	  syphilis	  register	  either	  
statewide	  or	  restricted	  to	  the	  non-­‐metropolitan	  
regions	  
5.   Collect	  treatment	  information	  for	  cases	  
6.   Collect	  data	  in	  enhanced	  notification	  form	  on	  
how	  contacts	  are	  notified	  	  
7.   Include	  a	  note	  reminding	  of	  testing	  and	  
TREATMENT	  for	  sexual	  contacts	  of	  cases	  
***	  
	  
*	  
	  
**	  
***	  
	  
*	  
Objective	  3	   As	  for	  data	  dissemination	  below	  	   	  
Objective	  4	   8.   Collect	  pregnancy	  status	  of	  any	  female	  cases	  
9.   Create	  a	  linking	  key	  to	  link	  any	  cases	  of	  congenital	  
syphilis	  with	  their	  mother	  
10.  Collect	  treatment	  information	  of	  mother	  
***	  
*	  
	  
**	  
Data	  Dissemination	   11.  Advertise	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  HealthyWA	  real-­‐
time	  online	  data	  site	  
12.   Improve	  accessibility	  to	  the	  real-­‐time	  data	  on	  the	  
HealthyWA	  site	  	  
13.   Include	  break-­‐down	  of	  real-­‐time	  data	  on	  
HealthyWA	  online	  site	  by	  health	  region	  
***	  
	  
*	  
	  
***	  
Data	  quality	   14.  Create	  an	  additional	  field	  in	  WANIDD	  to	  assign	  a	  
secondary	  outbreak	  number	  to	  cases	  	  
15.  Establish	  clear	  guidelines	  for	  assigning	  primary	  
and	  secondary	  outbreak	  numbers	  to	  cases	  
16.   Include	  a	  field	  on	  the	  enhanced	  reporting	  form	  to	  
report	  when	  the	  form	  was	  sent	  or	  actioned	  
17.  Create	  electronic	  versions	  of	  both	  the	  core	  and	  
enhanced	  data	  forms,	  that	  can	  be	  filled	  out	  and	  
submitted	  online	  
18.  Modify	  Date	  of	  onset	  on	  enhanced	  form	  so	  that	  it	  
is	  not	  associated	  with	  mode	  of	  presentation	  
***	  
	  
***	  
	  
**	  
	  
***	  
	  
	  
*	  
Representativeness	   19.  Collect	  data	  on	  sexual	  behaviour	  (particularly	  
bisexuality)	  
20.  Collect	  data	  on	  how	  cases	  are	  ‘shopping’	  for	  sex,	  
eg.	  use	  of	  Apps	  (as	  for	  Objective	  1)	  
***	  
	  
***	  
*:	  Low	  priority	  and/or	  difficult	  to	  implement:	  **:	  moderate	  priority	  and/or	  moderately	  
difficult	  to	  implement;	  ***:	  high	  priority	  and/or	  easy	  to	  implement	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Appendix	  9-­‐2	  Core	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  form	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Appendix	  9-­‐4	  Flow	  of	  information	  through	  the	  infectious	  syphilis	  surveillance	  system	  in	  WA	  
–	  North	  and	  South	  Metropolitan	  Health	  Regions	  
	  	  	  
1.   Person	  with	  syphilis	  visits	  a	  primary	  health	  care	  provider	  (sexual	  health	  clinic,	  general	  practice	  etc)	  or	  is	  
sampled	  as	  part	  of	  a	  screening	  program	  
2.   Samples	  are	  sent	  to	  the	  laboratory	  for	  analysis	  
3.   Positive	  laboratory	  results	  are	  notified	  directly	  to	  WANIDD	  and	  the	  submitting	  doctor	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Negative	  laboratory	  results	  are	  notified	  to	  the	  submitting	  doctor	  and	  case	  is	  discarded	  from	  the	  
surveillance	  system	  
4.   The	  CDCD	  are	  notified	  of	  the	  case	  by	  the	  doctor	  and	  enter	  details	  into	  WANIDD	  
5.   WANIDD	  -­‐	  sends	  de-­‐identified	  data	  to	  the	  national	  notifiable	  diseases	  surveillance	  system	  (NNDSS)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐	  	  notifies	  local	  population	  health	  unit	  of	  the	  notification	  
6.   The	  appropriate	  population	  	  health	  unit	  is	  notified	  of	  the	  case	  either	  through	  WANIDD	  	  or	  directly	  from	  
the	  CDCD	  
7.   The	  appropriate	  population	  health	  unit	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  -­‐	  contacts	  the	  diagnosing	  doctor	  to	  collect	  enhanced	  case	  data	  and	  uploads	  data	  to	  WANIDD	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  -­‐	  	  offers	  support	  to	  doctor	  for	  contact	  tracing	  
8.   Contacts	  of	  the	  original	  case	  identified	  through	  contact	  tracing	  visit	  a	  primary	  health	  care	  provider	  for	  
sampling	  
9.   CDCD	  epidemiologists	  extract	  and	  summarise	  data	  on	  a	  weekly,	  annual	  and	  quarterly	  basis	  
10.   Reports	  are	  disseminated	  to	  stakeholders	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Appendix	  9-­‐5	  Flow	  of	  information	  through	  the	  infectious	  syphilis	  surveillance	  system	  in	  WA	  
-­‐	  Kimberley	  Health	  Region	  
	  
	  
	  
1.   Person	  with	  syphilis	  visits	  a	  primary	  health	  care	  provider	  (sexual	  health	  clinic,	  general	  practice	  etc)	  or	  is	  
sampled	  as	  part	  of	  a	  screening	  program	  
2.   Samples	  are	  sent	  to	  the	  laboratory	  for	  analysis	  
3.   Positive	  laboratory	  results	  are	  notified	  directly	  to	  WANIDD,	  the	  submitting	  doctor	  and	  the	  Kimberley	  
Population	  Health	  Unit	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Negative	  laboratory	  results	  are	  notified	  to	  the	  submitting	  doctor	  and	  case	  is	  discarded	  from	  the	  
surveillance	  system	  
4.   WANIDD	  -­‐	  sends	  de-­‐identified	  data	  to	  the	  national	  notifiable	  diseases	  surveillance	  system	  (NNDSS)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐	  	  notifies	  local	  population	  health	  unit	  of	  the	  notification	  
5.   The	  Kimberley	  population	  health	  unit	  is	  additionally	  notified	  of	  the	  case	  through	  WANIDD	  or	  directly	  
from	  the	  diagnosing	  	  doctor	  	  
6.   The	  appropriate	  population	  health	  unit	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  -­‐	  contacts	  the	  diagnosing	  doctor	  to	  collect	  enhanced	  case	  data	  and	  uploads	  data	  to	  WANIDD	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  -­‐	  	  offers	  support	  to	  doctor	  for	  contact	  tracing	  
7.   Contacts	  of	  the	  original	  case	  identified	  through	  contact	  tracing	  visit	  a	  primary	  health	  care	  provider	  for	  
sampling	  
8.   CDCD	  epidemiologists	  extract	  and	  summarise	  data	  on	  an	  annual	  and	  quarterly	  basis	  
9.   Reports	  are	  disseminated	  to	  stakeholders	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Appendix	  9-­‐6	  Infectious	  Syphilis	  Case	  Definition	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Appendix	  9-­‐7	  	  Time	  to	  notification	  by	  health	  region	  
Health	  region	   Time	  to	  notification	  Median	  (days)	   Interquartile	  range	  (days)	  
South	  Metropolitan	   7	   5.0-­‐11.0	  
North	  Metropolitan	   7	   6.0-­‐10.5	  
Wheatbelt	   9	   5.0-­‐13.0	  
Goldfields	   13.5	   5.0-­‐24.5	  
Kimberley	   8	   6.0-­‐12.0	  
Midwest	   8.5	   7.5-­‐10.0	  
South	  West	   15	   15.0-­‐15.0	  
Pilbara	   9.5	   7.5-­‐13.0	  
Great	  Southern	   -­‐   (no	  notifications	  in	  analysis	  period)	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Appendix	  9-­‐8	  	  Enhanced	  notification	  form	  with	  example	  modifications	  to	  address	  
recommendations	  suggested	  in	  Section	  7	  
	  
*Example	  modifications	  are	  in	  green	  text.	  Superscript	  number	  next	  to	  each	  modification	  relates	  back	  to	  the	  
number	  of	  the	  recommendation	  it	  addresses	  in	  Table	  5-­‐1	  
	  
	  
Infectious+syphilis+enhanced+surveillance+form++Date+actioned/sent16 DOH+ID:++2015?
Name:+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++Sex:++++Male+++++++++++++++++++++++++++Female
DOB:+++++/+++++/+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Pregnant?)))))))))Yes+++++++++++No+8
P/code:
1.#Why#did#the#patient#present#to#you?
Symptomatic###
Routine#Screen########Sexual#Health
Antenatal
Pap#smear
Named#as#a#contact#(ie.#asymptomatic)
Other#(specify)
3.#What#was#the#sex#of#the#partner#from#who
syphilis#infection#was#acquired?
Person(s)#of#opposite#sex
Person(s)#of#same#sex
Person(s)#of#either#sex
Unknown
No#sexual#exposure
4.#What#was#the#apparent#mode#of#transmission?
Vaginal
Anal
Oral
Unknown
Other#(specify)
5.#From#whom#was#the#infection#most#likely#acquired?
Casual#partner
Regular#partner
Sex#worker
Client#(i.e patient#is#a#sex#worker)
Unknown
Other#(specify)
6.#Where/how#did#your#patient#meet#the#partner#from#
whom#syphilis#was#acquired?
Brothel
Beat#eg.#public#toilet
Internet#or#App 2 &#20
(specifiy – e.g Grindr)
Sex#on#premises#venue/sauna
Other#(specify)
None#of#the#above/unknown
8.#Patient’s#country#of#birth?
Australia
Other#(specify)
Unknown
9.#Language#mostly#spoken#at#home?
English#only
Other#(specify)
Unknown
10.#Patient’s#ethnicity?
Aboriginal/#Torres#Strait#Islander
Other#(specify)
Unknown
11.#Stage#of#disease#at#diagnosis?
Primary#i.e.#Chancre
Secondary#eg.#rash,#other#systemic#signs#&#sympt
Please2specify
Early#latent#(no#signs#or#symptoms)
12.#Date#of#onset#of#symptoms?#____/____/_______18
7.#Where#was#the#infection#most#probably#acquired?
Western#Australia
Interstate#(specify)
Overseas#(specify)
Unknown
13.#Treatment?#5 &#10
Date#treatment#initiated##____/____/_________
Benzathine penicillin#(IMI)#1.8g,#one#dose
Benzathine penicillin#(IMI)#1.8g,#three#doses################
Procaine#penicillin#(IM)#1.5g##daily#for#10#days
Other
Please#specify
14.#Type#of#clinical#facility#where#the#diagnosis#was#
made?
Public#hospital
Private#hospital
Sexual#health#clinic
Family#planning#clinic
Aboriginal#medical#service
General#practice
Prison/detention#centre
Public#health/community#health#
(includes#remote#areas)
Other#(specify)#
___________________________________________####################_________/____________/________________
Doctor/nurse’s#name#and#signature#######################################################Date##########################
Thank&you&for&completing&this&form.
15.#Who#will/or#has#notified#contacts#of#the#case#that#
they#need#to#be#tested#AND#presumptively#treated?
Diagnosing#physician
Population#health#unit
Case
2.#Who#does#the#patient#have#sex#with?#19
Person(s)#of#the#opposite#sex
Persons(s)#of#the#same#sex
Person(s)#of#either#sex
(6#&#7)
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Appendix	  A:	  Teaching	  experience	  during	  the	  MAE	  
	  
	  
There	  are	  two	  official	  teaching	  requirements	  of	  the	  Master	  of	  Applied	  
Epidemiology:	  
1.   Teaching	  a	  session	  to	  first	  year	  MAE	  students	  
2.   Lessons	  from	  the	  field	  
	  
Teaching	  a	  session	  to	  first	  year	  MAE	  students	  
I	  performed	  the	  teaching	  session	  for	  first	  year	  MAE	  students	  as	  a	  group	  of	  three.	  I	  
worked	  with	  two	  other	  MAE	  students	  on	  the	  project,	  Paul	  Dutton	  and	  Cecilia	  Xu.	  
We	  were	  given	  a	  40	  minute	  time	  slot	  and	  decided	  to	  cover	  the	  topic	  of	  study	  
design.	  During	  the	  first	  year	  of	  our	  MAE,	  Cecilia,	  Paul	  and	  I	  all	  had	  a	  similar	  
experience.	  We	  felt	  that	  although	  we	  had	  been	  taught	  study	  design	  during	  our	  MAE	  
course	  blocks,	  we	  were	  not	  confident	  ascribing	  or	  deciding	  upon	  study	  design	  in	  
real-­‐life	  situations	  where	  the	  situation	  does	  not	  always	  neatly	  fall	  into	  a	  particular	  
design.	  Our	  focus	  was	  to	  provide	  real-­‐life	  examples	  for	  the	  students	  from	  our	  own	  
experiences	  in	  the	  MAE	  and	  to	  make	  them	  think	  practically	  about	  what	  study	  
design	  they	  would	  use.	  	  
	  
We	  divided	  the	  session	  into	  four	  parts.	  The	  first	  gave	  background	  information	  on	  
study	  design.	  We	  covered	  the	  basic	  concepts	  and	  described	  real-­‐life	  studies	  that	  
illustrated	  some	  of	  the	  more	  difficult	  or	  confusing	  concepts.	  For	  instance,	  I	  
described	  a	  case-­‐control	  study	  I	  was	  performing	  to	  illustrate	  how	  although	  a	  case-­‐
control	  by	  definition	  collects	  retrospective	  data,	  the	  study	  itself	  can	  be	  prospective	  
in	  subject	  recruitment.	  Paul	  used	  an	  example	  to	  demonstrate	  why	  and	  when	  you	  
would	  calculate	  a	  relative	  risk	  although	  your	  study	  design	  is	  case-­‐control.	  Following	  
on	  from	  the	  first	  section,	  the	  second	  section	  was	  a	  quiz	  that	  consolidated	  the	  
information	  covered	  in	  question	  1.	  We	  provided	  the	  students	  with	  the	  basic	  details	  
of	  a	  published	  study	  including	  the	  background,	  the	  research	  question,	  and	  the	  
study	  group(s),	  and	  asked	  the	  students	  to	  determine	  what	  study	  design	  they	  
thought	  was	  used	  in	  the	  research.	  From	  our	  prior	  research	  into	  teaching	  methods	  
we	  had	  learned	  that	  asking	  students	  to	  use	  information	  they	  had	  learned,	  be	  that	  
by	  quiz,	  discussion	  or	  a	  small	  test,	  helped	  them	  to	  retain	  the	  information.	  
	  
In	  the	  third	  session,	  we	  exposed	  the	  students	  to	  study	  design	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  
responding	  to,	  and	  investigating,	  an	  outbreak	  in	  a	  case-­‐study	  type	  format.	  We	  
walked	  the	  students	  through	  a	  real-­‐life	  situation	  experienced	  by	  Cecilia	  in	  
responding	  to	  and	  investigating	  an	  outbreak	  of	  gastroenteritis,	  from	  first	  being	  
alerted	  to	  the	  outbreak,	  to	  generating	  the	  hypothesis,	  and	  finally	  testing	  the	  
hypothesis.	  The	  session	  was	  set	  up	  in	  such	  a	  way,	  that	  the	  students	  were	  
sequentially	  presented	  with	  information	  as	  it	  became	  available	  and	  made	  
suggestions	  about	  how	  the	  investigation	  should	  progress,	  after	  which	  we	  explained	  
to	  them	  what	  actually	  happened.	  We	  followed	  this	  session	  with	  a	  final	  quiz,	  again	  
to	  consolidate	  what	  they	  had	  learned.	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We	  asked	  the	  students	  to	  evaluate	  our	  teaching	  session	  at	  its	  end.	  We	  asked	  them	  
to	  score	  the	  session	  from	  1-­‐5	  (1	  =	  very	  poor,	  2=	  poor,	  3=neutral,	  4	  =good,	  5=	  
excellent)	  on	  six	  questions	  pertaining	  to	  the	  content	  of	  the	  session,	  the	  
presentation	  and	  delivery	  of	  the	  content	  by	  the	  instructors,	  the	  methods	  used	  to	  
deliver	  the	  content,	  whether	  they	  learned	  something	  new,	  the	  level	  of	  
engagement,	  and	  whether	  being	  asked	  questions	  and	  being	  quizzed	  helped	  with	  
the	  learning	  process.	  Our	  teaching	  session	  scored,	  on	  average,	  over	  4	  for	  every	  
question.	  Additional	  useful	  feedback	  included	  the	  possibility	  of	  splitting	  the	  class	  
into	  groups	  and	  allowing	  them	  to	  work	  through	  the	  quiz	  questions	  together	  and	  
then	  present	  to	  the	  class	  the	  rationale	  for	  the	  study	  they	  chose.	  The	  evaluation	  and	  
additional	  feedback	  provided	  useful	  information	  for	  how	  I	  could	  approach	  teaching	  
sessions	  in	  the	  future.	  
	  
Lessons	  from	  the	  field	  
During	  my	  MAE	  I	  performed	  secretariat	  duties	  for	  a	  large	  multijurisdictional	  
outbreak	  working	  group	  responding	  to	  an	  outbreak	  of	  infectious	  syphilis	  across	  
northern	  Australia.	  I	  was	  involved	  with	  the	  group	  from	  the	  time	  of	  its	  creation	  and	  
therefore,	  much	  of	  my	  secretariat	  work	  was	  in	  setting	  up	  the	  group	  and	  making	  
sure	  that	  it	  ran	  smoothly.	  I	  had	  no	  prior	  experience	  setting	  up	  and	  performing	  
secretariat	  duties	  for	  such	  a	  large	  group	  that	  involved	  people	  from	  a	  number	  of	  
jurisdictions.	  During	  this	  time,	  I	  also	  had	  no	  framework	  to	  follow	  and	  had	  to	  learn	  
‘on	  the	  fly’.	  I	  decided	  to	  create	  a	  lessons	  from	  the	  field	  that	  taught	  my	  colleagues	  
what	  was	  required,	  administratively,	  to	  run	  a	  large	  outbreak	  group.	  In	  effect,	  I	  
hoped	  to	  provide	  them	  with	  a	  map	  for	  how	  to	  go	  about	  this	  task	  if	  they	  ever	  found	  
themselves	  in	  the	  same	  situation,	  and	  how	  to	  avoid	  pitfalls.	  
	  
I	  ran	  the	  LFF	  as	  a	  case	  study	  and	  created	  a	  hypothetical	  multijurisdictional	  outbreak	  
that	  the	  students	  had	  to	  work	  through	  in	  their	  own	  time.	  We	  then	  met	  and	  worked	  
through	  the	  case	  study	  together.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  session	  I	  asked	  the	  students	  if	  
they	  had	  found	  the	  teaching	  exercises	  helpful,	  and	  whether	  they	  now	  felt	  
comfortable	  to	  set	  up	  and	  run	  a	  large	  multijurisdictional	  group	  if	  they	  were	  ever	  
asked.	  All	  students	  confirmed.	  
	  
I	  found	  the	  teaching	  exercises	  extremely	  useful.	  Firstly,	  I	  found	  that	  the	  act	  of	  
preparing	  a	  topic	  for	  teaching	  strongly	  consolidated	  my	  own	  understanding	  of	  the	  
topic.	  It	  was	  an	  extremely	  effective	  teaching	  exercise	  in	  itself.	  Secondly,	  I	  found	  
that,	  particularly	  in	  the	  LFF,	  the	  discussions	  with	  my	  peers	  (students)	  over	  the	  
questions	  highlighted	  different	  possible	  and	  correct	  answers,	  and	  other	  ways	  of	  
approaching	  problems.	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  teaching	  exercises	  were	  as	  much	  a	  
learning	  experience	  for	  me	  as	  for	  the	  students.	  
	  
Both	  the	  teaching	  powerpoint,	  and	  the	  LFF	  are	  provided	  below.	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Lessons from the field  
 
Managing a multijurisdictional outbreak team 
 
Johanna Dups 
 
Instructions 
This LFF takes you through a case study, based around the MAE student Sally. Information is 
provided as you go and tasks are outlined in boxes under the relevant sections. Additional 
information that you may find useful when completing this LFF accompany the document. 
Although, there are a number of tasks, the bulk of the learning will be derived from the 
group discussion that will following completion of the case study. 
 
Of the following documents, the first is required reading and the second is optional but will 
likely assist you with this LFF: 
1. The Syphilis SoNG for background information – you will likely find pages 27-38 
very useful 
2. Epidemiology of syphilis in Australia: moving toward elimination of infectious 
syphilis from remote Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities? 
 
 
Learning objectives 
By the end of this LFF you should be able to: 
 
• Understand the underlying elements necessary to successfully run an outbreak 
team that spans multiple jurisdictions 
 
• Understand the basic epidemiology and features of Treponema pallidum infection 
 
• Understand the components necessary in a ‘Terms of Reference’ 
 
• Develop a standardised template for reporting an outbreak situation 
 
• Develop and understand the importance a communication plan 
 
NOTE: although the information in this LFF is not real, it is loosely modelled off of a real 
life situation and should not be disclosed outside of this group. 
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Sally is an MAE student working for the Skane public health department in the small island 
country of Tweeden. Sally, who is rather excitable, has had a number of potential MAE 
projects fall through and is beginning to become…quite nervous. Twenty months is not a lot 
of time after all. One morning, the director of the Sexual Health and Blood Borne Virus 
group comes to Sally’s office. She explains to Sally that a number of cases of infectious 
syphilis have been notified in Skane in the last month. The number of cases is greater than 
expected in this area for that time period of time. This is a concern given that Skane has had 
no infectious syphilis notifications in the previous five years despite high testing rates. The 
director asks Sally to look into the situation and report back. 
 
Sally is aware that an infectious syphilis outbreak has affected the neighbouring state of 
Dedensen for the past year. The local public health units in Skane are remarkably efficient, 
and when Sally contacts them to get a little more information about these cases they are 
able to confirm that eight of the ten cases have had sexual contact with cases in Dedensen 
(epi-linked to the outbreak in Dedensen) and two cases are secondary transmission within 
Skane. It is now clear that the outbreak has crossed the border into Skane, and furthermore, 
local transmission is occurring. The local public health unit confirms that they are 
responding to the outbreak according to a series of National Guidelines from the Australian 
Department of Health (the Australian guidelines were so good, that Tweeden didn’t bother 
to write their own). Sally then contacts the CDC in Dedensen to update them of the cases in 
Skane. The CDC are already aware of these cases, and inform Sally, that two other 
neighbouring states have also detected increasing rates of syphilis, with links to their 
outbreak. Sally realises that this is actually a multijurisdictional outbreak. 
 
To complete the picture, Sally reviews the epidemiology of the outbreak cases and 
infectious syphilis in general, and reviews the reporting requirements in Skane (see flow 
diagram below). Treponema pallidum (the causative agent of syphilis) is endemic in 
Tweeden. Two populations experience the highest rates of infection, those of the MSM 
community, and Tweeden’s Indigenous community. Exploring the epidemiology of the 
outbreak, it becomes apparent that the rise in cases is occurring in the Indigenous 
community, cases are evenly distributed between males and females (indicative of 
heterosexual spread), and the predominant age group affected are those between 20-35 
years of age. Infectious syphilis is easily treated, however, infection of a pregnant mother 
can transmit to the developing embryo/foetus and lead to still births, miscarriages, and 
devastating conformational abnormalities at birth. This is called congenital syphilis. The 
major concern of an infectious syphilis outbreak is the increased risk for cases of congenital 
syphilis to occur. 
 
With all the information collected, Sally briefs her director, who then briefs the overarching 
communicable disease network for all of Tweden, CDNT. Local responses on the ground are 
appropriate, but with the cross-border nature of the outbreak, CDNT requests that a 
multijurisidictional group is formed to co-ordinate the response and share information. Sally 
volunteers to perform the secretariat duties. 
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Figure 1. Diagram documenting the flow of activities through the WA syphilis surveillance system. 
1. Person with syphilis visits a primary health care provider (sexual health clinic, general practice etc) or is sampled as 
part of a screening program 
2. Serum samples are sent to laboratories for analysis 
3. Positive laboratory results are notified directly to state communicable diseases branch and the submitting doctor 
Negative laboratory results are notified to the submitting doctor, case is discarded from the surveillance system 
4. Submitting doctor also notifies the state communicable diseases branch of syphilis case +/- initiating contact tracing 
5. The state communicable diseases branch  
               -  sends de-identified data to the national communicable diseases branch 
               -  notifies local public health unit of the notification 
6. Local public health unit contacts the submitting doctor 
                       – collects enhanced case details, sends to state communicable diseases branch 
                       -  offers support to doctor for contact tracing 
7. Contacts of the original case identified through contact tracing visit a primary health care provider for sampling 
8. Feedback and dissemination of information for public health action 
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A pilot meeting is held with all the members of the group to determine its purpose, and 
objectives, and to nut out a number of administrative aspects. The group agrees that its 
primary purposes are to: 
• Effectively control the current syphilis outbreak in Tweeden and, 
• Prevent congenital syphilis cases occurring as a result of the outbreak 
 
After this pilot meeting Sally is asked to prepare a Terms of Reference. 
“Sure” she replies, and then the request sinks in…… 
 
 
….when Sally is alone, she bolts for the computer and furiously begins to search…. 
Task 1. Who are the potential stakeholders in this outbreak?  
 
 
Task 2. List the people to include in the multijurisdictional group. 
 
 
	   301	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
 5 
• Terms of reference (TOR) 
• Example terms of reference 
• How to avoid exposure as an imposter epidemiologist 
• Terms of reference template 
……and comes to understand that the purpose of a terms of reference is to define the 
purpose and objectives of a group, and clearly describe how that group will function. 
 
 
The draft terms of reference are presented and discussed at the first full multi-jurisdictional 
meeting. One of the objectives agreed to in the terms of reference was to ‘facilitate data 
sharing between the states’. At the meeting, each state provided a syphilis ‘outbreak 
situation report’. Although each report was highly detailed they were in different formats, 
and as a result it was difficult to compare what was occurring in each state, or describe the 
Task 3. What information should Sally include in the terms of reference? 
 
 
Task 4. What might be the objectives of this group? 
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outbreak epidemiology as a whole. The group agreed to create a reporting template to 
standardise the reporting. 
 
 
Sally set about getting a template together and approached the States about her ideas…. 
 
 
 
and realised she would need to set up an advisory group for this job! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Task 4. Who would you seek advice from for making the template? 
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Task 5. The group decides to create a monthly reporting template that summarises the 
case situation to date (from beginning of outbreak to date), the situation in the last 
month, and the public health response activities in the last month. Can you create a rough 
template? 
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The reporting template is finalised and over the next few months a number of meetings are 
held. The information in the reports is of quite a sensitive nature and is therefore only 
available to members of the outbreak group. However, there are stakeholders which need 
to be kept abreast of the situation, and a duty to report the outbreak to the public. The 
group decides to produce a monthly report updating stakeholders of the situation and a 
separate public report to be published in the country’s communicable diseases journal. 
However, now there is a lot of communication – reports for the multijurisdictional group, 
updates for the stakeholders, papers for the public, and updates to CDNT – and before they 
can move forward Sally needs a clear outline of what information is confidential and needs 
restricted distribution, who is writing the different communication pieces, who are the 
target audience for each piece, and what processes they will go through before being 
released? – A communication plan is needed. 
 
The group decides to write a summary communication plan…. 
 
  
 
 
 
Most of the elements are now in place and Sally thinks about how useful it would have been 
to know this before she started, and that she may very well make an LFF of it to help her 
fellow students if they ever find themselves in a similar situation in the future. She then gets 
to thinking……. 
Task 6. What information should be captured in a communication plan for this purpose? (you 
can list these as though they were headings for a table that details the communication from 
the group). 
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Task 7. Would there be any differences in the response with a measles outbreak? 
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Case%control,studies,
versus,
Cohort,studies
What’s,the,difference?!?!
Learning,objectives
Give,the,students,the,ability,to:
• Characterise,and,identify,case,control,vs,
cohort,study
• understand,pros,and,cons,for,cohort,and,
case,control,study
• Determine,appropriate,study,designs,to,
investigate,outbreaks
2
Outline
• Introduction
• Quiz,1
• Case,study
• Quiz,2
3
Cross%sectional,,cohort,or,case,control
• Which,study
– Always,selects,cases,based,on,the,exposure?
– Always,selects,subjects,based,on,the,outcome?
– Cannot,assess,cause,and,effect?
– Is,good,for,looking,at,rare,diseases?
– Can,be,used,to,look,at,numerous,exposures?
– Is,good,for,rare,exposures?
– Is,generally,quick,and,cheap?
– Can,measure,multiple,different,outcomes?,
Types,of,studies
ANALYTICAL,STUDIES
Randomised
Uncontrolled,trials
Non%randomised
Experimental
Controlled,trials
Case%control
Cross%sectionalCohort,study
Observational
Cross%sectional,studies
• Cross%sectional,study,(prevalence,study),
– Looks,at,disease,and,exposure,at,one,point,in,time,,
therefore,cannot,assess,cause,and,effect,as,the,
temporal,relationship,cannot,be,determined.
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Cohort,studies
• Cohort,studies,% starts,with,the,exposure
– Can,be,retrospective,or,prospective
Cohort,studies
• Cohort,studies,% starts,with,the,exposure
– Can,be,retrospective,or,prospective
• Prospective,cohort,studies
– You,can,set,up,the,study,and,follow,the,cohort,
from,then,on
Cohort,studies
• Cohort,studies,– starts,with,the,exposure
– Can,be,retrospective,or,prospective
• Prospective,cohort,studies
– You,can,set,up,the,study,and,follow,the,cohort,
from,then,on
• Retrospective,cohort,studies
– You,can,select,a,cohort,and,see,what,happened,
to,get,them,to,this,point
Case%control,studies
• Case%control,studies,– starts,with,the,outcome,
– Are,always,retrospective
Case%control,studies
• Case%control,studies,– starts,with,the,outcome,
– Are,always,retrospective
Why?
Case%control,studies
• Case%control,studies,– starts,with,the,outcome,
– Are,always,retrospective
Why?
– Because,you,have,chosen,the,study,subjects,
according,to,the,outcome/disease,status,i.e.,
CASE,% if,they,have,the,
disease/condition/outcome,,or,CONTROL,–
do,not,have,the,disease/condition/outcome
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Outcome/Disease
Exposure/Risk3Factors
Investigation3
Starts
Direction3of3Study
Past FuturePresent
Investigation moves3
forward
First3cases3
occurred
Jo’s,Salmonella,Study
Outcome/Disease
Exposure/Risk3Factors
Investigation3
Starts
Direction3of3Study
Past FuturePresent
Investigation moves3
forward
First3cases3
occurred
New3cases3
occur
Jo’s,Salmonella,Study
Outcome/Disease
Exposure/Risk3Factors
Investigation3
Starts
Direction3of3Study
Past FuturePresent
Investigation moves3
forward
First3cases3
occurred
New3cases3
occur
New3cases3
occur
Jo’s,Salmonella,Study
Outcome/Disease
Exposure/Risk3Factors
Investigation3
Starts
Direction3of3Study
Past FuturePresent
First3cases3
occurred
New3cases3
occur
New3cases3
occur
New3cases3
occur
Jo’s,Salmonella,Study
Case%control,versus,cohort,studies
Cohort Case)control
Study,
characteristics
Start with,exposure,risk,factor
! follow,up,to,see,who,gets,disease
Start,with,disease,
! look,back,to,see,what,risk factors,
subjects,were,exposed,to
Measure Relative Risk,
(can,use,odds,ratio,but,RR,better)
Odds,Ratio
Strengths • Many,different,outcomes,can,be,
measured
• Good for,rare,exposures
• Can,measure,incidence,and,
prevalence
• Many,different exposures,can,be,
measured
• Good,for,rare,diseases
• Good,for,disease,with,long,
latency,periods
• Relatively,quick,and,cheap
Weaknesses • Not,good,for,rare,diseases
• Can,take,a,long,time,to,run!
expensive
• Bias,issues
% loss,to,follow,up
% misclassification/selection,bias
% healthy,worker,effect
• Not,good,for,rare,exposures
• Not,as,powerful,as,cohort,in,
determining causal,relationships
• Bias,issues
% recall
% selection
% observer
% sampling
Cohort,VS,case,control
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Cohort Case)control
Study,
characteristics
Start with,exposure,risk,factor
! follow,up,to,see,who,gets,disease
Start,with,disease,
! look,back,to,see,what,risk factors,
subjects,were,exposed,to
Measure Relative Risk,
(can,use,odds,ratio,but,RR,better)
Odds,Ratio
Strengths • Many,different,outcomes,can,be,
measured
• Good for,rare,exposures
• Can,measure,incidence,and,
prevalence
• Many,different exposures,can,be,
measured
• Good,for,rare,diseases
• Good,for,disease,with,long,
latency,periods
• Relatively,quick,and,cheap
Weaknesses • Not,good,for,rare,diseases
• Can,take,a,long,time,to,run!
expensive
• Bias,issues
% loss,to,follow,up
% misclassification/selection,bias
% healthy,worker,effect
• Not,good,for,rare,exposures
• Not,as,powerful,as,cohort,in,
determining causal,relationships
• Bias,issues
% recall
% selection
% observer
% sampling
Cohort,VS,case,control
Cohort Case)control
Study,
characteristics
Start with,exposure,risk,factor
! follow,up,to,see,who,gets,disease
Start,with,disease,
! look,back,to,see,what,risk factors,
subjects,were,exposed,to
Measure Relative Risk,
(can,use,odds,ratio,but,RR,better)
Odds,Ratio
Strengths • Many,different,outcomes,can,be,
measured
• Good for,rare,exposures
• Can,measure,incidence,and,
prevalence
• Many,different exposures,can,be,
measured
• Good,for,rare,diseases
• Good,for,disease,with,long,
latency,periods
• Relatively,quick,and,cheap
Weaknesses • Not,good,for,rare,diseases
• Can,take,a,long,time,to,run!
expensive
• Bias,issues
% loss,to,follow,up
% misclassification/selection,bias
% healthy,worker,effect
• Not,good,for,rare,exposures
• Not,as,powerful,as,cohort,in,
determining causal,relationships
• Bias,issues
% recall
% selection
% observer
% sampling
Cohort,VS,case,control
Whoa,– what?!?!
Paul’s,Salmonella,Study
21
Attendees:,
1418
Completed,questionnaire:
723
Sick:,
140
22
Paul’s,Salmonella,Study
Paul’s,Salmonella,Study
23
Attendees:,
1418
Completed,questionnaire:
723
Sick:,
140
What,study,would,you,use?
What,measurement,of,association,would,you,use?
Cohort Case)control
Study,
characteristics
Start with,exposure,risk,factor
! follow,up,to,see,who,gets,disease
Start,with,disease,
! look,back,to,see,what,risk factors,
subjects,were,exposed,to
Measure Relative Risk,
(can,use,odds,ratio,but,RR,better)
Odds,Ratio
Strengths • Many,different,outcomes,can,be,
measured
• Good for,rare,exposures
• Can,measure,incidence,and,
prevalence
• Many,different exposures,can,be,
measured
• Good,for,rare,diseases
• Good,for,disease,with,long,
latency,periods
• Relatively,quick,and,cheap
Weaknesses • Not,good,for,rare,diseases
• Can,take,a,long,time,to,run!
expensive
• Bias,issues
% loss,to,follow,up
% misclassification/selection,bias
% healthy,worker,effect
• Not,good,for,rare,exposures
• Not,as,powerful,as,cohort,in,
determining causal,relationships
• Bias,issues
% recall
% selection
% observer
% sampling
Cohort,VS,case,control
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Cohort Case)control
Study,
characteristics
Start with,exposure,risk,factor
! follow,up,to,see,who,gets,disease
Start,with,disease,
! look,back,to,see,what,risk factors,
subjects,were,exposed,to
Measure Relative Risk,
(can,use,odds,ratio,but,RR,better)
Odds,Ratio
Strengths • Many,different,outcomes,can,be,
measured
• Good for,rare,exposures
• Can,measure,incidence,and,
prevalence
• Many,different exposures,can,be,
measured
• Good,for,rare,diseases
• Good,for,disease,with,long,
latency,periods
• Relatively,quick,and,cheap
Weaknesses • Not,good,for,rare,diseases
• Can,take,a,long,time,to,run!
expensive
• Bias,issues
% loss,to,follow,up
% misclassification/selection,bias
% healthy,worker,effect
• Not,good,for,rare,exposures
• Not,as,powerful,as,cohort,in,
determining causal,relationships
• Bias,issues
% recall
% selection
% observer
% sampling
Cohort,VS,case,control
Cohort Case)control
Study,
characteristics
Start with,exposure,risk,factor
! follow,up,to,see,who,gets,disease
Start,with,disease,
! look,back,to,see,what,risk factors,
subjects,were,exposed,to
Measure Relative Risk,
(can,use,odds,ratio,but,RR,better)
Odds,Ratio
Strengths • Many,different,outcomes,can,be,
measured
• Good for,rare,exposures
• Can,measure,incidence,and,
prevalence
• Many,different exposures,can,be,
measured
• Good,for,rare,diseases
• Good,for,disease,with,long,
latency,periods
• Relatively,quick,and,cheap
Weaknesses • Not,good,for,rare,diseases
• Can,take,a,long,time,to,run!
expensive
• Bias,issues
% loss,to,follow,up
% misclassification/selection,bias
% healthy,worker,effect
• Not,good,for,rare,exposures
• Not,as,powerful,as,cohort,in,
determining causal,relationships
• Bias,issues
% recall
% selection
% observer
% sampling
Cohort,VS,case,control
Quiz,1
Cross%sectional,,cohort,or,case,control
• Which,study
– Always,selects,cases,based,on,the,exposure?
– Always,selects,subjects,based,on,the,outcome?
– Cannot,assess,cause,and,effect?
– Is,good,for,looking,at,rare,diseases?
– Can,be,used,to,look,at,numerous,exposures?
– Is,good,for,rare,exposures?
– Is,generally,quick,and,cheap?
– Can,measure,multiple,different,outcomes?,
Cohort,or,case%control
1. In,a,study,looking,at,risk,factors,for,Tularemia
infection,in,Sweden,,researchers,identified,and,
included,as,study,subjects,270,persons,notified,
with,Tularemia infection,over,a,four,month,period,
and,a,further,438,persons,without,a,notification,
for,Tularemia over,the,same,time,period.,This,
latter,group,of,study,subjects,were,randomly,
selected,from,the,Swedish,National,Population,
Register.,Is,this,a,cohort,or,case%control,design,to,
assess,risk,factors,for,Tularemia?
Eliasson et*al.*2002
Cohort,or,case%control
1. In,a,study,looking,at,risk,factors,for,Tularemia
infection,in,Sweden,,researchers,identified,and,
included,as,study,subjects,270,persons,notified,
with,Tularemia infection,over,a,four,month,period,
and,a,further,438,persons,without,a,notification,
for,Tularemia over,the,same,time,period.,This,
latter,group,of,study,subjects,were,randomly,
selected,from,the,Swedish,National,Population,
Register.,Is,this,a,cohort,or,case%control,design,to,
assess,risk,factors,for,Tularemia?
Eliasson et*al.*2002
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Cohort,or,case%control
2. An,outbreak,of,salmonellosis,was,identified,
at,a,high,school,graduation,party.,The,
investigating,team,interviewed,23,of,the,24,
graduation,party,attendees,and,collected,
information,on,potential,exposures.,All,cases,
were,later,confirmed,by,laboratory,analysis,
of,stool,samples,,and,data,analysed,to,
determine,associations,between,exposure,
and,salmonellosis.,Is,this,a,cohort,or,case%
control,design?
Cohort,or,case%control
2. An,outbreak,of,salmonellosis,was,identified,
at,a,high,school,graduation,party.,The,
investigating,team,interviewed,23,of,the,24,
graduation,party,attendees,and,collected,
information,on,potential,exposures.,All,cases,
were,later,confirmed,by,laboratory,analysis,
of,stool,samples,,and,data,analysed,to,
determine,associations,between,exposure,
and,salmonellosis.,Is,this,a,cohort,or,case%
control,design?
What,would,you,do?
3. An,increase,in,cryptosporidium,
notifications,was,detected,in,the,state,of,
Victoria,from,an,average,of,1,case/month,
to,23,cases/month.,An,MAE,student,was,
interested,to,determine,possible,risk,
factors,associated,with,infection,,to,
initiate,a,public,health,response.,What,
study,should,she,do,– case%control,or,
cohort?
33
What,would,you,do?
3. An,increase,in,cryptosporidium,
notifications,was,detected,in,the,state,of,
Victoria,from,an,average,of,1,case/month,
to,23,cases/month.,An,MAE,student,was,
interested,to,determine,possible,,,,,,,,,,,
risk,factors,associated,with,infection,,to,
initiate,a,public,health,response.,What,
study,should,she,do,– case%control,or,
cohort?
34
Exposure?
Population?
Cecilia’s,Clostridium*perfringens Study
Case,Study,– Scenario,1
Sunday,14,June,2015
36
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Case,Study,– Scenario,1
x,5,staff
37
Case,Study,– Scenario,1
x,5,staff
X 2,pubic
38
Case,Study,– Scenario 3
Function,
% held,on,Friday,12,June,from,16:30%21:00
% estimated,2000%3000,attendants
% food,was,provided,by,the,on%site,café
% staff,ate,together,when,function,concluded
39
Case,Study,– Scenario,2
Monday,15,June,2015% interviewing,cases
• Symptoms
– diarrhoea,,abdominal,cramps,,fever,,vomitingj
• Onset,time
– approx,12%15,hrs,post,exposure
• Duration
– 1%24,hours
40
Case,Study,% Epi Investigation
41
90,staff,
First,batch,of,
RSVP,members,
N=100
Case,Study,% Epi Investigation
42
90,staff,
First,batch,of,
RSVP,members,
N=100
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Case,Study,– Question
• What,study,would,you,choose,to,
investigate,this,outbreak?
• Why?
43
Case,Study,% What,we,did
• Cohort,study
– Staff,ate,function,food,at,the,venue,on,12,
June,(n=45)
• Case,control,study
– All,cases,found,in,both,public,and,staff,
members,(n=58)
44
Case,Study,% Epi Curve
Staff6cohort
Staff6and6Public6Case6
Control
45
Quiz,2,
Cohort,or,Case%control
On,Tuesday,July,14th 2015,,the,DHHS,was,alerted,by,Hospital,X,and,the,local,
council,of,gastrointestinal,illness,in,11,members,of,a,group,of,25,who,attended,
High,Tea,at,Hotel,L,on,Saturday,July,11th.,Five,cases,were,hospitalised and,one,
tested,positive,for,Salmonella.,
Preliminary,investigation,revealed,that,whilst,the,majority,of,cases,(450),attended,
Hotel,L,on,the,weekend,of,July,11th,,cases,also,attended,High,Tea,at,Hotel,L,
throughout,the,previous,week,from,July,6th,onward.,A,booking,list,subsequently,
obtained,from,Hotel,L,for,July,6th,% 12th,inclusive,revealed,that,1000,guests,had,
attended,High,Tea,during,this,period,,which,was,exceptionally,busy,on,account,of,
it,being,school,holidays.,The,booking,list,obtained,contained,the,name,and,
contact,telephone,number,of,the,individual,who,made,the,reservation,,as,well,as,
the,size,of,each,group.
You,decide,to,perform,an,analytic,study,to,determine,the,risk,factor,associated,
with,illness,and,implement,a,public,health,response.
What,study,would,you,do,– a,cohort,,or,a,case%control?
47
Cohort,or,Case%control
On,Tuesday,July,14th 2015,,the,DHHS,was,alerted,by,Hospital,X,and,the,local,
council,of,gastrointestinal,illness,in,11,members,of,a,group,of,25,who,attended,
High,Tea,at,Hotel,L,on,Saturday,July,11th.,Five,cases,were,hospitalised and,one,
tested,positive,for,Salmonella.,
Preliminary,investigation,revealed,that,whilst,the,majority,of,cases,(50/250,
guests),attended,Hotel,L,on,the,weekend,of,July,11th,,cases,also,attended,High,
Tea,at,Hotel,L,throughout,the,previous,week,from,July,6th,onward.,A,booking,list,
subsequently,obtained,from,Hotel,L,for,July,6th,% 12th,inclusive,revealed,that,
1000,guests,had,attended,High,Tea,during,this,period,,which,was,exceptionally,
busy,on,account,of,it,being,school,holidays.,The,booking,list,obtained,contained,
the,name,and,contact,telephone,number,of,the,individual,who,made,the,
reservation,,as,well,as,the,size,of,each,group.
You,decide,to,perform,an,analytic,study,to,determine,the,risk,factor,associated,
with,illnes and,implement,a,public,health,response.
What,study,would,you,do,– a,cohort,,or,a,case%control?
48
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Cohort,or,case%control
4. In,a,study,to,assess,the,association,between,
Azithromycin,levels,in,high,vaginal,specimens,
and,treatment,failure,for,Chlamydia,trachomatis,,
researchers,recruited,all,women,who,tested,
positive,for,genital,chlamydia,at,two,large,sexual,
health,centres,in,Australia.,Participants,were,
followed,up,for,,56,days,post,treatment,for,
evidence,of,treatment,failure,and,levels,of,
azithromycin,were,measured.,Is,this,a,cohort,or,
case%control,study,design?
Hocking,et,al.,2013
Cohort,or,case%control
4. In,a,study,to,assess,the,association,between,
Azithromycin,levels,in,high,vaginal,specimens,
and,treatment,failure,for,Chlamydia,trachomatis,,
researchers,recruited,all,women,who,tested,
positive,for,genital,chlamydia,at,two,large,sexual,
health,centres,in,Australia.,Participants,were,
followed,up,for,,56,days,post,treatment,for,
evidence,of,treatment,failure,and,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
levels,of,azithromycin,were,measured.,Is,this,a,
cohort,or,case%control,study,design?
Hocking,et,al.,2013
Defined,cohort
Outcome
Exposure/treatment
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Appendix	  B:	  Coursework	  
	  
Course	  Code	   Course	  Name	   Grade	  
POPH8917	   Public	  Health	  Surveillance	   HD	  
POPH8916	   Outbreak	  Investigation	   HD	  
POPH8915	   Methods	  in	  Applied	  Epidemiology	   HD	  
POPH8913	   Analysis	  of	  Public	  Health	  Data	   HD	  
POPH8914	   Issues	  in	  Applied	  Epidemiology	   Completed	  (Not	  graded)	  
	  
	  
